I have argued that deliberative democracy can give citizens the confidence to engage openly and frankly with one another, knowing that their views and opinions will receive a fair hearing. It can, moreover, enable them to accept that, in a democracy, citizens do not have an automatic right to get their way, but must instead seek to convince others of the merits of their claims. Critics argue, however, that deliberative democracy is not nearly as open or inclusive as its defenders claim. In order to deliberate successfully, citizens and representatives must know something about the kinds of political commitments that others are likely to have, and have some appreciation of the kinds of political arguments that those others might find acceptable. Otherwise, it is hard to see how they could engage in meaningful deliberation or produce the kinds of principled compromises that I have argued are so important to divided societies. The concern is, however, that this need for familiarity may result in exclusion since it may tempt dominant individuals or groups to close ranks and exclude those whose arguments seem strange or foreign to them (Taylor 1999; Williams 2000).

Deliberative democracy appears, therefore, to give rise to the following dilemma. The more familiar participants are with one another, the more likely it is that their deliberations will be successful. Knowing this, there is a strong temptation for the stronger members of society to exclude the weaker. This dilemma can operate on two levels.