A valuable source of materials for the study of political behavior exists in the election returns that are lodged and compiled in the offices of state, county, and municipal authorities. An increasing number of studies have shown how fruitfully these materials can be used with a variety of types of correlations. The difficulties attendant upon anything like a complete collection of all of the electoral information for the entire country, however, have discouraged more extensive utilization of this valuable source of research data. The investigator who attempts to study political phenomena over a considerable area is now handicapped by having to devote much time and energy to the mere physical accumulation of statistical materials from a number of more or less adequate sources. The purpose of this note is primarily to show the present situation in regard to the collection and publication of election returns, and incidentally what can be obtained from each state. Secondarily, suggestions are offered regarding the urgent need for improvement in the situation and lines along which it may be sought.

The first session of the Seventy-seventh Congress witnessed much activity in both houses, resulting, however, mainly in appropriation measures and defense legislation. Most of the bills carried through to enactment were calculated to meet the expectations of the President as set forth in his annual message of January 6, 1941. In that message, the President assured Congress that the “future and the safety of our country and of our democracy are overwhelmingly involved in events far beyond our borders…. The immediate need,” he said, “is a swift and driving increase in our armament production.” Before the session came to a close, joint resolutions declaring war on Japan, Germany, and Italy were passed. Thus it was perhaps the most epoch-making and influential legislative year, for the future affairs of our people, of any since the “founding fathers” assembled in New York City on March 4, 1789, to start legislating under the new national constitution.

On the first of January, 1910, the total amount of life insurance in force in Canada, exculsive of that on the assessment plan, amounted to over 780 millions of dollars. Of this, all, excepting a little less than 68 millions of industrial insurance, represented what we may properly style as ordinary or old line business. The policies to the number of upwards of a million were distributed between 53 different companies of which 23 were Canadian, 16 American, and 14 British. The British companies carried risks amounting in the aggregate to less than 47 millions and they seemed to be, on the whole, inactive in the matter of securing new business. In 1909, 8 of the 14 British companies carrying risks in Canada wrote no new Canadian business at all. On the other hand, the American companies make a much better showing; the sum total of their policies was nearly 218 millions of dollars, of which approximately one-fifth represented industrial insurance. The rest of the business, amounting to over 515 millions, was carried by the Canadian companies themselves. From these figures, it is evident that the home companies are now strongly entrenched within their own field. A comparison of the present situation with that of thirty years ago would show that the risks of the Canadian companies have increased much more rapidly than have those of their American rivals. In 1879, the amount of the policies of each in force in Canada was less than thirty-four millions. In the noteworthy expansion of life insurance which has since taken place, a number of causes have combined to swell the aggregate business of the Canadian companies. Not the least important factor here to be considered is that of sentiment—a desire to develop Canada for the Canadians and to promote and foster home enterprises. Moreover, on the more popular forms of policies, the premium rates offered by the home companies have been, as a rule, lower than those of their neighbors across the border.

Due to the necessities of post-war reconstruction, and owing also in no small part to the deflation of public confidence in the, private-initiative-in-industry presumption, it seems clear that greater nationalization and municipalization will occur in those countries where such a development is not already well-advanced. Where, as a result of revolution and dictatorship, extensive economic services are already publicly owned and operated, the problems of public administration have become enormous and disconcerting. Satisfactory bureaucracies are not built in a decade.

“They asked me my party; I told them Republican. That's Sam Lit's party, ain't it?” The speaker was a small, dark-visaged young man. He had addressed his question to Mr. Lit's partner on the ward committee in the first ward. It was the night of registration day, and the young Italian had just registered. Not only were the genius of the Republican party, its traditional issues, and the great leaders from Abraham Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt to Herbert Hoover obliterated, or non-existent, to him, but the important local issues of the impending (1931) mayoralty and councilmanic campaigns as well. The one thing in the party process that mattered was the personality of Sam Lit, the ward committeeman. This potential voter is one of the thousands in America's third city that illustrate the general statement: “We cannot be much interested in, or moved by, the things we do not see. Of public affairs, each of us sees very little, and therefore they remain dull and unappetizing until somebody with the makings of an artist has translated them into a moving picture. …Being flesh and blood, we will not feed on words and names and grey theory.”

Looking at the post-war period, it seems obvious that the government of the United States will give more attention to foreign affairs than it has in any comparable period of American history. How can the machinery for conducting foreign relations best be organized to meet these increasing responsibilities?

The conduct of foreign relations in the modern world is no simple matter. Technical experts, intelligence systems, ability to negotiate, national political stability, a large and loyal staff of public servants—these are but some of the national requisites for effective participation in world affairs. The mobilization and organization of the best staff resources in the country, the negotiation of national policies, and then of international agreements, constitute a formidable task under any system of government.

The conduct of foreign relations is, of course, easiest in a completely authoritarian state. It is made immeasurably more difficult by any division of authority. In most non-authoritarian governments, some division of authority has been found desirable, even at the expense of occasional awkwardness of procedure, because thereby the dangers of usurpation of power are minimized. The United States has gone farther than any democratic country in dividing responsibility in foreign affairs. Not only is there the usual distinction between legislative and executive authority, but the independence of the two branches has been so far underlined that the achievement of over-all government policies (as distinct from legislative and executive policies) is extremely difficult unless the party relationships are just right between the two ends of Pennsylvania Avenue.