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How has English-speaking Canadian political science conceived of the relationship between Quebec and Canada? Why has an issue that has been considered central for more than three decades become less attractive, if not marginal, within the discipline? The aim is to examine, from this example, the overlapping relationship between science and politics. The intent is also to show that Canadian political science has examined the Quebec/Canada relationship from four different angles: 1) its interest in Quebec politics was part of the urgency of the moment, based on a crisis that challenged the foundations of the political system; 2) it questioned the legitimacy of the sources of the dispute, namely the compatibility between the new expressions of Quebec nationalism with the presumed principles on which the Canadian political community had been founded; 3) Quebec nationalism also encouraged a reflection on the existence (or not) of “English Canada” as a sociological and political reality; 4) the combination of the first three factors caused the prescriptions for getting out of, or resolving, the crisis to evolve over time, to the point of rendering research on this issue obsolete.
La Commission de vérité et réconciliation du Canada (CVRC) réitérait en 2015 la volonté des Peuples Autochtones de renouveler leur relation avec l’État canadien. Cet article présente une réflexion théorique sur les possibilités offertes par le fédéralisme afin de renouveler cette relation entre les Autochtones et l’État. L'article confronte les arguments des tenants du fédéralisme comme cadre des relations entre les Autochtones et l’État et ceux des critiques de l’établissement d'un rapport fédéral de nation à nation entre les Peuples Autochtones et le Canada. L'article présente donc une proposition pour le renouvellement de la relation entre les Autochtones et l’État à travers un modèle de fédéralisme basé autour de régions autochtones autonomes.
This chapter is in many ways a chapter that reaches interesting abstractions on the nature of power, rights, and of constitutionalism, all in the interests of environmental law. We began with a discussion on Tiebout, who argued that when people with the same preferences cluster together in communities, that competition between local authorities will, under certain restrictive conditions, lead to allocative efficiency. This implies a market in jurisdictions and in states competing in public goods and services. Van den Bergh’s model forecasts a 'bottom up federalisation', wherein the default assumption is that the best level of governance is at the most local level available, unless it is otherwise demonstrable that the particular environmental issue cannot be sufficiently resolved at that level of government. Another point that we addressed is the issue of centralisation, of whether all actors should be required to comply with a singular jurisdiction-wide regulatory requirement to prevent an environmental problem (centralisation), or, should they be allowed to individually discover their own most efficient method of preventing the environmental problem (decentralisation).
Law and Economics views the operation of private and public law as complementary, best seen as two aspects of a joint mechanism to guide actors in their environmental behaviours. This is a mechanism design technique from game theory, often referred to in popular press as ‘smart mixes'. Liability rules have their limits. Perhaps most noteworthy is that you have no case until you are already injured, thus civil liability rules are not optimal. Public regulations can monitor behaviour prior to an accident. Public regulation has a more diverse set of governance tools, including criminal law and incarceration. Public regulation is not free from its own problems. Agency capture and deflection of regulatory drafting are major concerns. Private regulatory mechanisms are programmess wherein public authorities design mechanisms that engage several private parties, all related to the environmentally risky activity, to create new interactions that both reveal more data and alter private behaviour to align with public regulatory goals. The story of environmental Law and Economics is not a tale in defence of private law rights against public law regulation, but rather a harmonious tale of two systems that can be integrated to function as a more effective and efficient whole.
Instead of assuming “warlords” as a homogeneous counter-force to the May Fourth enlightenment while imagining Chinese intellectuals as a natural alliance for the “anti-warlordism” National Revolution, this article examines the prevailing idea exchange and political collaboration between Chen Jiongming, the Cantonese military strongman, and the May Fourth intellectual within and beyond regional borders. Between 1919 and 1922, Chen Jiongming not only fostered his anarcho-federalist blueprint, but also garnered support from prominent thinkers hailing from across different ideological camps such as Liang Bingxian, Chen Duxiu, and Hu Shi. Focusing on the ideological and intellectual aspects of warlord rule, this article attempts to situate the study of warlordism against the backdrop of the Chinese enlightenment, to downplay the differences between the man of guns and the man of letters, and thereby to redefine, re-characterize, and reappraise “warlords” as active agents—the initiators—of China's renewals during this formative period.
This chapter tests the main empirical hypothesis introduced at the end of Chapter 7. If it is true that the most significant mode of persistence of the Christian Democratic ideology in the contemporary political landscape is not as a partisan phenomenon, but rather as a feature of established institutional frameworks and political cultures in regimes where it previously held a dominant political position, then many of its distinctive features should still be visible in these institutional frameworks and political cultures. To see whether this is indeed the case, I will focus on one such regime in particular: the EU.
This chapter discusses how Republicans at the federal and state level are adding behavior modification requirements to a wide array of public benefits programs, thus driving a divide between red and blue states. Behavior modification requirements include tying public assistance to work requirements, family caps (limits on benefits based on family size), and drug tests. Congress first approved behavior modification requirements on a large-scale as part of welfare reform in 1996. These requirements are attempts to control the behavior of the poor, based on an assumption that poor people are morally deficient. To implement these changes, Republicans are using federalism tools such as waivers, or statutorily permitted deviations from federal program norms on a state-by-state basis. The Trump administration has already approved work requirements for Medicaid and signaled that it will permit a range of behavior modification requirements in housing and nutrition assistance programs. As a result, state variations in terms of poverty rates and poverty relief will deepen. In short, a person’s experience at the bottom of the economic ladder differs widely depending on where they live, and red state versus blue state policy differences are driving part of that geographic divergence.
This chapter describes how states and their human service agencies team up with private companies to turn vulnerable populations into sources of revenue. Cash-strapped states have been unwilling to raise sufficient revenue through general taxation and are thus looking for money elsewhere, including schemes that are largely unknown to the public to divert federal aid and other funds from children and the poor. Foster care agencies take resources from children in their care, including Social Security disability and survivor benefits, Veteran’s Assistance benefits if their parents died in the military – and even child support. States use illusory budget shell games to siphon away billions in Medicaid funds intended for children and low-income adults. Juvenile courts maximize revenue by removing children from their homes. To illustrate the interconnections of a sampling of the practices, Anna is introduced, a hypothetical foster child who encounters and is impacted by the revenue strategies in different states. The chapter explains how the state practices are undermining the purpose of government and the intended benefits of fiscal federalism – and how a fundamental realignment is required so that states are true to their purpose, to exist not for themselves but for the good of the people.
This chapter argues that federalism-based controversies in the social welfare field over legal structures, legal rules, and the location of governance are best understood as arguments about both deservingness and control played out through controversies about administrative structure. In short, programs are called “welfare,” or are urged by some to be more like “welfare,” when what is really meant is that we wish to use the administrative mechanisms of federalism to control, stigmatize, punish, and deter recipients. In contrast, when we perceive recipients as entitled, these mechanisms fall away to be replaced by purely federally controlled, far less visible, and far more inviting administrative structures. To make this process visible, the chapter describes the administrative tools of benefit programs across the economic spectrum, as well as the corresponding cultural assumptions tied to programs across this spectrum, and then contextualizes a debate like the one over Medicaid work rules in this context.
This chapter focuses on traditional cash welfare. It provides background on federal cash assistance to poor families, explains current TANF policy, and proposes that antipoverty scholars turn their attention to a fundamental precondition of democratic experimentalism: the presence of meaningful and well-functioning democracy that includes the poor. A democratic structure that operates nondemocratically by weakening the political voices of poor people is an insufficient environment for a just approach to welfare. Instead of laboratories of democracy, states in this domain often function as laboratories of suffering –political entities that experiment upon poor people without robust informed consent. While some democratic deficits are likely inevitable in any system, in welfare, we see a governance structure in which the sole direct beneficiaries of the regime are largely shut out of the democratic processes that structure that regime.
Holes in the Safety Net: Federalism and Poverty explores the relationship between antipoverty programs and federalism. The introduction provides a foundation for the rest of the book through an overview of the extent and nature of poverty in the United States as well as a brief history of how welfare programs have changed over time. We are at a moment in which the basic structure of the safety net is uncertain and up for grabs. Proposals to replace existing programs with block grants or to allow states to impose tougher restrictions on welfare recipients abound, often justified using the language of federalism. This chapter introduces these challenges and then provides a roadmap of the rest of the book.
Contrary to popular belief, states long have played crucial policy-making roles in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly food stamps). The goals of state involvement has evolved as various interest groups have gained and lost power and as those groups’ attention to SNAP has risen or fallen. In the program’s early days, many states saw themselves as disciplinarians of the poor, anxious to keep food assistance from dampening low-income people’s willingness to perform hard labor for small wages. As agriculture mechanized and urban areas asserted greater power in state politics, states shifted to seeking to maximizing federal SNAP funding, both for themselves and for low-income households. The federal quality control (QC) system pitted state administrators’ interests against those of recipient households. It also led to two decades of strife between states and federal administrators, destabilizing the program. More recently, right-wing groups have sought to make state SNAP policy a vehicle for ideological warfare. The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) and allied groups have won passage of legislation requiring states to adopt options that deny food assistance to many low-income households in genuine need.
Antipoverty efforts must begin early because abundant evidence demonstrates that experiences during the first five years of life lay a foundation for future learning and the acquisition of skills. Public investments can help foster early childhood development, but these efforts must begin early and must involve both parents and children. This chapter describes the patterns of convergence and divergence in state approaches to supporting early childhood development. For the prenatal period until age three, the federal government is the primary source of funds, and there is fairly limited variation in how this money is spent across the states. For the period from age three until entrance to kindergarten, the federal government and states largely share the cost of supporting early childhood development, leading to significant differences among the states, particularly in access to preschool for three- and four-year-olds. This chapter explores these funding differences, emphasizing the political economy of state choices and noting that, perhaps surprisingly, some conservative-leaning states, not known for generous social welfare spending, are making a substantial effort to invest in early childhood education, especially for four-year-olds. The chapter closes with insights for both advocates and scholars.
A resurgence in work requirements for safety-net programs, including the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), has marked the early years of the Trump administration. Some lawmakers at both the federal and state level have moved to revive and expand SNAP’s work requirements, despite evidence that such work requirements do little to increase self-sufficiency or improve long-term economic outcomes among those living in poverty. This chapter takes up the issue of work requirements in the context of rural communities, where the need for safety-net programs and food system supports is acute. We begin with a brief overview of SNAP and examine the recent push to make SNAP work requirements more strict. We then turn to an overview of the need and current state of use of the social safety net in rural America. If work requirements are to be effective – and, indeed, appropriate – work opportunities must be available. We, therefore, consider employment data and information on safety-net use across the rural-urban axis. Finally, we present a case study about the results of relatively early efforts to impose work requirements on SNAP receipt in Maine.
This chapter clarifies how the practice of poverty law has changed since Congress created federally funded legal services in 1964. Lawyering on behalf of poor people has always been deeply entangled with the actions of individual states. However, 50 years since the War on Poverty, poverty lawyering has become even more state focused. The increasingly state-based nature of the work has wide-ranging implications for legal practice and the development of doctrine. The chapter pays particular attention to the limitations and opportunities lawyers face that are specific to poverty law. Lawyers practice in spite of restrictions placed on federally funded organizations, challenges of coordination across states, and the fragility of private funding and pro bono assistance. States also face limitations in their lawmaking, but these fiscal, bureaucratic, and legislative weaknesses create various openings in which poverty lawyers can lobby and litigate.
Throughout American history, protecting states’ rights within federal health reform laws has served purposes other than the needs of the poor, such as excluding those deemed undeserving of assistance, the “able-bodied.” This chapter explores the role of federalism in health reform, paying particular attention to the importance of universality in programs meant to aid the poor, such as Medicaid. American federalism is dynamic, involving separate state negotiations with the federal government rather than the fixed dual sovereignty imagined by the Supreme Court. Such negotiations lead to variability, which in health care may lower the baseline for reform-resistant states and thus the nation as a whole. This is especially significant when the federal government attempts to improve conditions nationwide, as it did with the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA’s) universal health insurance coverage. The example of Medicaid expansion under the ACA demonstrates how state variability can improve coverage but also jeopardize it; keeping states in the picture sometimes results in restricting access to the safety net rather than strengthening it. The debates of the twentieth century about the role of government in health and who is deserving of aid are bound to repeatedly arise without fully gauging federalism’s mixed effects in health reform.