In the philosophical discussion of the last decades, the position has gained a foothold according to which there is a more or less well-identifiable, partly detached domain of values, which is not necessarily hypostatized, but which supposedly belongs to the furniture of the world. This discussion is commonly conducted using the vocabulary of “moral realism,” and it has in the meantime generated subtly nuanced formulations and argumentations. After an initial phase, the discussion has subsequently centred on the nature of normativity. The subtlety of positions and the ingenuity of argumentations is impressive – expressed in a philosophical style that ceased to be baroque, intended for outdoor use, and has taken up features of rococo, which is at home mainly indoors. This chapter suggests that empirical findings should be taken seriously and develops a novel naturalistic account of normativity informed by the deliverances of the sciences.

In solitude, as with any human experience, choice is an important driver. We know that humans, in general, like having some decision-making capability, or at least the perception of it. Positive time spent in solitude stems from the desire to be with ourselves, and we talk about how to exercise choice to be more comfortable and stronger in solitude. Simply wanting to avoid other people does not unlock its benefits and opportunities. The fact that you choose to devote your morning walk, drive to work, or shower time to solitude is what matters in building an enduring practice of everyday solitude. In this chapter, we also consider involuntary solitude, like prisoners in solitary confinement and pandemic lockdowns. This chapter also looks at what it means to have a "preference for solitude," the importance of understanding motivation in why we’re choosing time alone, and what it means to have the right framing and expectations for solitude.

Little in mainstream society indicates that when we choose it, solitude can be wonderful, even transformative. Instead, the focus on loneliness in modern life can make us think that solitude is a disease requiring treatment, and maybe cured by avoiding solo moments altogether. Until recently, science has supported those assumptions because decades of prevailing research have focused on humans as “social animals” and the fact that fulfilling relationships are integral to well-being. By comparison, scientists have spent very little time and resources on understanding the role of solitude, and the power of positive solitude in particular, in shaping our lives. That’s why we three researchers with very different backgrounds formed our Solitude Lab and have spent several years researching what time alone means to different people around the world. In Solitude, we share those insights from thousands of people from all walks of life who helped us to redefine and reframe time alone as a chosen place, a zone of truth, sincerity, independence, and intimacy where we can best connect with our values, interests, and emotions.

This chapter explores aspects of Sen’s analysis of self-interest and commitment, seeking to highlight their interplay by probing some imagined situations. Detailing three facets of self-interest the author detects in traditional economic theory and the two forms of committed behaviour he then identifies (not confining one’s goals to the pursuit of ones own welfare and not basing one’s choices exclusively on one’s goals at the expense of those of others), the implied eightfold pattern of interrelations between these subtle concepts is presented, illustrated by a hypothetical internet dating conundrum. Sen’s stress on the self as a reasoning, self-scrutinizing agent who may but (in contrast with much prevailing theory) need not choose on the basis of self-interest underpins an account of rational choice that pays more respect to individual freedom, with significance in economics. Using an example outlining conflicting duties and pressures UK MPs might have felt during Brexit votes, Sen’s account is defended against attacks that, through reliance on strained definitions of interests and goals, seem to over-exploit the potential malleability of language.

This chapter introduces the basics of the economic approach to understanding decision-making. This is done using examples drawn from consumer decision-making in the context of healthcare. Topics include how to think about preferences, different types of costs, optimization, and the importance of perceptions. The end of chapter supplement discusses how to use price indexes.

Chapter 4 explains how in traditional liberalism, autonomy as the ability to reason has been recognised as the foundation for personhood, thereby excluding adults with cognitive disability. Interpretations of Article 12 that require the abolition of decision-making by substitutes refashion autonomy from being marked by rationality and independence to being marked by shared personhood and interdependence so as to include adults with cognitive disability. I argue that these refashionings ultimately fail because despite avowals to the contrary, they perpetuate the privileging of rationality and of the bounded, independent individual. They also fail to recognise the interdependency of Article 12 with other rights in the CRPD, especially socio-economic rights. I argue that a concept of autonomy as achievement, as the development of autonomy competencies, as demanding the availability of a range of options and as demanding recognition of the indivisibility of human rights is the autonomy underpinning Article 12 and the CRPD.

Chapter 7 summarises the book’s findings and explains their implications for advocacy and law reform. It argues that recognition of the indivisibility of human rights is important to ensure that targeted services are provided for people with disability to address their disproportionate levels of socio-economic disadvantage. It decries the privileging of civil and political rights especially the right to legal capacity over all other rights, for encouraging the ‘lazy state’ that erroneously justifies its neglect of marginalised people in the name of upholding their human rights. It provides the example of personalised or individualised services premised on simplistic notions of choice and control, which often fail to uphold the rights of people with cognitive disabilities. It stresses the importance for the state and community of acknowledging difference to promote services that ensure civil, economic, political, social and cultural inclusion in all cases.

We introduce choreographic choice, another construct for choosing between alternative choreographies. Differently from conditionals, choreographic choices are not necessarily resolved by a single process but might require performing interactions instead.

This chapter introduces computational models of decision making as worthy successors to the traditional, algebraic utility framework that has dominated the field. It provides an overview of several different computational modeling approaches before providing a detailed example of perhaps the most well-established of these, based on sequential sampling of information and evidence accumulation. It is shown how this approach can account for common paradoxes in decision behavior, and how it can be extended to a variety of tasks and response modes while retaining the same basic cognitive principles. The chapter concludes with an illustration of how process-tracing methods that capture the information acquisition and response processes can help to evaluate computational models of decision making and discriminate among them.

Chapter 5 highlights that a large share of the singlehood scholarship draws little attention to the race or class dimensions of this demographic shift of the rise in singlehood. Collectively, Chapter 5 argues that the singlehood scholarship overlooks how systemic inequalities, including racism and gendered racism, shape singlehood among Black adults – especially Black women. Such shortcomings are particularly relevant when it comes to looking at whether Black individuals are single through choice or circumstance (or both), and what the implications of this are for the Love Jones Cohort particularly and the Black middle-class more generally. Chapter 5 looks at the degree to whether the women and men of the Love Jones Cohort chose their SALA status, and how systemic inequalities, institutional constraints, and societal pressures play a role in such decision-making (or lack thereof), particularly among the Cohort’s women. Chapter 5 suggests that while many hope or anticipate that they will one day marry and so leave the Cohort, this is not something they are willing to pay any price to achieve – and introduces the term “respectability singleness.”