Le marché oligopolistique pose le problème de la coexistence de concurrents qui maximent leurs profits respectifs en toute indépendance. En affirmant qu'il s'agit là d'un problème surdéterminé, Pareto conclut à l'impossibilité d'aucune solution. Il ne conçoit pas que l'offre décidée par un duopoleur A sur la base d'un calcul indépendant puisse être considérée également comme une réaction à l'offre d'un rival B. L'incompatibilité dont se soucie Pareto reste entière dans le système d'anticipations de Frisch. Dans ce système, on ne peut supposer données les anticipations du vendeur A, sans postuler que les offres du rival B se conforment à ces anticipations. Mais comment peut-on dire alors que ces mêmes offres ne dépendent que des anticipations de B? Pour résoudre ce problème, la théorie qui est esquissée dans cet article pose en principe que les anticipations d'un joueur ne sont pas indépendantes, ni des conditions qui font le cadre de la partie, ni de l'expérience accumulée par l'observation des coups antérieurs du rival. L'introduction de ce principe permet de présenter une solution unique et stable qui a par ailleurs l'avantage d'échapper à l'objection de Pareto. L'analyse qui suit traite surtout du duopole, considéré comme le cas le plus simple du problème général de l'oligopole.

There is so little agreement concerning theories of political ideology that it may be appropriate to devote some preliminary remarks to the main orientations of recent research. I shall then state the approach to political ideology which is adopted in this paper.

“Political ideology” has different meanings in the two principal fields of knowledge in which it is used: sociology and political theory. The ambiguity which results is the greater because neither of these disciplines has as yet integrated this notion into the main body of its operational concepts. If the Marxist school of thought be excepted, one may well state that the notion of political ideology plays only a secondary and marginal role as a tool of sociopolitical analysis.

Political theorists and philosophers generally view political ideologies as a part of the complex of forces which sustains the political structure or tends to its overthrow. For them, political ideologies are one of the means to power, or, as stated recently by Anthony Downs, of getting votes. This approach is adequate so far as it goes, but in my view it narrows the notion of political ideology to one of its most manifest functions in democracies. Furthermore, most such treatments of political ideology assimilate it to a pseudo-philosophy. When this pseudo-philosophy is considered good, it is said to uplift and educate the people; when it is considered bad, it is held to mystify and corrupt them.

When Graham Wallas published his Human Nature in Politics, just over fifty years ago, it was already becoming apparent that the machinery of representative democracy was not working as smoothly as its liberal creators had intended. The successful operation of its institutions, which implied the existence of a society of rational well-intentioned individuals, was being frustrated by oligarchic party structures, self-interested pressure groups, the apathy and ignorance of the mass of the population, and the power of irrational persuasion. As the gulf between the theory and the practice of democracy became more obvious, there resulted a disillusionment which led many to a complete rejection of the democratic thesis. It was this setting that led Ostrogorski, Michels, and others to prophesy the collapse of democratic political machinery.

But to prove that the institutions set up by men to achieve a certain ideal are inadequate for that purpose is not the same as to prove the worthlessness of the ideal. Such was the essence of Graham Wallas' thesis. The founders of democratic theory believed they had discovered the means for a fuller expression of human dignity and a more complete development of the individual's potential. An unfortunate over-emphasis on the role of reason in political activity, however, made impossible the realization of their ideal through the machinery they had established, especially the machinery for the election of representatives. Democracy, nevertheless, remained an ideal that might still be attainable if some adjustments were made to account for previously neglected facts about human nature.

It has been the custom of economists since the Mercantilists to assume the existence of a capitalistic labour market. It appears that this abstraction was adopted, not from ignorance of labour conditions–Malthus, who sponsored the bleakest model of a labour market, after all possessed exceptional knowledge of contemporary social conditions–but because it simplified the economists' main task, as they conceived it, of expounding how a capitalist economy works. The abstraction had the disadvantage, however, of diverting attention from how a capitalistic labour market might develop. This question, besides its historical and sociological interest, is relevant to the study of labour markets, and of “economic development.” Yet, in Canada, it has received only brief attention. This paper proposes a more detailed view of how our capitalistic labour market arose.

By a capitalistic market is meant one in which the actions of workers and employers are governed and linked by impersonal considerations of immediate pecuniary advantage. In this market, the employer is confident that workers will be available whenever he wants them; so he feels free to hire them on a short-term basis, and to dismiss them whenever there is a monetary advantage in doing so. Hence, the employer takes no responsibility for the workers' overhead costs: labour, to the employer, is a variable cost. From a broader viewpoint, the capitalistic labour market represents a pooling of the labour supplies and labour needs of many employers, so that all of them may benefit by economizing on labour reserves. Economy is possible because the labour requirements of employers collectively are less than those of employers individually, to the extent that short-term needs for labour dovetail, and to the extent that a worker can stand as a reserve to many employers. When the demand and supply conditions of labour are dependable enough to permit this pooling, the overhead costs of labour can be transferred from individual employers to the market, that is, to the workers themselves and to the community at large. The essential historical aspect of the capitalistic labour market, then, is the development of the supply and demand conditions that will support it. Two questions are especially critical: How are workers induced to flow into the labour market pool? And how are they prevented from flowing out again?

Practically the only public acknowledgment of the vast powers of the House and the protection which is afforded the House and its members by the tradition of centuries is contained in the statement of the Speaker at the beginning of every new Parliament. When the Speaker leads the members of a new House of Commons to the Senate he claims from the governor general on their behalf “all their undoubted rights and privileges, especially that they may have freedom of speech in their debates, access to your Excellency's person at all reasonable times, and that their proceedings may receive from your Excellency the most favourable consideration.” These are, of course, immediately granted by the governor general.

The privileges of Parliament so briefly referred to and so perfunctorily granted are of two types. Some, are personal to every member of the House and enable him to carry out his parliamentary responsibilities without interference; others are the additional privileges of the House as a body, breach of which is considered in law to be analogous to contempt of court.

The former enable a member to speak on any subject free of any fear of legal responsibility for anything he may say. He is free from arrest under civil process while the House is in session and for a reasonable time before and after the session. He is also exempt during the session from duty as a witness or as a juror. Threats against a member and attempts to bribe him are likewise considered as breaches of privilege.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Simon de Montfort would have enjoyed the clash that recently took place in the Federal Republic of Germany between the adherents of increased direct democracy and the proponents of a system of pure representative democracy. At stake was the crucial issue of atomic armament for the West German defence forces. Should the basic decision be made by the people through a referendum, or by their representatives in parliament? This constitutional and political question was referred to the Federal Constitutional Court, which reached a verdict of importance to the future of the Republic-and to political scientists.

This essay is designed to serve as a case study of a nation in the twentieth century in debate over the scope of direct democracy within a representative system. It also seeks to assess the rationale of transferring, on occasion, the power to make decisions in the realms of foreign and military policy from the executive and parliament to the people themselves. And finally it attempts to evaluate the interplay of political parties and interest groups, and the conflict over jurisdiction between the national government and the constituent Laender in the context of the proposed referendum.

A formal representation of Malthus' views on the short-run expansion and contraction of income and employment, as discussed in the Principles, has not, so far as I know, been published. Aside from any pedagogical usefulness inherent in the attempt made here to do this, it might also be worth while to examine the model with a view to its possible relevance for the contemporary scene.

Malthus' concern with effective demand produced a classification of the major categories of spending which has interesting implications for the advanced, mixed economies of our time.

It will be recalled that his flows of spending are set up somewhat as follows:

1. Consumption by the productive classes, consisting of

(a) spending for necessaries by labourers;

(b) spending for necessaries, conveniences, and luxuries by capitalists.

2. Investment spending (chiefly by capitalists), composed of

(a) circulating capital inputs, mainly necessaries contained in the wages fund;

(b) fixed capital inputs.

3. Spending by unproductive consumers, largely for conveniences, luxuries, and non-material personal services, that is, by

(a) private persons out of rentier incomes (e.g., rents and interest income on the public debt);

(b) government out of public funds raised through taxation or borrowing.

4. Foreign demand.

The index-number theorem is the theorem that, if two sets of price and quantity data on consumption are compared, the Laspeyres (base-weighted) index-number of the price or quantity of one collection as compared with the other will be greater than the Paasche index-number for the same comparison: the Laspeyres index will show a larger increase or a smaller decrease than the Paasche index, as the case may be. In symbols, the theorem is that

where p and q refer respectively to price and quantity, and the subscripts 0 and 1 to the base and the other collection of price and quantity data.

As developed by J. R. Hicks, the index-number theorem is presented as a deduction from, and an empirical test of, the “preference hypothesis” (that consumers choose according to a scale of preferences). But R. L. Marris has shown that the theorem is not necessarily contradicted by a change in tastes, so that it cannot be regarded as a test of the hypothesis of given preferences; rather, it is an inference from, and test of, the hypothesis that consumers' preferences are consistent. As such, it depends on an assumption, which must either be argued in general or proved in the particular case, about what consumption would have been had relative prices been the same in the two situations. The purpose of this paper is to explain the index-number theorem, and the assumptions on which it depends, by means of an application of the geometry of the familiar two-goods case.

In 1953 a new formula for dealing with the complicated racial problems of the settler communities was introduced into the African scene. This innovation—the doctrine of inter-racial partnership—was launched with the merger of the territories of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland into a federal state. In its brief life, government under the “partnership” banner can already claim several noteworthy reforms in this community of some 280,000 Europeans, 34,000 Asians and persons of mixed race, and more than 7,300,000 Africans. A new university has been established which opens its doors to members of all races. In Southern Rhodesia, the long-established legal bars to the ownership of urban property by Africans have been relaxed. In Northern Rhodesia, the first breach in the industrial colour bar has been made in the important copper fields. Further, serious discussion has been given to several proposals with more sweeping implications, for example the draft bill which would scrap segregation in the trade unions of Southern Rhodesia and proposals which would extend the franchise to substantial numbers of Africans.

The sheer size of the United States economy makes it vitally important to much of the rest of the world. Indeed cyclical and structural changes within it may have more profound effects on foreigners than on Americans. Foreigners are understandably concerned about their vulnerability, and it is clear that this problem has for some time been recognized by economists and policy-makers everywhere.

In particular, since the experiences of the 1930's, United States recessions have assumed the ominous role of an economic plague capable of rapidly and seriously debilitating productive activity in many countries. The principal cause of this debilitation is the curtailment of United States imports. Only if economic activity is maintained at reasonably high levels in the United States does this problem appear to be manageable. An optimistic view of the possibility of avoiding deep depression is widespread, and it is supported by the record of the past twelve years; but less severe or “normal” cyclical activity is something we must live with, and recessions of the magnitudes of those of 1948-9, 1953-4, and 1957-8 may be capable of sufficiently strong “side effects” on imports to cause serious difficulty in other countries. That this danger has been a principal theme of international economics in the post-war period is reflected in recent commentaries on its failure to materialize in 1957-8. The discovery that recession in the United States need not seriously depress imports is perhaps the most surprising feature of the 1957-8 downswing.

It is increasingly clear that inflation cannot be explained simply by reference to changes in aggregate demand. Some economists have tried to distinguish between different “types of inflation” and to conceive of variations in the price level as the consequence of a multifunctional process. Dean Edward Mason, going deeper than most, explains changes in the general price level by the interaction of the highly diverse market structures of which the modern economy is composed. This paper, building on Mason's foundation, will relate the movements of the price level (including the so-called cost-push and demand-pull types of inflation) to the general process of allocating resources in the context of an economy composed of very diverse forms of market organization.

It will be assumed that the economy consists of an oligopolistic sector and a competitive sector. Each market of the oligopolistic sector is served by large firms, each with a sufficient share of the given market to permit it to exercise, both as buyer and as seller, a significant influence on price and output. Price and the terms of sale are controlled as a matter of company policy, that is, are “administered.” It follows that, since price is administered, output and hence the influx of resources into the industry are similarly controlled.

To the observer who has experienced the transformation of Germany from imperial to republican regimes and the struggles for and against the establishment of democracy after the First World War, the most striking feature of the political scene in present-day West Germany–the Bundesrepublik–is the nearly complete absence of social or political mass movements. Whereas German society from 1918 to 1933 was virtually seething with political and social schemes, creeds, sects, and parties, post-Nazi Germany seems quiet and sober. The labour unions have become even less concerned with fundamental changes in the social order than they were in the days of the Weimar Republic. The youth movement seems dead. There is no mass movement of former Nazis or of neo-Fascists. Even the Communists are no longer a strong force.

Voting in all kinds of elections is very heavy, but organized membership in political parties is low. There seems to be a widespread reluctance among the older people to join any kind of organized political group or to commit themselves to any kind of “cause.” Most Germans, having burnt their fingers once or twice, seem to refrain from active participation in public life as much as possible. This does not mean that the channels through which a common will, a political consensus, is formed have ceased to function. Political parties, though fewer in number than in the Weimar era, do exist; trade unions and organizations of farmers, artisans, business men, and industrialists exert their influence along with numerous and varied “lobby” organizations (refugees and expellees, victims of nazism, veterans' organizations, war invalids' associations, and so on); and last though not least the Roman Catholic Church and the Evangelical (Protestant) churches raise their voices and take a stand on all important issues of public life. But none of these influential groups seems to aim at radical changes in the political or economic order. Nor is any large and powerful group opposed to the democratic system of government which was formed under the authority of the American, British, and French occupation regimes.