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Introduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 October 2009

By
José María Maravall  and
Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca
Edited by
José María Maravall  and
Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca
José María Maravall
Affiliation:
Professor of Sociology, Universidad Complutense de Madrid; Director, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales (Instituto Juan March)
Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca
Affiliation:
Doctor Miembro, Instituto Juan March; Associate Professor of Sociology, Universidad Complutense de Madrid; Professor of Political Science, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales (Instituto Juan March)
José María Maravall
Affiliation:
Juan March Institute, Madrid
Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca
Affiliation:
Juan March Institute, Madrid
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Summary

We discuss in this book some core topics in the positive theory of democracy. We try to understand the relationship between citizens and politicians: what guides voters at election time, why governments survive and fall, and how institutions modify the power of the people over politicians. These are all relevant questions to determine the role of elections in democracy. Note, however, that elections can be analyzed from many other perspectives different from the representative dimension of democracy. Thus, elections can be also interpreted as an epistemic device to reach the right decision (Coleman 1989); as an exercise of self-government (Przeworski 2005); or as an opportunity for participation and deliberation (Elster 1998).

This book focuses on the representative side of democracy – how rule for the people and rule by the people are connected. Do elections (rule by the people) induce politicians to act in a representative way (rule for the people)? A common theme in all the contributions here included may sound commonsensical or even trivial: we need to combine some analytical rigor with empirical analysis. If we dare to say something so obvious, it is because the field is badly divided into formal analysis and empirical studies. We take seriously what we have learned from economic models of democracy, but we use these conclusions to organize the empirical research of cases that are far removed from the assumptions made in the formal literature.

Type
Chapter
Information
Controlling Governments
Voters, Institutions, and Accountability
 , pp. 1 - 16
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

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References

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  • Introduction
    • By José María Maravall, Professor of Sociology, Universidad Complutense de Madrid; Director, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales (Instituto Juan March), Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, Doctor Miembro, Instituto Juan March; Associate Professor of Sociology, Universidad Complutense de Madrid; Professor of Political Science, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales (Instituto Juan March)
  • Edited by José María Maravall, Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca
  • Book: Controlling Governments
  • Online publication: 28 October 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511611414.002
Available formats
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Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Introduction
    • By José María Maravall, Professor of Sociology, Universidad Complutense de Madrid; Director, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales (Instituto Juan March), Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, Doctor Miembro, Instituto Juan March; Associate Professor of Sociology, Universidad Complutense de Madrid; Professor of Political Science, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales (Instituto Juan March)
  • Edited by José María Maravall, Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca
  • Book: Controlling Governments
  • Online publication: 28 October 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511611414.002
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Introduction
    • By José María Maravall, Professor of Sociology, Universidad Complutense de Madrid; Director, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales (Instituto Juan March), Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, Doctor Miembro, Instituto Juan March; Associate Professor of Sociology, Universidad Complutense de Madrid; Professor of Political Science, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales (Instituto Juan March)
  • Edited by José María Maravall, Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca
  • Book: Controlling Governments
  • Online publication: 28 October 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511611414.002
Available formats
×