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Chapter 3 “Consolidation (1979–1989)” explores how RJ further safeguarded its existence and promoted its expansion by demobilizing its opponents and those of the IRP, including shah loyalists and royalists, communists and Marxists, Sunni and ethnic separatists, traditional elites and other counterrevolutionaries, and Iraqi forces and their collaborators. By monitoring these adversaries and embellishing the threat that they posed to the IRI, RJ created a self-fulfilling prophesy by radicalizing and pushing Khomeini and the IRP into further confrontation with them. The Cultural Revolution (1980–83) and the Iran-Iraq War (1980–89) facilitated and accelerated the mobilization and expansion of RJ and allowed it to help the IRI in its efforts to Islamize the provinces and villages, and repel invading Iraqi forces and their allies along the western border. RJ further marginalized its opponents and those of the IRI by physically and ideationally penetrating the provinces and villages through infrastructure, healthcare, education, culture, and religion.
This chapter examines ZANU PF’s presidential succession politics, which gathered strong momentum from the late 1990s onward. Mujuru joined active politics as a ZANU PF Member of Parliament after his retirement from the military in 1992 and he led a faction in the internal fight to succeed Mugabe. The chapter examines the elite politics of this succession struggle, in which Mujuru never sought the presidency for himself. It contends that the primary reasons for Mujuru and Mugabe’s political falling out centred on issues such as Mujuru’s opposition to Mugabe’s one-party-state project, Zimbabwe’s 1998 military intervention in the DRC and the deleterious effects of Mugabe’s policies on Mujuru’s commercial interests. The chapter also lays bare the causes of Mujuru’s important rivalry with Emmerson Mnangagwa, a presidential succession contender. Lastly the chapter surveys Mujuru’s business activities and considers his private life as husband and father.
This chapter examines the role of media and publicity in Turkey’s failed attempt at popular constitution making. The project of writing a new constitution through an inclusive, participatory, and consensus-driven process was mediated by an illiberal press in Turkey, where the AKP government routinely fortified its own media bloc and undermined critical voices. Based on a combination of newspaper content analysis and institutional history from 2011 to 2013, this chapter demonstrates how the Constitutional Conciliation Commission ‘Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu, AUK’ first intended to break out of the polarized and repressed news cycles by instituting control over journalistic work. As the internal disagreements intensified and external actors became vocal about the new constitution, however, the AUK loosened its hold on the press, leading to a more polarizing narrative that reduced complex constitutional debates to simple ideological sound bites. By juxtaposing Turkey’s popular constitution-making experiment with its highly divisive, illiberal media, the chapter concludes by questioning some of the deeply held assumptions between democracy and media in contemporary theory.
This chapter reflects on the book’s findings and elucidates three major factors behind Turkey’s intra–alliance opposition behavior: 1) international systemic and regional sub–systemic factors; 2) irreconcilable interests due to lack of progress in its EU accession talks, US support for Syrian Kurds at the expense of Turkey’s key interests in the Middle East, the unresolved Cyprus problem, Turkey’s resentment for its exclusion from European and Middle Eastern security developments by its transatlantic partners, causing biases and mistrust in Turkey’s relations with the EU, the USA, and NATO; and 3) domestic factors. It then explores three potential scenarios on the future of Turkey’s relations with the West and argues that the factors outlined here provoke unease and reinforce ambitions on the part of Turkey to provide a hedge against the West. It places the book’s findings in a larger context of intra–alliance opposition/conflict and discusses the implications of its findings for the IR literature. It argues that Turkish hard balancing is on the horizon and concludes by making recommendations for engaging Turkey in a mutually beneficial way.
The academic literature is abundant with works on Turkey–EU and Turkey–USA–NATO relations. Nevertheless, most of the works in the literature study these topics through descriptive analysis, without the incorporation of any theoretical framework, or through the lenses of Europeanization theory or Constructivism. This chapter identifies the gaps in the existing literature and formulates a framework of intra-alliance opposition. The extant literature on soft balancing is theoretically vague (Brooks and Wohlforth 2005) and lacks rigor in terms of the definition of the tools of statecraft a second-tier power utilizes within an alliance. There is conceptual overlap between different tools that are identified by the IR literature in general, and the soft balancing literature in particular, which leads to conceptual confusion, as they may also be used for different ends, i.e. bargaining, issue linkages, retaliation, and tit-for-tat strategies. Accordingly, Chapter 1 offers a clear delineation of the interactive processes of intra-alliance opposition and offers a framework of intra-alliance opposition.
The chapter highlights issues raised by attempts to preserve street and graffiti art. It does so by exploring whether street and graffiti artists could successfully oppose the removal or destruction of their works by relying on the moral right of integrity; and whether the heritagisation of these forms of art could also be a valuable legal option to conserve them. Cases where artists have tried to protect their works, and local councils and communities have attempted to conserve street artworks, will also be analysed. The chapter concludes that a reasonable balance between the rights and interests of all stakeholders – artists, property owners and local communities – needs to be achieved, and that this is best undertaken by judges, or administrative bodies, equipped to grasp the specificity and complexity of each case.
Revolutions are traumatic experiences for individuals, their communities, and the larger society of which they are a part. This chapter focuses on society, analyzing those trends and dynamics within post-revolutionary societies that give the entire polity – not just the state but non-state actors as well – the peculiar characteristics that they acquire after revolutions. The chapter examines the changing nature of state–society relations in the aftermath of revolutions. In specific, the chapter focuses on how the emerging leaders of the new state impose their own vision of the revolution on social actors, not all of whom may share the same vision. New state leaders often suppress or altogether eliminate nonconformists while at the same time continuing to keep the momentum of revolutionary mass mobilization going. This has consequences for the emerging political culture, which is often polarized, revolves around zero-sum assumptions, and is therefore anti-democratic. The ingredients for political opposition are abundant and often extremist, though the prospects of yet another revolution are dim.
This chapter discusses developments in the Christian rhetoric of free speech in the fourth century, after Christianity had become an accepted religion. A theological controversy arose, known as the Arian controversy, that pitched supporters of different interpretations of Christian doctrine against each other. Christians, who saw themselves as heirs of the martyrs, needed to find a new rhetoric of opposition that fitted the realities of the post-persecution era. Was it acceptable to inveigh against a Christian emperor because he subscribed to an alternative interpretation of Christ’s truth? This chapter focusses on the rhetoric of Bishop Hilary of Poitiers (d. 368) who came to be regarded as the head of the anti-Arian faction in the West and wrote an invective against Emperor Constantius II. In Hilary’s letters, we find a new vocabulary and rhetoric of free speech which covered a whole range from persuasion to criticism, from polite advice to outright abuse. The chapter shows how Hilary created a new, powerful image of a Christian truth-teller that was built on the cultivated memory of martyrs, apostles and prophets.
This chapter investigates narrative representations of free speech in early Christian martyr acts written between c. 150 and the end of persecution in 313. It discusses both pagan and Christian models that inspired authors of early Christian martyr acts to represent the speech and behaviour of martyrs in a certain manner. One of the issues the authors addressed was how a Christian should behave when he or she stood trial before secular authorities, and what measure of frank speech was appropriate in this situation. Early Christian martyrs are often presented as respectful, polite and reticent towards authorities during interrogation. We also see a clear preference for plain speech over studied rhetoric. The chapter addresses the question of whether new interpretations of parrhesia that we find in these martyrdom narratives should be seen as indicative of a growing reluctance among Christians to criticise those in power, or as part of a process of acculturation.
Democracy can be eroded by governments that use only constitutional means to monopolize power and gain discretion in policy making. Opposition can be effective only if citizens are forward looking, anticipating cumulative consequences.
How do parties that have long been confined to opposition behave once they take the decision to support government? This article analyses the case of the three Portuguese radical left parties that took such a move in the wake of the post-bailout 2015 election. Leveraging the concept of contract parliamentarism and the analysis of different data sources through different methods, we show that the three parties adopted a similar strategy after agreeing deals with the centre-left socialists. Specifically, while keeping close scrutiny on the executive action, the parties have voted consensually on most of the legislation proposed by the government. In exchange, the majority of policy pledges agreed with the socialists were implemented by the beginning of the legislature. Based on these findings, the article underlines the importance for supporting parties of conducting a thorough negotiation of policy goals and the timing of their implementation before joining the government, and of pursuing an autonomous discursive agenda.
Childhood disruptive behaviors are highly prevalent and associated with adverse long-term social and economic outcomes. Trajectories of welfare receipt in early adulthood and the association of childhood behaviors with high welfare receipt trajectories have not been examined.
Boys (n = 1000) from low socioeconomic backgrounds were assessed by kindergarten teachers for inattention, hyperactivity, aggression, opposition, and prosociality, and prospectively followed up for 30 years. We used group-base trajectory modeling to estimate trajectories of welfare receipt from age 19–36 years using government tax return records, then examined the association between teacher-rated behaviors and trajectory group membership using mixed effects multinomial regression models.
Three trajectories of welfare receipt were identified: low (70.8%), declining (19.9%), and chronic (9.3%). The mean annual personal employment earnings (US$) for the three groups at age 35/36 years was $36 500 (s.d. = $24 000), $15 600 (s.d. = $16 275), and $1700 (s.d. = $4800), respectively. Relative to the low welfare receipt group, a unit increase in inattention (mean = 2.64; s.d. = 2.32, range = 0–8) at age 6 was associated with an increased risk of being in the chronic group (relative risk ratio; RRR = 1.16, 95% CI 1.03–1.31) and in the declining group (RRR = 1.13, 95% CI 1.03–1.23), after adjustment for child IQ and family adversity, and independent of other behaviors. Family adversity was more strongly associated with trajectories of welfare receipt than any behavior.
Boys from disadvantaged backgrounds exhibiting high inattention in kindergarten are at elevated risk of chronic welfare receipt during adulthood. Screening and support for inattentive behaviors beginning in kindergarten could have long-term social and economic benefits for individuals and society.
This chapter argues that the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood by 2019 was neither as violent nor as undemocratic as the conventional narrative purported. Indeed, the Brotherhood’s return to Syria was constrained by mundane organisational flaws such as internal dissent, poor political decision-making and lack of mechanisms for command and control of its cadre. It is an understanding of these organisational flaws and its history that illuminates the character of the movement, as these organisational deficiencies are likely to ensure that the group finds a glass ceiling that will prevent it achieving either a dominant or prominent role in the exercise of power in Syria in the future. It is simply not well placed to harness any such opportunity.
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was more than 60 years old by the time Syrian uprising unfolded in 2011, having survived Syria’s democratic era, the early Baʿth years, the consolidation of the Baʿth regime under Hafez al-Assad, its own militarisation, and long exile outside the country. This chapter provides an overview of the key points in the Brotherhood’s history, including the Islamic reform movements and organisations that contributed to its founding.
This chapter examines the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s political development and practice through its behaviour in parliament in the period 1947-1963, opposition to the government, internal political dynamics and interaction with other opposition groups. It traces the emergence of the Brotherhood’s foundational organisational characteristics of ideological flexibility and pragmatism, and makes two main arguments: First, while the Brotherhood mostly remained true to its political platforms discussed in Chapter Two, the platforms have never enjoyed universal support amongst members. Second, although the group had a strong track record of democratic behaviour in its early years, its experience as an opposition group under authoritarianism changed the group, endowing it with a desperation for relevance that has made it vulnerable to opportunism. In particular, the group’s behaviour between 1967 and 2011 had significant consequences for the group’s credibility in Syria after the 2011 uprising began.
While Alexis de Tocqueville is most famous for his analysis of American democracy, this chapter argues that when it came to France, he preferred parliamentarism over the American constitutional model. During his long career in French parliamentary politics, Tocqueville in fact developed a distinctive theory of parliamentarism, which was different from Constant’s, but which also differed from the conception of parliamentarism propagated by Constant’s great rivals, the Doctrinaires. Tocqueville rejected Constant’s argument for a monarch who reigned but did not govern. However, he agreed with Constant that corruption posed a severe threat to the survival of French parliamentarism.