By the 1990s, India’s appellate courts had become closely involved in the regulation of street vending in several metropolitan cities. However, despite the frequent use of legal mechanisms by street vendor collectives, there has been little progress towards “formalization” of the street vending economy. To understand the limited impacts of legal intervention, it is necessary to examine the timing and the circumstances under which street vendor collectives first turned to judicial forums for protecting their livelihoods. Based on a historical examination of street vendor politics in Bombay and Madras, I show that legal mobilization in both instances was a response to serious threats faced by the political regimes that had previously shielded street vendors from dispossession and exploitation, rather than being a direct result of new legal opportunities (such as the emergence of public interest litigation). Since organized street vendors had a strong preference for maintaining the status quo, litigation was used as an effective method for buying time in the face of a hostile or uncertain political environment, even when the ultimate verdict was not likely to favor street vendors.

Activists have long turned to courts to influence policy. Much of the literature analyzing the experience of activists using courts has focused on judicial outcomes, yet accomplishments beyond successful judgments can be of equal importance as they also effect social change. In particular, engaging in litigation can have a demonstrable impact on the social movements themselves – building and strengthening movements, and providing spaces for manoeuvring. This chapter examines the impact of litigation on the development of the Right to Food Campaign in India, one of India's largest contemporary social movements. Using qualitative data from in-depth interviews with activists and lawyers and a comparative analysis with an earlier case, this chapter analyzes the factors and conditions under which courts can be catalysts for social mobilization, including the existence of opportunities for reform, pre-existing rights consciousness and organizational resources available for mobilization.

This chapter argues that ethnicity is a universal human characteristic; it is an identity whose moral economy of mutual social relations causes internal dispute more continuously than external contexts cause interethnic competition. Ethnicities are mixed, shared, and subject to constant change in their own self-awareness and their inter-relations with others. The last two centuries of Kenya’s history illustrate this point. In the stateless, precolonial, past, different ways of taming the varied regional environment were the greatest influence on the nature of “ecological ethnicities” that shared ideas, took in each others’ economic migrants, and engaged in little “inter-tribal war”. Under colonial rule, access to scriptural literacy and arguments about how best to resist subjection caused much a sharper, patriotic, ethnic self-awareness. Regional inequalities in development, especially the triumph of agriculture over pastoralism, made ethnicity more competitive – a condition greatly emphasised when independence gave some Africans a centralised coercive power over others. Kenya has only recently adopted a devolved constitution that may defuse this often lethal competition but it is as yet too early to say.

This chapter attempts to review comprehensively the interconnection between ethnicity, development and social cohesion with special reference to modern history and contemporary circumstances in Africa. Ethnicity is a historical construct, changeable in relation to the political economy of the modern state. At the same time, ethnicity is a given and overwhelming reality for people, thereby reciprocally affecting politics and economy. Ethnicity dynamically changes in accordance with vertical and horizontal cleavages and thus intra- and inter-ethnic relations and given competitive situation for limited resources in the state and market has tended to result in exclusionary ethnic cohesion and political tribalism in Africa. African ethnicity and its interconnection with development and social cohesion should be understood, referring to phenomena occurring in the contemporary context of globalization: increasing migration causing ethnic diversity and exclusionary reactions, increasing corruption and decline of trust in the state, international spread of organized crimes, increasing incapability of national governments towards global crisis, destructive impact of unregulated markets, and yawning inequality as a global issue. We then examine five critical issues with grave political and economic implications: building democratic institutions, constitutions and governance devolution, media and education, land and territory, natural resources and foreign investment. We conclude the chapter with argument that achieving growth with equity and social cohesion through overcoming relevant problems is not unique challenge to Africa in this acceleratingly globalizing world.

This chapter sketches future scenarios of TRIPS implementation in developing countries by looking at past experience and current trends, and by comparing historical and cross-country patterns. The chapter focuses on the three largest emerging economies - Brazil, India, and China (BICs) - because they have the highest potential to shape the intellectual property regime. The chapter finally draws some lessons from these previous experiences to suggest what the likely positions of the BICs will be on TRIPS implementation up to 2025.

In recent years, the negotiation of various trade agreements, such as the TPP, TTIP and CETA, has been accompanied by a large public backlash. Are we observing a paradigm shift in public perception of world trade or just temporary shifts in public support for the global economic order that oscillate around a more or less steady level? This chapter provides an overview of the major determinants of support for or opposition against PTAs and discusses how much room to maneuver policy makers have in designing such agreements. Furthermore, we discuss what policy makers can do to increase support for such agreements. We thereby focus on framing strategies and provide an analysis of which types of arguments are conducive to increase support for PTAs and how individuals process such information. This allows us to construct different future scenarios for policy makers to better align the negotiation and design of future trade agreements with the demand of their constituencies.

The chapter focuses on the WTO’s current crisis, most visibly manifested in the forced vacancies on the Appellate Body and the foreseeable disappearance of what used to be described as the “jewel in the crown” of the WTO. Hahn is of the opinion that this crisis will only be ended, if the members can agree on a number of reform steps relating to the broader governance of the system. The author predicts that without those changes, the organization will wither away like a picture of Dorian Gray. Hahn describes the different issues that need to be addressed that range from privileging a multi-speed WTO, the status of developing countries, the intellectual property approach by China as well as changes in anti-dumping and anti-subsidy laws.

International migration is a relative newcomer on the “trade and” agenda and has hitherto received relatively little attention in trade and migration studies alike. The inclusion of labour migration as one essential mode of cross-border trade in services, so-called Mode 4 in the GATS, opened the agenda for more far-reaching developments at the level of regional and bilateral free-trade agreements . This chapter shows that this deepening of the trade-migration nexus is intricately linked to power shifts in the global economy and the rise of regionalism. For the international trade regime in 2025, this means that, in combination with the ongoing power transitions, the trade-related mobility agenda is likely to expand beyond what the former sponsors of the GATS agreement, the European Union (EU) and the United States, originally intended.

The Introduction summarizes the book's main research questions and arguments. It asks why forty-nine Muslim-majority countries have higher levels of violence, authoritarianism, and underdevelopment, in comparison to world averages. It criticizes the explanations that point to Islam or Western colonialism as the root cause. Instead, it argues that the ulema–state alliance, which emerged in the eleventh century, has been the main reason for Muslims' enduring problems. The ulema–state alliance marginalized the intellectual and bourgeois classes. This alliance also eliminated a certain level of separation between religious and political authorities, as well as intellectual and economic dynamism, which existed in the Muslim world before the eleventh century.

This chapter critically evaluates explanations that identify Western colonization/exploitation of Islam as the key factor for underdevelopment. It then explores the roles of the ulema’s anti-progressive ideas and political authoritarianism in contributing to socioeconomic underdevelopment in Muslim countries. The chapter uses the term “vicious circle” to highlight the interactivity of these problems. Next, the chapter examines the role of history and institutions. It stresses that exclusionary institutions in the Muslim world have been produced by authoritarian rulers, who hold political power, and the ulema, who provide the ideological legitimation. The chapter concludes with an explanation of why it is necessary to analyze the history of Muslim societies and polities in order to assess their contemporary problems, linking Part I of the book to Part II.

This chapter focuses on the discourse emanating from developing countries regarding international economic law, particularly as it relates to liberalization and development. It highlights tensions between narratives of cooperation among developing countries and domestic realities of diverging interests and priorities. With respect to cooperation, the larger, middle-income countries and some regional groupings emphasize mutual respect for sovereignty and domestic political economy choices. Investment relations among them are ostensibly in support of domestically designed developmental projects and needs. South–South trade groups seek to unlock regional potential free from the political constraints that often accompany North–South trade relations. However, a closer consideration of the domestic discourse and political economy models of Brazil, China, India and African countries (in the context of regional groupings such as SADC- and African Union-sponsored initiatives) denotes significant divergences in objectives for trade and investment relations, as well as in the degree and means of economic liberalization.

This chapter begins by examining Muslims’ military, commercial, and intellectual achievements between the seventh and eleventh centuries. At that time, most of Islamic scholars (ulema) were funded by commerce, while only a few of them served the state. The merchants flourished as an influential class. The chapter goes on to analyze the beginning of the intellectual and economic stagnation in Muslim lands in the eleventh century. It explains how, gradually, the ulema became a state-servant class and the military state came to dominate the economy. The alliance between the ulema and the military state diminished the influence of philosophers and merchants. This changing distribution of authority led to the long-term stagnation, if not the decline, of Muslim intellectual and economic life. This gradual process began in the eleventh century and continued for centuries, as subsequent chapters elaborate.

The Conclusion summarizes the book’s arguments about Muslim and Western countries’ comparative conditions of development and their historical origins. It emphasizes that these countries are similar, at least comparable. It reiterates that neither Islam nor Western colonialism can simply explain the problems of violence, authoritarianism, or socioeconomic underdevelopment in Muslim countries. Thus, both essentialist and post-colonial explanations are unsatisfactory. Instead, the ulema–state alliance, which emerged in the eleventh century and marginalized intellectual and bourgeois classes, has been the main reason for Muslims’ long-lasting problems. At the end, the book recommends that Muslims pursue a political and socioeconomic reform to revive the intellectual and economic dynamism they had in early Islamic history. For such a reform to take place, Muslims need creative intellectuals and an independent bourgeoisie, who can balance the power of the ulema and state authorities.

This chapter analyzes the problem of violence in many Muslim countries. It emphasizes that there is no Muslim exceptionalism; violence has occurred in all parts of the world. The frequent Muslim terrorist activities are a relatively recent trend that began in the 1980s. This trend is related to the worldwide decline of socialism and the rise of religious political movements. The chapter critically analyzes the explanations that point to either Islam or Western colonialism as the root cause of violence in several Muslim countries. The chapter examines the roles of Jihadi-Salafism and the ulema in Muslim countries’ problems with violence. It emphasizes that military conflicts and terrorism have multiple causes, including socioeconomic and political conditions, especially in authoritarian states.

How we narrate is intimately related to who we are and how well we are doing. Our narratives are built in social interactions with others, and those interactions are nested within broader sociocultural and historical contexts. Thus our narratives can be validated but also negated, negotiated, and reconstructed in ways that privilege both particular contents and particular ways of narrating those contents. In the process, what is not said (silence) becomes as important for identity as what is said (voice). We explore how voice and silence in narratives are shaped both unconsciously and intentionally in how people tell their stories to and with others. Our sociocultural and developmental perspective also highlights the role of cultural master narratives in influencing the structure and content of individuals’ narratives. Using examples from our research, we demonstrate how these various forms of cultural narratives are embraced, contested, negotiated, and/or negated in specific social interactions – giving rise to narratives that allow the construction of certain voices and leave other voices absent, and what this means for individual identity. We also consider the research context as a specific form of interaction that can shape both voice and silence.