Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-cjp7w Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-23T10:42:45.133Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Direct and Representative Democracy in West Germany: The Atomic Armament Issue

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 November 2014

Gerard Braunthal
Gerard Braunthal*
Affiliation:
University of Massachusetts
Get access

Extract

Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Simon de Montfort would have enjoyed the clash that recently took place in the Federal Republic of Germany between the adherents of increased direct democracy and the proponents of a system of pure representative democracy. At stake was the crucial issue of atomic armament for the West German defence forces. Should the basic decision be made by the people through a referendum, or by their representatives in parliament? This constitutional and political question was referred to the Federal Constitutional Court, which reached a verdict of importance to the future of the Republic-and to political scientists.

This essay is designed to serve as a case study of a nation in the twentieth century in debate over the scope of direct democracy within a representative system. It also seeks to assess the rationale of transferring, on occasion, the power to make decisions in the realms of foreign and military policy from the executive and parliament to the people themselves. And finally it attempts to evaluate the interplay of political parties and interest groups, and the conflict over jurisdiction between the national government and the constituent Laender in the context of the proposed referendum.

Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science/Revue canadienne de economiques et science politique , Volume 25 , Issue 3 , August 1959 , pp. 313 - 323
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 1959

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Articles 73 to 76 in the Weimar Constitution. For commentaiies, see Anschütz, Gerhard, Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs vom 11. August 1919 (Berlin, 1930), 535 ff.Google Scholar; Mattern, Johannes, Principles of the Constitutional Jurisprudence of the German National Republic (Baltimore, 1928), 521 ff.Google Scholar

2 See: Friedrich, Carl J., Constitutional Government and Democracy (Boston, 1946), 554–8Google Scholar; Kaisenberg, Georg, Volksentscheid und Volksbegehren (Berlin, 1926)Google Scholar; Schmitt, Carl, Volksentscheid und Volksbegehren (Berlin, 1927)Google Scholar; Finer, Herman, The Theory and Practice of Modern Government (rev. ed., New York, 1949), 564 ff.Google Scholar

3 Rat, Parlamentarischer, Stenographischer Bericht, 3rd session, I, no. 3, 09 9, 1948, 43.Google Scholar

4 Ibid., Hauptausschuss, 22nd session, 263 ff.

5 Ibid., 9th session, I, no. 9, May 6, 1949, 184. The Communist proposal was defeated in the main committee by 11 to 7; the Centre proposals by 18 to 3, and by 12 to 3 with 6 abstentions. See also von Mangoldt, Hermann, Das Bonner Grundgesetz (Berlin, 1953), 136–7, 371–2.Google Scholar One constitutional authority of the Social Democratic party, Walter Menzel, disagreed with his party colleagues and urged a return to the Weimar precedents. Rat, Parlamentarischer, Stenographischer Bericht, 3rd session, I, no. 3, 09 9, 1948, 30.Google Scholar

6 A survey of public opinion in April, 1949, revealed that only 51 per cent of the people approved the creation of a West German state. Neumann, Erich P. and Noelle, Elisabeth, Antworten (Allensbach am Bodensee, 1955), 63 ff.Google Scholar

7 Spannungen und Kräfte im Westdeutschen Verfassungssystem (2nd ed., Stuttgart, 1958), 22.Google Scholar

8 Die repräsentative und die plebiszitäre Komponente im demokratischen Verfassungsstaat, no. 219/220, Recht und Staat (Tübingen, 1958).Google Scholar

9 “Volksbefragung über die Volksbefragung,” Die Zeit, 05 22, 1958.Google Scholar

10 Dirks, Walter, “Die Gefahr der Gleichschaltung,” Frankfurter Hefte, XIII, no. 6, 06, 1958, 371–91.Google Scholar

11 New York Times, March 27, 1958.

12 Das freie Wort (Free Democrat weekly), March 28, 1958.

13 See the author's “West German Trade Unions and Disarmament,” Political Science Quarterly, LXXIII, no. 1, 03, 1958, 82–99.Google Scholar

14 DGB Nachrichtendienst, March 28, 1958; Weft der Arbeit, April 4, 1958.

15 Schenke, Wolf, “Lahme Opposition,” Neue Politik, III, no. 14, 04 5, 1958, 3–4.Google Scholar

16 Trautmann, Walter, “Streik–kein politisches Kampfmittel,” Der Volkswirt, XII, no. 14, 04 5, 1958, 547–8.Google Scholar George Meany, President of the A.F.L.–C.I.O., is also reported to have disapproved of a strike in a talk with Erhard, Ludwig, Minister of Economics. Frankfurter Rundschau, 04 5, 1958.Google Scholar

17 The labour leaders in later weeks rejected demands for more action from several national unions, thus reversing their decision of March 28. They justified this reversal by citing the need to wait for the pending Court decision on the question of referenda. One suspects that all along they had not really wanted to take any action at all, but had agreed at the beginning of the controversy on some measures in order to curb the more “radical” national unions, and workers who remarked: “If life is threatened, should we then not go on the barricades instead of making resolutions?” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 06 4, 1958.Google Scholar

18 An EMNID poll taken in March, 1958, commissioned by the Social Democratic party, showed that 83 per cent were against atomic armament, 13 per cent for, and 4 per cent had no opinion. Vorwärts, March 21, 1958.

19 Deutscher Bundestag, 3. Wahlperiode, Druck 303. Article 38 of the Basic Law, and the Bund electoral law were to serve as legal bases for the referendum. According to article 38, Bundestag deputies “are representatives of the whole people, not bound by orders and instructions, and subject only to their conscience.”

20 Sternberger, Dolf, “Was für eine Verfassung haben wir denn?” Die Gegenwart, XIII, no. 8, 04 19, 1958, 231–4.Google Scholar

21 The Laender constitutions stipulate that in the initiative process 10 or 20 per cent of the eligible voters must submit petitions and a bill, generally excluding budgetary matters, to the Land government, which then submits it to the Landtag. If the bill receives approval there, it becomes law; but if it is not approved, it must receive the approval of a majority of the people in a referendum. The Land government and the Landtag also have the right to submit a proposal for a referendum direct to the people, thus omitting the initiative stage.

22 Article 68. Cf. Füsslein, Rudolf W., Deutsche Verfassungen: Grundgesetz und deutsche Landesverfassungen (Berlin, 1955), 50, 95 ff., 214–17Google Scholar, for textual provisions on the initiative and the referendum in the eight constitutions.

23 The Free Democratic party agreed, only because of its decentralized nature, to let each of its semi-autonomous Land organizations make this decision, even though headquarters opposed a national referendum.

24 “Volksbefragung: Kabinettstod gegen Atomtod,” Der Spiegel, XII, no. 16, 04 16, 1958, 15–18.Google Scholar

25 Ibid.

26 The text of the Court decrees is found in Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvF 3/58, 2 BvF 6/58, 30.Juli 1958 (Hamburg and Bremen); and 2 BvG 1/58, 30.Juli 1958 (Hesse).

27 Constitutional experts went so far as to speculate on what the Bund could do if the Court's decision were disobeyed by the Laender. Article 37, Basic Law, grants the federal executive the power to interfere in Land affairs if certain federal obligations are not complied with, but then only with the consent of the Bundesrat. That such consent could not easily be obtained from a body representing the Laender is apparent. Furthermore the Basic Law does not give the government power to declare a state of emergency, proclaim martial law, or provide for the maintenance of public order. In the autumn of 1958, Gerhard Schroeder, Minister of the Interior, urged that the Basic Law be amended to enable the government to cope with problems of that sort. Such an amendment would require the consent of two-thirds of both chambers, and therefore the support of the Social Democrats. But the Social Democrats and other critics cite article 48 of the Weimar Constitution (regarding emergency powers) and reply that they would lend their support only if the powers of the government were effectively circumscribed. In the absence of such an amendment, the Bund could take other drastic measures: it could cut its financial subventions to the Laender or empower commissioners to supervise Land officials or police forces. Der Spiegel, XII, no. 21, 05 21, 1958, 15–17 Google Scholar; New York Times, Nov. 6, 1958. Because the Court's decree on the Hesse case was accepted, these speculations remained academic. However, the concluding chapter on emergency powers in the Federal Republic has not yet been written.

28 News from Germany (published by the Social Democratic parly), XII, no. 10, 10, 1958, 4.Google Scholar