Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Dedication
- List of Illustrations
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 The Route to War, 1738–1739
- 2 Mobilisation and the Outbreak of War, June–October 1739
- 3 The Opening Moves, October 1739–January 1741
- 4 The Widening War and the Fall of Sir Robert Walpole, January 1741– February 1742
- 5 Shifting Focus, the Growth of the Continental Commitment, February–December 1742
- 6 The Continental Commitment, January 1743–February 1744
- 7 War with France and Crisis of the Worms Policy, February 1744–December 1744
- 8 Rebellion and the End of the Flanders Policy, January–December 1745
- 9 Europe and America: the Critical Balance, January–December 1746
- 10 Newcastle’s War: the End in Europe and America, January 1747–October 1748
- 11 Conclusion: The Peace and British Naval Power
- Bibliography
- Index
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Dedication
- List of Illustrations
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 The Route to War, 1738–1739
- 2 Mobilisation and the Outbreak of War, June–October 1739
- 3 The Opening Moves, October 1739–January 1741
- 4 The Widening War and the Fall of Sir Robert Walpole, January 1741– February 1742
- 5 Shifting Focus, the Growth of the Continental Commitment, February–December 1742
- 6 The Continental Commitment, January 1743–February 1744
- 7 War with France and Crisis of the Worms Policy, February 1744–December 1744
- 8 Rebellion and the End of the Flanders Policy, January–December 1745
- 9 Europe and America: the Critical Balance, January–December 1746
- 10 Newcastle’s War: the End in Europe and America, January 1747–October 1748
- 11 Conclusion: The Peace and British Naval Power
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
This is not a comprehensive history of the war that lasted from 1739 to 1748, nor even of Britain's part in it. It is not able to encapsulate all the recent work on the emergence of ‘Britishness’ in the eighteenth century. Nor is it possible to build in an analysis of the war and its impact on parliamentary activity. It is an attempt to show how the naval war was intimately tied up with domestic political and European diplomatic imperatives. It tries to explain how and why decisions were made, and how the wider war shaped the naval contribution, as much as vice versa. The Seven Years War was not a re-run of the war of 1739-1748 with more competent personnel. The situation was very different from the 1750s, but the lessons that were learned between 1739 and 1748 were powerful and provided the basis for the emergence of Britain's global naval supremacy just over a decade later.
This work has been many years in gestation. I am extremely grateful to Dr Philip Woodfine, whose advice and comments have much improved this work. The opinions and any errors that remain are entirely my own. I owe a debt to archivists at local and national archives for making it a pleasure to visit and work with their collections. The quotations from the Cumberland Papers held in the Royal Library at Windsor are from the microfilms made of these papers in 1968 and are used by gracious permission of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II. The papers of the Fourth Duke of Bedford are used by kind permission of the Duke of Bedford and the Trustees of the Bedford Estates. The Chatsworth Manuscripts, from the Devonshire Collection, are used by kind permission of the Duke of Devonshire and the Chatsworth House Trust.
This work has its origins in an interest in eighteenth century British politics and administration, encouraged by Professor Aubrey Newman of the University of Leicester. That interest was further honed by the friendly criticism of Graham Gibbs of Birkbeck College, who patiently guided me through a doctoral dissertation almost twenty five years ago.
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- Information
- The Emergence of Britain's Global Naval SupremacyThe War of 1739-1748, pp. ix - xPublisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2010