Council Regulation 1347/2000 (the ‘Brussels II Regulation’) marked the beginning of the ‘Europeanization’ of family law. This article analyses the development of EU family law policy over the last decade, with particular focus on the common law perspective. It is argued that the Brussels II Regulation and the ensuing EU family law measures have had (and will have) a significant negative impact in English and Irish law, clashing with internal legal policy and sitting uneasily alongside existing legal structures.

The global financial crisis has served to highlight serious weaknesses in global governance, revealing fault lines in the international financial architecture and its accompanying regulatory apparatus. Most glaringly, the spotlight has fallen on Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs)—key governance agencies in the pre-crisis domestic and international regulatory structures, and ones directly linked to the subprime mortgage debacle. The aim of this article is to provide a critical appraisal of CRAs as a mechanism of global governance in the light of their role in the subprime mortgage debacle and to evaluate the case for stricter regulation of CRAs. In this respect, special emphasis is placed on the recent EU attempt—by way of a new Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies—to bring rating agencies within the regulatory fold. It is argued that while the EU Regulation has serious implications for the operation of CRAs within the Community, the reform measure is potentially illustrative of a growing dissonance between EU and US responses to global governance issues more generally.

‘[Securitisation led to the belief among many that] poor quality assets … assembled as a portfolio … could somehow by alchemy be converted into something stronger than they were’.1

‘The crap had become cake.’2

‘In January 2008, there were 12 triple A-rated companies in the world. At the same time, there were 64,000 structured finance instruments, like CDO tranches, rated triple A.’3

For over 15 years, the reports of the EEA Agreement's imminent demise have proven to be greatly exaggerated. In this article it is argued that a great deal of the credit for this accomplishment is due to the EFTA Court. Through a distinctly dynamic approach to the Agreement, the EFTA Court has been able to convince an initially sceptical ECJ that the goal of extending the internal market to include the EFTA States is actually achievable. For the EFTA States, the consequence is a more ‘supranational’ EEA Agreement than originally conceived. Further, it is shown that the EFTA Court appears, in hard cases, to lean even further towards teleological (ie integrationist) interpretation than the ECJ. It is suggested that this may be due to to structural imbalances between the two EEA courts, the EFTA Court's desire to prove its independence from the EFTA States and its quest for recognition from the ECJ.

In most of Europe, expropriation must comply with the standards set under European human rights law. Article 1 of the First Protocol (‘P1-1’) to the European Convention on Human Rights declares that ‘every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.’ The European Court of Human Rights has stated that the right would be ‘largely illusory and ineffective’ if it did not guarantee full compensation in all but exceptional circumstances.1 It is quite clear, however, that this was not the belief of at least some of the States that had signed it when it came into force in 1954. P1-1 makes no reference to compensation. An interference must be lawful, and in the public or general interest, but there is nothing that expressly requires compensation. Nevertheless, the Court has declared that any interference with the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions must strike a ‘‘fair balance’ between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights’,2 and this means that expropriation without compensation that is reasonably related to the value of the property would normally violate the owner's rights under P1-1.3

The WTO Appellate Body has so far authorized public appeal hearings as the exception, not the rule: it is limited to those instances in which the main parties request it. Such authorization constitutes a very positive development for the WTO dispute settlement system, for it enhances the transparency of the system at its highest stage. Indeed, the Appellate Body is becoming a leading actor in the formation of international law1 owing to the fact that it is the most active international court of the world, the relevance of the issues it deals with and the fact that it is at the apex of a dispute settlement system with permanent and exclusive jurisdiction over 153 States. Nonetheless, it is not in tune with inter-state international adjudication where the trend concerning hearings is, for good reason, geared towards openness and transparency, not privacy, as the rule.

The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (‘the RTC’) is an attempt on the part of a group of Caribbean States to respond in a collective manner to the pressing challenges posed by the forces of globalization and liberalization. The RTC seeks, inter alia, to deepen regional economic integration through the establishment of a Caribbean Community (‘CARICOM’) including a CARICOM Single Market and Economy (‘CSME’). The States in question—Antigua & Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad & Tobago—are for the most part former British colonies that gained their independence in the 1960s and 1970s. The RTC signals yet another important step in the tortuous path taken by these Anglophone Caribbean States ‘to avoid the looming threat of marginalization’1 following the failure in 1962 of the West Indies Federation.2 Significantly, this latest step is being taken side by side with the non English speaking civil law States of Haiti and Suriname thereby adding a new and interesting dimension to the integration process.

Taxonomy, as a methodological tool introduced from natural science, brought the categorization of legal systems to comparative law.1 The term ‘legal family’2 is normally used as a metaphor, because it recognizes that within each grouping there are many variations. Each of the legal families is regarded as a combination of fundamental features of legal systems which have certain similarities. As an analytical device, taxonomy renders the comparison of different laws and legal institutions manageable by means of simplifying or abstracting the diverse and complicated realities of a myriad of legal systems. As a result, the concept of legal families acts as a support for legal borrowing and transplantation, as well as comprising an inevitable part of most comparative law works. Even where as few as two jurisdictions are involved, the categorization of legal families is still a useful tool for most comparative legal analysis. Assisted by the notion of legal families, comparativists can readily understand and explore an unfamiliar legal system.3 Normally, such scholars tend to accept the conventional or widely accepted categorization of a particular legal system as belonging to a certain legal family. However, without detailed scrutiny of the first-hand material, distortions may arise as a result of preconceptions held at the beginning of the comparative study.4

A rule of customary international law is binding upon all States. One controversial question is whether a State should be permitted not to be bound by such a rule in the event that it objected to it in the early stage of its formation and did so constantly thereafter. This is the theory of the ‘persistent objector’. Articles recently published about the theory focus on its specific application in different areas of international law, including international investment law,1 international humanitarian law2 and human rights law.3 The present article intends to examine the concept of persistent objector in general international law.4

As a precursor to the United Kingdom's ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2001, the respective Parliaments in the UK adopted two Acts to implement the obligations that treaty imposed on the UK, and to implement the international crimes, as defined in that treaty, into the law of the UK. When the International Criminal Court Act (ICC Act) was being debated in 2001, Baroness Scotland, speaking for the Government, explained that part of the raison d'etre of the Act was that the UK ought not to be seen as a safe haven for international criminals. However, in line with article 11 of the Rome Statute, the jurisdiction of UK courts over such offences, insofar as they were not already covered by the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 and the Genocide Act 1969 (the latter of which was repealed by the ICC Act) only applied prospectively.

The period since the last survey published in this journal has been marked by much activity, but also some frustration, in the area of EU environmental policy.1 The present survey comes as the EU nears the end of its Sixth Environmental Action Programme (EAP) setting out the EU's environmental policy directions from 2002 to 2012, where it identified four priority areas for this period: climate change; nature and biodiversity; environment and health; and natural resources and waste.2 While progress has been made in each of these fields, significant setbacks have also occurred and, in a number of important areas, the state of the EU environment continues to deteriorate.