In October 1748 most Europeans were content that the war that had ravaged the continent for more than seven years was over. During this period Britain had been fighting three wars. The Anglo-Spanish War had been subsumed into the War of Austrian Succession, from which the Anglo-French War emerged as the most vital to Britain's survival as a Protestant power. They were inseparable in so far as the Anglo-French struggle and naval power linked them all.

The eventual British victory in that crucial struggle for maritime supremacy with France has provided the dominant perspective for historical interpretations of the events of 1739 to 1748. Looking back in the knowledge of that victory the navalist ideology and rhetoric that preceded the war and the contentions of the Patriot opposition throughout its course looked prescient when compared to the dominant Old Corps attachment to the continental campaign. From this perspective, the war appears to have been mismanaged and misdirected, wasting the true potential of British sea power. However, by looking closely at the political and diplomatic conditions of the time, a different picture emerges.

In 1739 Britain had confidently expected to make great and permanent changes to the commercial and colonial environment in the West Indies by the application of naval power. From the beginning it was understood that French intervention could alter the prospects of success dramatically, but it was a risk that had to be taken and, despite growing French activity, the ministry did not allow itself to be deflected from what it saw as the decisive expedition to the Caribbean. Fleury's behaviour and attitude suggested that he was not enthusiastic for war and rapid, dramatic success could enable the British to make peace from a position of strength before France intervened decisively in favour of Spain. When the Brest and Toulon squadrons were finally known to be steering for the West Indies in September 1740, the British ministry was forced to delay the expedition in order to reinforce the naval escort. For the next six months Britain's fate lay in the balance. If the French and Spanish squadrons joined in the West Indies, Vernon's squadron, the expedition and even Jamaica were under threat.