So far, I have considered arguments that have for the most part focused on the morality of the virtual act itself: either through an association with sentiment (Hume and the neo-sentimentalists) or in terms of the consequences for the gamer and her wider society (utilitarianism). Even Kant's deontological argument is in some sense consequentialist when applied to gamespace, or so it has been claimed: in so far as engaging in STAs will cultivate, through an argument from extended analogy, the intention to treat oneself and others immorally (this being the negative “real-world” consequence of STAs). In other words, one (potentially) fails in one's duty to protect oneself from vice and not to treat others as a means to an end.

In this chapter I consider an a priori argument for the moral appraisal of video game content based on what that content is said to represent – that is, its underlying meaning or socially significant expression – irrespective of any cost to oneself or others that may be incurred as a result of playing the game: either through cultivating cruelty or disrespect to others, or other antisocial behaviours, or even in terms of how the representation makes one feel (i.e. disgusted).