Hypocrisy, when addressed at all, is typically considered a functional, even valuable, aspect of international political practice within international relations theory. It is alternatively seen as necessary to the exercise of sovereignty and a rhetorical device used to seek pragmatic political change. Utilising insights from feminist, queer, and postcolonial theory, this article challenges this understanding of hypocrisy. The article demonstrates that hypocrisy is animated and elided by an investment in a particularly liberal vision of politics and international order (and concomitant obfuscation of the racialised, sexual, gendered, and colonial underpinnings of those same assumptions). The notion of hypocrisy relies upon a unitary and stable subject whose moral consistency is to be expected across time and space – a luxury less afforded to those disadvantaged within intersectional international hierarchies. Consequently, although the charge of hypocrisy appears to be about holding power to account, the article finds that it serves less to uphold normative principles than to re-centre the privileged and powerful subject – typically, the sovereign state of liberal international order – and its consistency with itself, as the unit and basis of moral concern. The article concludes by outlining the limitations of hypocrisy as a strategy of critique.

Liberal neutrality compels governments to respect individual preferences. Yet health-promotion campaigns, such as modern tobacco control policies, often seek to cultivate a preference for a healthy lifestyle. Liberal theorists have attempted to justify these policies by appealing to the concept of ‘means paternalism’, whereby these policies align with existing preferences. In contrast, this article argues that shaping preferences can be not only permissible but also morally required. Governments can preserve neutrality while influencing preferences by promoting generic goods valued in diverse societies and considering the preference-formation of future generations. This argument provides a stronger rationale for tobacco control policies.

In 1912, the Italian parliament approved the extension of male suffrage, making it ‘almost’ universal. This process of revising representation transformed the very idea of the relationship between citizens and the state and shaped a profoundly different Italy. The aim of this article is to trace both the process leading to the approval of universal suffrage and its impact on the party system. With a compilation and analysis of data developed from scratch for the elections of 1909 and 1913, it was possible to analyse the main dimensions of the two rounds in a disaggregated manner. Three aspects make 1913 a year of transition. First, the degree of competition in the electoral process, especially in the South, increased considerably. Second, the decline of liberal formations was not transformed into defeat, thanks only to the Catholic vote. Third, the birth of the Popular Party and the failure to create a mass party of conservatives were causes of the imbalance in the party structure.

This article examines the ways in which the language of legal rights is invoked by those seeking to improve the treatment of animals. Drawing from a range of analytical, realist, and critical legal and social theorists, it argues that certain argumentative techniques commonly employed to justify the extension of legal rights to animals may serve to strengthen and reproduce the very forms of exploitation they seek to challenge. The article begins by identifying and critiquing the binary characterisation of rights/welfare and property/personality in liberal animal law scholarship. It then employs the insights of Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin to expose and critique various appeals to an ‘exterior’ or ‘extra-legal’ domain which functions to stabilise the meaning of these doctrinal categories. In doing so, it explores the strategic viability of rights discourse in the animal advocacy movement with a view to highlighting the limitations of liberal constructions of animal rights.

Michael Walzer's use of John Stuart Mill's A Few Words on Non-Intervention (1859) helped to inaugurate it as a canonical text of international theory. However, Walzer's use of the text was highly selective because he viewed the first half as a historically parochial discussion of British foreign policy, and his interest in the second was restricted to the passages in which Mill proposes principles of international morality to govern foreign military interventions to protect third parties. As a result, theorists tend to see those canonized passages as if through a glass darkly. Attention to the detail and context of Mill's first-half critique of Lord Palmerston's opposition to the Suez Canal project reveals that his discussion of purely protective intervention is embedded in a broader exploration of the limits of self-defence, including the moral permissibility of preventive military force and the use of protective interventions for defensive purposes. Moreover, reading the text holistically facilitates a refutation of some objections directed at it by Michael Doyle to the effect that Mill's conception of self-defence incorporates elements of aggression which makes it extremely dangerous when adapted for application to the contemporary world.

I compare Christopher Lasch's thought to specific features that research in political science attributes to contemporary populism. Lasch openly favoured a historical form of populism but is rarely considered when current forms of populism are discussed. The research literature characterizes populism as superficially tied to democracy while undermining it, as committed to the moral binary of people and elites, and as intellectually “thin” because it does not engage with the complex theories that ground other ideologies. These characters make populism incoherent and inimical to democracy. Lasch manifests all three characters while connecting them to a sustained worldview. Humans’ awareness of death is the core feature that makes them rational, ethical and equal. Attempts to dilute that awareness are inimical to the equality at democracy's basis. Experts and professionals encourage this dilution by promising remedies and progress. Democracy depends on ordinary people who resist elites and their complex phraseologies.

This article considers the political theory and political theology of Arnold Ruge during the years he edited the Hallische and Deutsche Jahrbücher, paying special attention to his relationship with a variety of “liberalisms” circulating at the time. It argues that Ruge's central and consistent commitment was to the “absolute state,” which he described as “an end in itself.” Such a state, Ruge believed, would constitute a space in which citizens could realize their public freedom. I show how Ruge constructed this approach through critical engagements with three forms of liberalism: the Romantic nationalist liberalism of Ernst Moritz Arndt; the ethical pluralist liberalism of Franz von Flourencourt; and the pragmatic economic liberalism of Karl Biedermann. I conclude with reflections on Ruge's 1843 “Eine Selbstkritik des Liberalismus.”

US and UK courts define religion as a belief system dealing with existential concerns, which is separable from politics, and need not be theistic. Where does this concept of religion come from? Some scholars trace it to the advent of the Protestant Reformation when religion became a matter of competing theological propositions. My analysis of both John Calvin and Roger Williams shows that those Protestant thinkers emphasized the view that religion is essentially a belief system. However, Protestantism cannot explain all of the features of the US and UK concept of religion. It is because of the liberal belief in individual rights and in popular sovereignty that early liberals like Roger Williams and contemporary courts embrace the separability of religion from politics. These courts also reject the view that religion is necessarily theistic given their liberal commitment to treating citizens that subscribe to certain non-theistic ideologies as equal citizens to citizens with theistic ideologies.