There is an old aphorism that fire is a good servant but a bad master. Something like this aphorism is frequently applied to the appropriate role of the bureaucracy in government. Because bureaucracy is often viewed as tainted with an ineradicable lust for power, it is alleged that, like fire, it needs constant control to prevent its erupting from beneficient servitude into dangerous and tyrannical mastery.

The folklore of constitutional theory relegates the bureaucracy to somewhat the same low but necessary estate as Plato does the appetitive element of the soul. In the conventional dichotomy between policy and administration, administration is the Aristotelian slave, properly an instrument of action for the will of another, capable of receiving the commands of reason but incapable of reasoning. The amoral concept of administrative neutrality is the natural complement of the concept of bureaucracy as instrument; for according to this view the seat of reason and conscience resides in the legislature, whatever grudging concession may be made to the claims of the political executive, and a major, if not the major, task of constitutionalism is the maintenance of the supremacy of the legislature over the bureaucracy. The latter's sole constitutional role is one of neutral docility to the wishes of the day's legislative majority.

The contested status of the science of politics has compelled its supporters to pursue their endeavor in an atmosphere of continual apology. The contemporary exponents of scientific aspirations in the realm of political phenomena remain on the defensive as they are confronted with the tenacious persistence of two focal problems: (1) Does the study of politics reveal the potentiality of a science, in view of the immense diversity of human behavior, which appears to be unpredictable and beyond control for the purpose of observation? (2) What would constitute the criteria of a science of politics, provided that the possibility of establishing such a discipline is conceded? In its essential features, this dual issue represents the current manifestation of a controversy which emerged in Utilitarian thought. The parties to the dispute were James Mill, Thomas Babington Macaulay (the only participant who cannot be identified with Utilitarianism), and John Stuart Mill. The respective arguments of the contestants were presented in James Mill's Essay on Government (1828), in Macaulay's article, Mill's Essay on Government (1829), and John Stuart Mill's A System of Logic (1843). Although these works have suffered no neglect in the history of political theory, the controversy which they reveal in their combined context has not commanded as much attention as its pertinence to contemporary problems merits.

The review is republishing below the findings and recommendations included in the Report recently prepared by the Special Committee on Service Voting of the American Political Science Association and presented to the President of the United States, who submitted it to Congress. The Committee was composed of the following members: Paul T. David, chairman, Robert Cutler, Samuel J. Eldersveld, Bertram M. Gross, Alexander Heard, Edward H. Litchfield, ex officio, Kathryn H. Stone, and William B. Prendergast, secretary.

In a letter of April 7, 1952, to Luther Gulick, President of the Association, President Truman expressed his appreciation for the work of the Committee and of the Association in the following words:

I wish to thank you, and the members of the Special Committee on Service Voting of the American Political Science Association, for the outstanding report on “Voting in the Armed Forces” which you sent me with your recent letter. This report more than fulfills my request to the American Political Science Association for an analysis of the progress made on soldier voting, and recommendations for steps to be taken to see that a maximum number of servicemen vote this year.