This short article considers the two primary legal frameworks that can operate to control decisions by a State, in this case the UK, to deploy troops to conflict or post-conflict zones—British constitutional law and international law, and how they have both been thrown into sharp relief by the continuing debate about the possible adoption by the House of Commons of a non-statutory war powers resolution.

After almost two years of uncertainty, the EU is now progressing towards the adoption of harmonized rules on the law applicable to divorce through the activation, for the very first time, of the enhanced cooperation mechanism.

The last two years have witnessed a flurry of diplomatic activity on climate change. In addition to the 16 weeks of scheduled inter-governmental negotiations under the auspices of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), meetings, many at a Ministerial level, were convened by the G-8, the Major Economies Forum, the UN Secretary General, and Denmark, the host of the 15th Conference of Parties (COP-15) to the FCCC. Notwithstanding regular and intense engagement at the highest-level many fundamental disagreements remained in the lead up to COP-15, including on the future (or lack thereof) of the Kyoto Protocol, the legal form and architecture of the future legal regime, and the nature and extent of differential treatment between developed and developing countries.

In a 6–3 opinion the United States Supreme Court held, in its first case involving the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction2, that a ne exeat3 order confers a right of custody for a left behind parent, entitling that parent to maintain an action under the Convention. The decision reverses a 5th Circuit opinion4 which followed the rationale of CrollvCroll.5Croll held that a parent with visitation rights, coupled with a ne exeat clause, possessed only part of the ‘bundle of rights’6 which comprise ‘rights of custody’, and that such limited rights were insufficient to compel a return remedy under the 1980 Convention. The Supreme Court's decision settles a conflict among the federal circuits on this issue.7 Following the Croll rationale were Fawcett v. McRoberts,8 and Gonzales v Gutierrez.9 The 11th Circuit, however, in Furnes v. Reeves,10 held that a ne exeat provision in a Norwegian custody agreement conferred a right which would satisfy the Convention's definition of ‘custody rights’.

What happens when a European State breaches its international obligations and then ceases to exist? Does its obligation to repair the harm caused by the breach devolve to a new state that occupies part of the territory of an old state? When will a new European State be held accountable for violations that took place before the entry into force of a human rights treaty? This comment examines the European Court of Human Rights' (hereinafter ‘the Court’ or ‘the ECtHR’) encounter with the law of state succession, specifically succession to treaty obligations and succession to responsibility for the wrongful acts of a predecessor state. In Bijelic v Montenegro and Serbia the Court held that Montenegro was to be automatically regarded as a party to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter ‘the Convention’), as well as Protocol No 1 thereto, from the date of its declaration of independence from the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (hereinafter ‘the State Union’), and that Montenegro alone could be held responsible for violations of these instruments occurring in the territory of the State Union that began before March 2004 (the date of ratification of the Convention and Protocol 1 by the State Union) but continuing through 2009. Bijelic is not the first time the Court has been called upon to decide a question of succession to treaty obligations or responsibility, but the judgment is noteworthy for the unique approach the Court adopted to deciding both of these issues. This comment will place the decision in the larger context of Court practice with respect to both of the implicated succession issues, identify the aspects the Trial Chamber's analysis that distinguish it from its predecessors and discuss the decision of the Court in light of general and emerging trends in international law. In the process, this comment will provide a uniquely thorough examination of ECtHR practice with respect to succession to responsibility and identify the trends, to the extent that such trends exist, that characterize the Court's approach to this area of law.

On 29 March 2010, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), sitting as a Grand Chamber, delivered its Judgment in the Medvedyev v France case, which involved the interdiction and the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction over a drug smuggling vessel on the high seas. The case was referred by both the applicants and the Respondent State to the Grand Chamber, following the Judgment of a Chamber of the Fifth Section of the Court, on 10 July 2008. The Grand Chamber accepted this referral and the public hearing took place on 6 May 2009. This decision is of considerable importance as one of the very few decisions of the Strasbourg Court which has touched upon issues pertaining to the law of the sea, let alone to interdiction of vessels on the high seas, and the only case to have found a violation of the Convention on the part of the interdicting State, namely France.