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Not feeling right about uncertainty monitoring

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2023

Ian R. Newman Open the ORCID record for Ian R. Newman [Opens in a new window]  and
Valerie A. Thompson
Ian R. Newman
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology and Health Studies, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada ian.newman@usask.ca; valerie.thompson@usask.ca
Valerie A. Thompson
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology and Health Studies, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada ian.newman@usask.ca; valerie.thompson@usask.ca
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Abstract

De Neys proposed a “switch” model to address what he argued to be lacuna in dual-process theory, in which he theorized about the processes that initiate and terminate analytic thinking. We will argue that the author neglected to acknowledge the abundant literature on metacognitive functions, specifically, the meta-reasoning framework developed by Ackerman and Thompson (2017), that addresses just those questions.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e133
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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