We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Identifying the impact of remittances on household members remaining behind is difficult due to selection into migration. In this paper, we exploit an unexpected embargo on Qatar, the second major destination among Nepali migrants. Using longitudinal data on about 1,500 Nepali households with migrants prior to the embargo, we assess how this shock translates into changes in remittances and development outcomes. We find a 56% reduction in remittances for households with a migrant in Qatar. At least in the months immediately after the shock, such a fall in remittances does not seem to translate into recipient household's welfare. However, we cannot exclude that such effect might materialize in the medium run. That is particularly true for poor and credit-constrained households, especially vulnerable to the remittance windfall and lacking the ability to move their migrants or other household members to other destinations.
Egypt is the most populous state in the Arab world, with just over 100 million citizens residing in the country, and Egyptian nationals have long looked abroad for opportunities. This chapter examines the evolution of the country’s policies toward its diaspora and seeks to understand how the Egyptian government has attempted to protect, assist, and cultivate loyalty among its citizens abroad, as well as how it has sought to exert further control over this population. Beginning with targeted secondment policies that aimed to spread pan-Arabist ideology in the 1950s and 1960s, and broadening to mass labor exportation agreements directed primarily toward other Arab nations in the 1970s, Egypt sought to address demographic concerns of overpopulation and an overburdened and underfinanced public sector, and to reap the benefit of remittances as a major contribution to the country’s GDP. But the chapter also addresses Egypt’s failure to establish effective governance of, and engagement with, its diaspora. This includes the overlapping responsibilities of the numerous ministries in charge of emigration, an unwillingness to resolve domestic economic issues in order to prevent further brain drain and to incentivize the return of Egyptians abroad, and the state’s continued use of transnational repression toward its citizenry.
India has historically been the leading country of origin of international migrants, with an estimated 32 million overseas Indians in 2018, including 19 million Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) and 13 million Non-Resident Indians (NRIs). This chapter looks at how India initially adopted a policy of limited engagement with Indians abroad due to limited material capacities to support a large and diverse overseas community. In reaction to the emergence of an increasingly rich and influential Indian diaspora in the OECD countries, and as India’s own material capacities grew, the chapter then describes how the Government of India sought since the early 1990s to actively co-opt its community abroad by providing more consular services and by redesigning its diaspora policies and institutions. The chapter shows that the expansion of India’s consular support services has also been driven by the need to ensure stable remittances from low-skilled migrants. Also noted is how the Indian government has developed repressive tools against Indians abroad whom it considers to be a threat to its national sovereignty and integrity. This chapter concludes that, despite the design of new policies to engage nationals abroad, limited material resources devoted to these initiatives have in turn limited their implementation and success.
According to Türkiye’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there are approximately 6.5 million Turkish people living abroad. With national communities in more than seventy nations, the Turkish diaspora has a global reach. This chapter examines Türkiye’s relations with its national communities abroad. Over the decades, Türkiye reimagined its relationship with its citizens abroad, which in turn allowed national communities abroad to reimagine their home state. In the early years of labor migration, Türkiye focused on economic benefits such as remittances. Later on, Ankara noticed the public policy potential of national communities living abroad. With widening diplomatic support and an increase in selective cultural engagement, Türkiye expanded its reach to overseas communities. While diplomatic services benefited all, some forms of cultural support targeted conservative populations. Domestic security concerns also led to an interest in understanding the political leanings of the diaspora.
Overseas Pakistanis continue to grow in number, expanding the national community abroad. The three main challenges that exist for the Pakistani government in protecting its citizens abroad are interconnected and have to do with maintaining remittances, increasing educational opportunities, and potentially loosening visa restrictions that hamper the ability of Pakistanis to travel and interact with other countries economically. While the world has focused on security, mainly evaluating Pakistan from an Afghanistan-focused lens as US and NATO forces remained in the country till August 2021, Pakistanis have been busy seizing opportunities for themselves and their families, indicating a high level of agency. The Pakistani government is motivated by its diaspora’s agency and self-identity needs, and welcomes engagement. This movement has now resulted in remittances becoming Pakistan’s largest source of national foreign exchange. In order to maintain remittances, the Pakistani government’s activities are likely to intensify over time. As the Pakistani government engages with its citizens abroad, one of the most interesting revelations about this research is the lack of direct military involvement.
Challenging the myth of non-return, this chapter shows that, by the 1970s, many guest workers did want to return to Turkey. But instead of support, they encountered opposition from the Turkish government. In the 1970s, the link between return migration and financial investments dominated bilateral discussions between Turkey and West Germany. After the Oil Crisis, West Germany devised bilateral policies to promote remigration. Turkey, then mired in unemployment, hyperinflation, and debt, actively resisted those efforts. The Turkish government realized that guest workers played a significant role in mitigating the country’s economic crisis. To repay its foreign debt, Turkey needed guest workers’ remittance payments in high-performing Deutschmarks. If guest workers returned to Turkey, then that stream would dry up. Turkish officials thus strove to prevent mass return migration at all costs – even when it contradicted guest workers’ interests. These tensions also manifested in Turkey’s charging of exorbitant fees for citizens abroad who sought exemptions from mandatory military service, prompting young migrants to create an activist organization that critiqued this policy. The knowledge that they were unwanted in both countries widened the rift between the migrants and their home country, which disparaged them as “Germanized” yet relied on them as “remittance machines.”
The international migration literature has highlighted four key stylized facts from the perspective of the source country: (i) Migration rates are notably high, with some nations seeing over ten percent of their population living abroad. (ii) Certain developing countries have witnessed a significant exodus of skilled workers, commonly referred to as brain drain, spanning several decades. (iii) Migrants often maintain strong ties to their country of origin, evidenced by the substantial remittances they send back to their relatives. (iv) Migration is not necessarily permanent, as a considerable number of individuals return to their home country after a period spent abroad. In this paper, we present a theoretical model that endogenously explains these facts. Our model allows us to explore key issues in migration literature from a theoretical standpoint. We analyze the general equilibrium effects of migration, its long-term implications, and its welfare consequences. Additionally, we investigate whether the combined impact of return migration and remittances can counterbalance the effects of skilled migration. Finally, we evaluate the efficacy of policy interventions designed to mitigate the adverse effects of brain drain.
We are the first to study how the resources freed up when a child, child-in-law, or grandchild moves out of a household are reallocated, taking into account the age of the leaver. Using the 2011 and 2013 waves of the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study, we document that, on average, the remaining household members save part of the resources freed up by the leaver and consume another part. Differentiating the leavers by age, we find that after the departure of a member of the younger generation aged 0–24, the remaining household members save the resources freed up by the leaver. However, if the leaver is above 24, they spend the freed-up resources. Our results are robust to the use of different specifications, estimation methods, and consumption aggregates. Finally, we observe that remittances directed toward non-resident offspring do not increase after the departure of a member of the younger generation.
This chapter presents a cutting-edge study of multidimensional poverty since it fully exploits highly granular data on expenditure (government programmes) matched with social development indicators. First, we explore how economic well-being and various socioeconomic rights, in Mexico, have benefited from domestic income and remittances of households located in the deciles 1 to 5 of the income distribution. Second, we analyse the degree of substitutability of remittances (or personal income in general) vis-à-vis spending on social programmes.
Platform economies are depicted as the foundation for a new era of economic production. This transpires through the incorporation of digital technologies and algorithmic operations into the heart of economic and financial practices. However, different assumptions are made about the effects of digital platforms depending on geographical location. While digital platforms are approached as inherent to processes of financialization globally, they are reduced to processes of financial inclusion when referencing the ‘Global South’. Analyses of financialization as a one-way-vector - Global North to Global South - overlook the variability, the limits, and responses to financialization. In contrast, a focus on market devices illustrates the specificities of value creation. An example of this is ‘the float’, a form of financial value generated by mobile telecommunication operators, mobile money issuers, and commercial banks in Africa. Through this lens, we see instances of both value subjugation and autonomization, evidence that the fault lines of value production generated by ambiguous market devices are obscured by the Global North/Global South frame.
In the last decade, remittances have become connected to financialization, expanding financial markets and deepening financial logics in what has been termed the financialization of remittances (FOR). In Nepal, where remittances are of key importance, this manifests itself in the country's development strategy through attempts to formalize remittances and promote financial inclusion, entrepreneurship, and financial infrastructure. This article focuses on the most salient manifestation of the FOR in Nepal: a large-scale financial literacy education (FLE) campaign for transnational families. To examine how this FOR-FLE complex works, we bring together insights on emotional governance with those on the creation of (gendered) financial subjectivities. Based on an analysis of FLE pedagogical material and interviews with FLE experts, we suggest that the FOR-FLE complex in Nepal mobilizes a pedagogy of fear and hope to discipline the financial behavior of transnational families, transforming them into self-governing miniature financial corporations. We also highlight the gender dimensions of this emotional regime, which creates terror and works to patronize, shame, and stigmatize nonmigrant women of transnational families, rendering them responsible for development, decreasing out-migration, and reducing the economy's import dependency.
This chapter examines the role of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in global migration governance and its implications for migrant workers’ rights and well-being. As global lead migration agency for the U.N. system, is well-positioned to influence whether and how States address the significant gaps in international migration law and institutions that enable the continued exploitation and abuse of migrant workers worldwide. This chapter explores IOM’s potential to advance migrant workers’ rights by examining an IOM initiative explicitly established to do so: IOM’s International Recruitment Integrity System’s (IRIS), which seeks to promote ethical cross-border recruitment. IOM’s approach tends to prioritize increasing labor migration to harness “the developmental potential of migration” – but too often at the cost of migrants’ rights. Moreover, IOM ultimately encourages further privatization of area of governance that experts—and, indeed, ethical recruiters themselves—believe requires, instead, strong state involvement in order to meaningfully advance migrant workers’ rights protection.
Greater labor migration can establish more channels for information flows, directly contributing to faster economic growth and improved innovation and work. It can also expand international remittances, which can be invested by recipient households in home countries in education, entrepreneurship, and improved and sustainable agricultural technologies. At the same time, however, increased emigration of medical professionals and technical workers from poor countries can reduce quality of local services, innovation, health status, and productivity. This analysis attempts to quantify the economic benefits and costs of permitting an immediate 10% increase in the bilateral migration of skilled workers (physicians, engineers or science, engineering, technology, and mathematics workers, and other persons with advanced educations) among the nations of the African Continental Free Trade Area and, more broadly, among 25 global regions. Economic benefits include higher migrant incomes abroad, welfare gains in destination countries associated with higher economic efficiency, spillover productivity gains, and an improved ability of the younger and more skilled working force to support the needs of the wider population, resulting in higher national production. Benefits in source countries include productivity enhancements from two sources: (a) greater access to knowledge associated with more bilateral trade and investment and (b) the ability of local households to invest remittances in productivity-enhancing activities. Welfare losses in source nations include static efficiency reductions and a worsened demographic support capability. In Africa, the benefit-cost ratios range from 3.7 to 6.9; in the global analysis, 17 to 38.
Volume 2 of The Cambridge History of Global Migrations presents an authoritative overview of the various continuities and changes in migration and globalization from the 1800s to the present day. Despite revolutionary changes in communication technologies, the growing accessibility of long-distance travel, and globalization across major economies, the rise of nation-states empowered immigration regulation and bureaucratic capacities for enforcement that curtailed migration. One major theme worldwide across the post-1800 centuries was the differentiation between “skilled” and “unskilled” workers, often considered through a racialized lens; it emerged as the primary divide between greater rights of immigration and citizenship for the former, and confinement to temporary or unauthorized migrant status for the latter. Through thirty-one chapters, this volume further evaluates the long global history of migration; and it shows that despite the increased disciplinary systems, the primacy of migration remains and continues to shape political, economic, and social landscapes around the world.
Volume 2 of The Cambridge History of Global Migrations presents an authoritative overview of the various continuities and changes in migration and globalization from the 1800s to the present day. Despite revolutionary changes in communication technologies, the growing accessibility of long-distance travel, and globalization across major economies, the rise of nation-states empowered immigration regulation and bureaucratic capacities for enforcement that curtailed migration. One major theme worldwide across the post-1800 centuries was the differentiation between “skilled” and “unskilled” workers, often considered through a racialized lens; it emerged as the primary divide between greater rights of immigration and citizenship for the former, and confinement to temporary or unauthorized migrant status for the latter. Through thirty-one chapters, this volume further evaluates the long global history of migration; and it shows that despite the increased disciplinary systems, the primacy of migration remains and continues to shape political, economic, and social landscapes around the world.
This chapter moves beyond Fambul Tok and looks at how processes of transition and justice occur outside of the official scope and discourse, or through what I refer to as unrecognized mechanisms. I problematize the notion of transition, looking again at the official transitional justice discourses and contrast these with interview narratives that demonstrate the fluidity of conflict and post-conflict periods. The chapter further examines how unrecognized mechanisms that were employed by Sierra Leoneans served as more meaningful avenues of ‘transitioning’ past their war-related experiences. Individuals engaged in everyday activities, such as economic restoration, agriculture and religion in an effort to transition to what I call a new normal. The importance of the everyday and re-obtaining a sense of normality were key priorities. Individuals, therefore, define and enact their own ideas of what it means to transition, engaging with alternative, often more immediate and pragmatic, channels within their existing social structures to reach their own defined goals. Using Sierra Leone as an example, this chapter demonstrates how individuals in post-conflict societies are active agents in defining and facilitating their own post-conflict processes, thereby recognizing the unrecognized and understanding notions of transition and justice at work.
Are Latin American presidents at greater risk for removal in remittance-dependent countries? Departing from the debate about whether remittances produce democratic or autocratic outcomes, this article asks whether remittances contribute to presidential removals, which are an important characteristic of Latin American democracies since the Third Wave. It uses questions about supporting a military coup under high corruption and crime scenarios to gauge remittance recipients’ support for early removal of a president. It finds that remittances create a constituency that tolerates military coups. Using data from Martínez (2021), the analysis also shows that remittances increase the risk of removal for presidents who face a greater number of scandals; but remittances do not pose this threat under poor economic performance.
It is no secret that migrant destination countries have become increasingly interested in regulating migrant inflows. We discuss in this chapter some potential tools of migration management suggested by other scholars – notably, border restrictions and fortification, foreign aid, and bilateral trade agreements. We turn the conversation toward a different area of policy: labor market access. We argue that migrant-receiving countries interested in regulating migration can do so by creating temporary labor market access for people from sending countries. Allowing some migrants formal employment opportunities significantly increases the amount of remittances they send home, a financial resource that family members can use to finance their immobility rather than sending additional family members abroad. We use an array of data and empirical specifications to make the case that labor market access increases remittances, and that this increase in remittances reduces subsequent authorized and unauthorized migration to the United States. Our findings suggest that countries interested in managing migration pressures have an incentive to open up more temporary pathways to the formal labor market for migrants.
Migrants not only foster investment capital flows toward their home countries; they also invest in their families by sending remittances back to their households. We begin this chapter with a review of the literature on the reasons why migrants remit, as well as the economic and political benefits of their remittances. Our primary contribution focuses on how migrant-sending countries can encourage greater remittance inflows. Over the past several decades, countries have increasingly built political institutions, such as dual citizenship and diaspora-specific government ministries, that attempt to engage their diasporas. We argue, and empirically find, that some of these institutions do incentivize greater remittance inflows, suggesting that origin countries have a significant opportunity to attract this form of external capital. This chapter also includes a new theoretical and empirical perspective on the origin of these institutions – why some countries have quickly adopted diaspora-centric institutions, while others have been slow to do so. We argue and find that countries are quicker to adopt these institutions when their diaspora holds political rights in economically and politically powerful destination countries.
Migration is among the central domestic and global political issues of today. Yet the causes and consequences - and the relationship between migration and global markets – are poorly understood. Migration is both costly and risky, so why do people decide to migrate? What are the political, social, economic, and environmental factors that cause people to leave their homes and seek a better life elsewhere? Leblang and Helms argue that political factors - the ability to participate in the political life of a destination - are as important as economic and social factors. Most migrants don't cut ties with their homeland but continue to be engaged, both economically and politically. Migrants continue to serve as a conduit for information, helping drive investment to their homelands. The authors combine theory with a wealth of micro and macro evidence to demonstrate that migration isn't static, after all, but continuously fluid.