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In this chapter, Alfano argues that a Nietzschean virtue is a well-calibrated drive. Being well calibrated requires that several criteria, both internal to the agent and related to his social context, be satisfied. In particular, a drive is only a candidate virtue if it is conducive to what Nietzsche calls life and health. Roughly, this means that a drive is only a candidate virtue if it supports or at least does not interfere with the agent's other drives. Second, a drive is only a candidate virtue if it or the actions it motivates are not systematically condemned by the agent whose drive it is. Finally, a drive is only a candidate virtue if expressing it is not liable to elicit intense and easily internalized disapprobation from the agent's community.
In this chapter, Alfano connects the Nietzschean constructs of instinct, drive, and type. He argues that a drive is a disposition to engage in a characteristic pattern of actions and evaluations. Drives are distinguished from preferences and desires in that preferences and desires aim at outcomes whereas drives aim at activity. As such, drive-motivated behaviors can lead to consequences that the agent does not prefer. Instincts, according to Alfano, are innate drives, but not all drives are instinctual. A person's type, in the Nietzschean framework, is the full constellation of her instincts and other drives. Different people embody different types, which turns out in the next chapter to be crucial to understanding Nietzsche's person-type-relative unity of virtue thesis.
At its core, constitutional law addresses the uses and abuses of government power. This should include the use and abuses of the government’s expressive powers. This book describes and explores the complexities of the constitutional questions triggered by the government’s speech, and offers a framework for thinking about them. Its objectives also include shining a light on the government’s speech in its many manifestations, with its vast array of audiences, topics, means, motives, and consequences. The more we recognize the volume and variety of the government’s speech in our lives, the more thoughtfully we can puzzle over its constitutional implications. The government’s speech packs great power. Even—and perhaps especially—in times of grave crisis, the government’s speech can be soaring in its inspiration, its humanity, and in its success in achieving essential public purposes. At times, however, the government’s speech instead threatens, bullies, divides, and deceives for self-interested reasons, and sometimes with crushing results. This book identifies some of the motivations for and consequences of those choices, as well as possible means for constructively influencing them.
Extensive work exists on value in multiple domains. However, there are different interpretations, highlighting a lack of clarity about the fundamental characteristics. To address this, we present seven value axioms resulting from inductive research. The axioms may be viewed as general rules describing value in any context, therefore conveying the fundamental characteristics of the phenomenon. They reveal that value is: (1) connected to people; (2) an output of a cognitive process; (3) in requirement of a determination process; (4) a matter of a given situation; (5) determined by the interpretations of entities; and related to (6) entities and (7) criteria. The nature of value is of particular importance to the design community, given the emphasis on value in design and product development. In this context, a lack of clarity may be perceived in terms of when value appears, appropriate metrics, and how to add value. To provide explanations, there is a need for a theory of value in design. The presented axioms may provide the basis, as they are fundamental statements on the nature of value and not limited to a specific domain. We highlight theory requirements based on the axioms.
Normative ethics asks: What makes right acts right? W. D. Ross attempted to answer this question in The Right and the Good (1930). Most theorists have agreed that Ross provided no systematic explanatory answers. Ross's intuitionism lacks any decision procedure, and, as McNaughton (2002: 91) states, it ‘turns out after all to have nothing general to say about the relative stringency of our basic duties’. Here I will show that my own Rossian intuitionism does have a systematic way of explaining what makes right acts right. Deontological theories have struggled to say what internal to acts could make them right. From Price to Ross, the striking but uninformative answer has been the nature of the act. In this paper I will provide a Rossian theory of the moral natures of acts. It contains a set of self-evident principles of moral stringency and other considerations that can assist agents in deciding what prima facie duty overrides what.
Retention of participants has been an issue in the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC). It has been suggested that the perceived value of WIC may affect whether participants remain in the programme. The present study aimed to explore this phenomenon.
Using a constructivist approach, thirty-one individual in-depth interviews were conducted. Transcripts were analysed using constant comparative analysis. Social, cultural and environmental factors that contribute to the value of WIC were explored as the phenomenon of interest.
Eight WIC clinics across the State of Illinois, USA.
Thirty-one caregivers of children enrolled in WIC for at least 6 months.
Several factors influenced perceived value of WIC at the interpersonal (level of social support), clinic (value of WIC services v. programme administration issues), vendor (shopping difficulties), community and systems levels (other programme use, stigma and restrictions on food choice). Other themes existed along continua, which overlapped several levels (continuum of perceived need and perceived value of infant formula).
Many caregivers value WIC, especially before their child turns 1 year old. Improvements are needed at the clinic, during shopping and within the food packages themselves in order to increase perceived value of WIC.
Humans often comply with social norms, but the reasons why are disputed. Here, we unify a variety of influential explanations in a common decision framework, and identify the precise cognitive variables that norms might alter to induce compliance. Specifically, we situate current theories of norm compliance within the reinforcement learning framework, which is widely used to study value-guided learning and decision-making. This framework offers an appealingly precise language to distinguish between theories, highlights the various points of convergence and divergence, and suggests novel ways in which norms might penetrate our psychology.
‘Heritage’ is a concept that often carries significant normative weight in moral and political argument. In this article, I present and critique a prevalent conception according to which heritage must have a positive valence. I argue that this view of heritage leads to two moral problems: disowning injustice and embracing injustice. In response, I argue for an alternative conception of heritage that promises superior moral and political consequences. In particular, this alternative jettisons the traditional focus on heritage as a primarily positive relationship to the past and thus offers resources for coming to terms with histories of injustice.
The Polish Peasant in Europe and America is one of the foundational works of American and world sociology, famous for its innovative qualitative methodology. Its authors proposed new theoretical ideas, including a concept of social causality and a new theory of personality combining a biologistic concept of temperament with a culturalist concept of character. Interpreters of the book still disagree about the extent of each author’s actual contribution to the work and about its scientific status in light of modern sociological theories. This article claims that to understand the book one has to take into account the previous intellectual trajectories of both authors. As a theoretical dialogue between representatives of two contrary approaches, the work may serve as an alternative to the supposed theoretical “convergence” offered two decades later by Talcott Parsons.
Maximizing Hedonism maintains that the most pleasurable pleasures are the best. Francis Bradley argues that this is either incompatible with Mill’s Qualitative Hedonism, or renders the latter redundant. Some ‘sympathetic’ interpreters respond that Mill was either a Non-Maximizing Hedonist or a Non-Hedonist. However, Bradley’s argument is fallacious, and these ‘sympathetic’ interpretations cannot provide adequate accounts of: Mill’s identification with the Protagorean Socrates; his criticisms of the Gorgian Socrates; or his apparent belief that Callicles is misguided to attempt to show that the pleasures of the intelligent can be more valuable than the pleasures of fools without also being more pleasurable.
This paper examines how state and non-state actors govern through pursuing speculative conservation among resource-dependent people who must renegotiate altered livelihoods amidst extractivism in ruptured landscapes. As donor aid declines and changes form, bilaterals, state agencies, and civil society now pursue advocacy in overlapping spaces of intensifying extractivism and speculative governance in the ruptured frontiers of Southeast Asia. In these spaces, bilaterals and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) struggle to work with upland farmers who negotiate the contrasting expectations of the abstract, speculative nature of conservation initiatives and the lucrative nature of extractive labour in the face of dramatic transformations of agrarian livelihoods and landscapes. Through a case study of the Philippine uplands, we demonstrate that as speculative conservation unfolds and manifests within and beyond these landscapes, it endeavours to revalue nature monetarily in ways that help reorganise labour and capital in an effort to overcome the exhaustion of capital wrought by rupture. We propose that during moments of rupture speculative conservation coproduces value from ruin by renewing and preserving capital flows.
What is progress and what is not progress? We can talk about progress in lots of different arenas; we will focus primarily on economic and scientific progress, but also make brief reference to cultural and moral progress. In our discussion, we want to distinguish, especially, between overall, long-term progress and narrower, shorter-term progress or regress. We will refer to these as “global” and “local” progress, respectively. Of course, one can also regress; therefore, we will also look at instances where progress, along some dimension, slows or even moves backwards. Generally, such regress is local, and often still in a context of broader, global progress. In scientific progress, for example, there are many instances of short-term progress which, if not completely discarded or disproved, are at least substantially modified or fundamentally challenged. And yet, those research paths, even when later abandoned, still contributed to the overall progress of the field. In that sense, the regress (that is, rejection or modification of previous theories) is corrected by, but not in conflict with, the overall progress. In the case of economic progress, the concept of regress usually takes on a different form in which things that aren’t advancing progress don’t necessarily stop it, but are simply retarding progress — that is, making the rate of progress less efficient. The consequence, we suggest, is that when talking about economic progress, objections to certain consequences of economic progress (for instance, income inequality — a type of regress, in our terminology) should not be cordoned off and dealt with independently, but should be incorporated into the way we think about economic progress itself — as instances of local regress within a context of global progress. We explore the effects of these different relations between progress and regress to suggest some of the challenges those seeking to broaden the standard measure, GDP, to incorporate other social values of well-being will face moving forward.
This essay discusses two ways in which an agent can make progress with respect to value: self-cultivation and aspiration. The self-cultivator becomes a more coherent version of the person she was before, acquiring beliefs or desires or habits or skills that serve her antecedent valuational condition. The aspirant, by contrast, acquires new values. The existence of aspiration is under pressure from those who would assimilate it either to self-cultivation, or to a change in value that is done to a person rather than a change that is her own work. I show that those two options cannot be exhaustive by discussing liberal arts education; it is, I argue, paradigmatically aspirational.
Accurately quantifying a consumer’s willingness to pay (WTP) for beef of different eating qualities is intrinsically linked to the development of eating-quality-based meat grading systems, and therefore the delivery of consistent, quality beef to the consumer. Following Australian MSA (Meat Standards Australia) testing protocols, over 19 000 consumers from Northern Ireland, Poland, Ireland, France and Australia were asked to detail their willingness to pay for beef from one of four categories that best described the sample; unsatisfactory, good-every-day, better-than-every-day or premium quality. These figures were subsequently converted to a proportion relative to the good-every-day category (P-WTP) to allow comparison between different currencies and time periods. Consumers also answered a short demographic questionnaire. Consumer P-WTP was found to be remarkably consistent between different demographic groups. After quality grade, by far the greatest influence on P-WTP was country of origin. This difference was unable to be explained by the other demographic factors examined in this study, such as occupation, gender, frequency of consumption and the importance of beef in the diet. Therefore, we can conclude that the P-WTP for beef is highly transferrable between different consumer groups, but not countries.
What is the source of epistemic normativity? In virtue of what do epistemic norms have categorical normative authority? According to epistemic teleologism, epistemic normativity comes from value. Epistemic norms have categorical authority because conforming to them is necessarily good in some relevant sense. In this article, I argue that epistemic teleologism should be rejected. The problem, I argue, is that there is no relevant sense in which it is necessarily good to believe in accordance with epistemic norms, including in cases where the matter at hand is completely trivial. Therefore, if epistemology is normative, its normativity won’t come from value.