In the last chapter, I argued that the requirement of reciprocity can play its part in helping to create a stronger sense of common national identity among the citizens of a divided society. More specifically, I argued that, by requiring citizens to provide reasons for their proposals that others can accept, reciprocity promotes the kinds of compromises that build shareable goods. In turn, those goods can form the basis of a stronger sense of common national identity. That argument, however, is incomplete. In so far as the deliberative requirement of reciprocity is concerned only with how to justify political proposals, it might underpin the decisions of a small and highly exclusive group of ruling elites just as easily as it might underpin the decisions of a large and highly representative legislative assembly. But then it would seem that reciprocity alone is too weak to support the basic assumption upon which all forms of democracy ultimately rest – that all those who are bound by a decision should be entitled to an equal say in its making.

As we saw in Chapter 2, democracy can be justified by appealing to two important values, namely intrinsic equality and personal autonomy. A group of benevolent elites might be willing to engage in reasoned discussion among themselves, and might, moreover, be willing to treat each person's good and interest with equal consideration. In this sense, the requirement of reciprocity satisfies the value of intrinsic equality.