Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Dedication
- List of Illustrations
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 The Route to War, 1738–1739
- 2 Mobilisation and the Outbreak of War, June–October 1739
- 3 The Opening Moves, October 1739–January 1741
- 4 The Widening War and the Fall of Sir Robert Walpole, January 1741– February 1742
- 5 Shifting Focus, the Growth of the Continental Commitment, February–December 1742
- 6 The Continental Commitment, January 1743–February 1744
- 7 War with France and Crisis of the Worms Policy, February 1744–December 1744
- 8 Rebellion and the End of the Flanders Policy, January–December 1745
- 9 Europe and America: the Critical Balance, January–December 1746
- 10 Newcastle’s War: the End in Europe and America, January 1747–October 1748
- 11 Conclusion: The Peace and British Naval Power
- Bibliography
- Index
4 - The Widening War and the Fall of Sir Robert Walpole, January 1741– February 1742
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 March 2023
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Dedication
- List of Illustrations
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 The Route to War, 1738–1739
- 2 Mobilisation and the Outbreak of War, June–October 1739
- 3 The Opening Moves, October 1739–January 1741
- 4 The Widening War and the Fall of Sir Robert Walpole, January 1741– February 1742
- 5 Shifting Focus, the Growth of the Continental Commitment, February–December 1742
- 6 The Continental Commitment, January 1743–February 1744
- 7 War with France and Crisis of the Worms Policy, February 1744–December 1744
- 8 Rebellion and the End of the Flanders Policy, January–December 1745
- 9 Europe and America: the Critical Balance, January–December 1746
- 10 Newcastle’s War: the End in Europe and America, January 1747–October 1748
- 11 Conclusion: The Peace and British Naval Power
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
War in Europe January to May 1741
The movement of a major part of the fleet to the West Indies at the end of 1740 was a creditable achievement. However, there were worrying signs. The Admiralty could now count on only 13 ships of the line in home waters. There were very few other 70s or 60s ready to be put into commission and orders were given to commission the ‘great ships’ of 100 and 90 guns, which were lying in ordinary at Chatham and Portsmouth. These ships were less versatile than the smaller ships of the line and demanded larger numbers of seamen to man them, but they were the only ships available.
Manpower was, as usual, the key to the campaign. Norris estimated that 30 ships were laid up for lack of manpower. The pressing of seamen continued. The tenders sent out into the Channel to intercept merchant ships returning home and take seamen from them continued to bring in some sailors for the navy, but once again more radical solutions to the manpower problem failed to make headway. The Register Bill that Wager had brought before Parliament in February 1740 to establish a register of seamen met with such resistance that Walpole was forced to abandon it during the first reading. However, by the end of the year the manning problem was so serious that Wager was ordered to bring it back to the Commons on 27 January 1741, but after a passionate series of encoun- ters, it was dropped again. Once again the ministry was forced back on the old methods. A new press was approved with an end to protections for coasters and colliers and an embargo on outward-bound shipping until the fleet was manned. New bounties for volunteers were approved, but this again proved inadequate, and soldiers were needed to serve on the fleet until new marine regiments could be raised.
There was some relief when Andrew Thompson, Waldegrave's secretary in Paris, was able to re-establish his spies and informants in the French ports.5 He got the great news that D’Antin was returning to France with his ships devastated by disease.
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- The Emergence of Britain's Global Naval SupremacyThe War of 1739-1748, pp. 97 - 120Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2010