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The crusading activity of Venice, more than that of any other participating society, was influenced by other activities and concerns, due to the range and depth of its commercial and strategic interests in theatres of conflict and along transit routes. Its role was reshaped over time by shifts in the geographical configurations of both crusading activity and Venetian interests. In the early decades of crusading, in which the forces of the maritime powers autonomously complemented the activities of other crusaders, crusading action was mingled with the assertion of Venetian prerogatives in the Adriatic and the Byzantine sphere. The shift from land to sea routes linked the role of the maritime cities increasingly to transport and escort of the armies of others, and hence to their geographical position as nodes on transit routes. The diversion to other routes of many of the crusaders from its natural catchment area as a port undercut Venice’s crusading prominence in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries, with the signal exception of the Fourth Crusade. Venice’s participation in late medieval crusading was constrained to varying degrees by the distribution of its territorial and commercial interests in the areas dominated by different powers.
Hungary has a long, rich history of wine production. Historians have emphasized wine's importance to the development of both the Hungarian economy and Hungarian nationalism. This article ties together these historiographical threads through a case study of a small village in one of Hungary's most famous wine regions. Tracing the village's history from the 1860s to World War I, the article makes three main claims. First, it demonstrates that from the start, this remote village belonged to wider networks of trade and exchange that stretched across the surrounding region, state, and continent. Second, it shows that even as Magyar elites celebrated the folk culture and peasant smallholders of this region, they also cheered the introduction of what they saw as scientific, rational agriculture. This leads to the last argument: wine achieved its place in the pantheon of Hungarian culture at a moment when the local communities that had grown up around its production and stirred the national imagination were undergoing dramatic and irreversible change.
After the collapse of the Habsburg Empire and the sanctioning of new national borders in 1920, the successor states faced the controversial task of reconceptualizing the idea of national territory. Images of historically significant landscapes played a crucial role in this process. Employing the concept of mental maps, this article explores how such images shaped the connections between place, memory, and landscape in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Hungarian revisionist publications demonstrate how Hungarian nationalists visualized the organic integrity of “Greater Hungary,” while also implicitly adapting historical memory to the new geopolitical situation. As a counterpoint, images of the Váh region produced in interwar Czechoslovakia reveal how an opposing political agenda gave rise to a different imagery, while drawing on shared cultural traditions from the imperial past. Finally, the case study of Dévény/Devín/Theben shows how the idea of being positioned “between East and West” lived on in overlapping but politically opposed mental maps in the interwar period. By examining the cracks and continuities in the picturesque landscape tradition after 1918, the article offers new insight into the similarities and differences of nation-building processes from the perspective of visual culture.
This article discusses the contribution of European political parties to democratic backsliding. It focuses on the European People’s Party’s efforts to protect the Hungarian government, and the European Conservatives and Reformists party’s permissive acceptance of the Polish government’s attacks on democracy and the rule of law, analysing these patterns of behaviour as a form of complicity in democratic backsliding. In a second step, the article examines the existing possibilities and normative justification for sanctioning European political parties that make a complicit contribution to democratic backsliding.
The great budgetary transformation of central Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union demonstrates the critical importance of economic context, political culture, history, and institutions in the recreation of public financial management systems. Since the collapse of the USSR, countries in this region have served as fiscal laboratories that experiment with budgetary reforms. This includes countries like Hungary and Poland that joined the European Union.
One of the major political narratives in the build-up to the critical parliamentary election of 2010 in Hungary was related to the “government of bankers.” Pre-2010 governments earned this label by the opposition based on their supposed close relationship with banking interests and for purportedly formulating financial and tax policy according to the needs of major financial institutions. In this article, we examine the preference attainment of the Hungarian Banking Association, the pre-eminent interest group in banking, and that of OTP, the biggest bank in Hungary, in order to evaluate this popular claim. The article addresses this challenge by comparing the policy influence of Hungarian Banking Association and OTP in the government cycles ending and starting in 2010. We adopt a computer-assisted qualitative content analysis framework and juxtapose the policy positions of the interest group in their formal communications with actual legislation related to the same issues. Results show that the general preference attainment of the banking lobby on major policy issues decreased after 2010—nevertheless, seismic activity was already under way after 2006.
In both Poland and Hungary new constitutions were adopted after elections that provided a new government with the formal capacity to control the process by excluding opposition interests. However, whereas in Poland the constitution was in the end the result of a compromise among a plurality of political interests, in Hungary the government unilaterally imposed the constitution with negative consequences for the future of democracy in the country. In this chapter, we argue that a more consensual constitution-making process was possible in Poland because opposition forces, in spite of their meager results in terms of parliamentary representation, were able to exert influence over the process through extra-institutional and institutional means. In contrast to Hungary, where opposition groups were extremely weak or discredited, in Poland extra-parliamentary opposition maintained significant support among voters and functioned as an effective political constraint on dominant parties. Thanks to their strength outside formal political institutions, opposition forces in Poland were able to induce incumbents to make changes in the constitution-making procedures that allowed them to have some clout in the drafting of the constitution.
Recent constitution-making episodes in countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia, Hungary, and Iceland have highlighted the important, varied roles that courts might play during constitution-making processes undertaken from a democratic starting point. This chapter develops a typology of the functions that courts have played during these processes. In some cases, courts have played a catalytic function, spurring constitution making that otherwise might not have occurred; in others, they have played a blocking function, stopping constitution making from taking place; and in a third set of cases, they have played a shaping function, neither catalyzing nor preventing constitution making, but instead impacting the nature of the process. These functions, in turn, tend to be tied to different theories of constitution making. What emerges from this survey is that there is no single best mode of judicial intervention during constitution making; the optimal response is contextual. A key descriptive goal is to understand how political context affects the ways in which courts act; a key normative goal is to improve the fit between the nature of judicial action and the needs of a given context.
Each of these chapters contains a case study of a couple from the relevant country. Each includes a description of the everyday life of the couple with respect to the division of housework and childcare, a recounting of the history of their relationship and how it became equal, a discussion of how they balance paid work and family, and an analysis of the factors that facilitate their equality. Those factors include their conviction in gender equality, their rejection of essentialist beliefs, their familism, and their socialization in their families of origin. By showing how and why they undo gender, these couples provide lessons on how equality at home can be achieved.
Social indices of social integration, such as divorce, were more successful in predicting the suicide rates of the elderly in the provinces of Hungary than they were in predicting the suicide rates of young adults.
This article was first conceived as a commemorative address for the centenary of the extinction of the Habsburg monarchy, which occurred in November 1918. It seeks to take a correspondingly broad view, geographically and chronologically, of the factors that occasioned that collapse. It addresses three main themes, structured loosely around three classic historiographical analyses of the monarchy as a whole. The great irony of the last phase of Habsburg rule in Central Europe is that it was undermined by precisely those elements in the politics and society of the region that seemed, on the face of things, to derive most advantage from it. The article concentrates on the long-term dysfunctionality caused by the evolution of the Hungarian and German problems, and by the progressive enfeeblement of dynastic institutions. It also engages more briefly with a countervailing phenomenon, that some of those interests most conspicuously spurned by central government might have been the readiest to rescue it. On the argument presented here, World War I, which finally brought the monarchy low, was a catalyst rather than an independent determiner of that outcome.
This chapter investigates structural labour market reforms in Hungary from 1986 to 2016, a period encompassing the fall of communism, EU accession in 2004 and the global financial crisis. Using the narrative approach, we identify three main labour reforms: in 1992 and 2002 aimed at increasing and in 2012 aimed at decreasing employment protection. We study their effects using a unique data set of about 6 million Hungarian wage earners. We find that (1) the skill premium almost doubled from 6.4 per cent in 1986 to 12.3 per cent in 2016, but peaking in 2004; (2) the gender wage gap decreased to a third with the difference in log wages declining from 0.31 in 1986 to 0.13 in 2004, with no changes thereafter; and (3) gender discrimination practically halved as the unexplained component from the Oaxaca decomposition of the difference in log wages decreased from 0.27 in 1989 to 0.15 after 2004.
In the mid-nineteenth century, it was the Habsburg Empire rather than any of the Germanic states that set the pattern for patent regulation in central Europe. Its statute for patent privileges in 1852 involved a strict definitions of novelty and explicit documentary demands for patent specifications across its territories. However, as the evolving German patent system became the dominant external reference point in later decades, leading figures in Austro-Hungary began to question its imperial patent system and looked increasingly to Berlin for their frameworks, although not excluding reference to Roman, French, and Anglo-American law. Thus a variety of legal traditions and intra-imperial debate wrought changes across the Austro-Hungarian territories that culminated in distinctive national systems once the Empire had dissolved in 1918. This chapter traces both the formal devolution from imperial to national patent systems in Austria, Hungary, Poland, and Czech regions as well as the persistent legal and technocratic imperatives that ultimately drew these legacy systems closer to each other again.
Spanish bullfights have been organized twice in Hungary: in 1904 and 1924. Unlike in 1904, when the bullfights arrived in Budapest from Paris and were held with the city's urban tourism promotion interests in mind, the 1924 corrida was connected to the internationalization of Spanish bullfights through their support by fascist Italy, causing a domestic political imbroglio in Hungary due to competing political and business interests at home. At the same time, the bullfights represented another novelty in the field of transnational popular entertainment, whose different waves had continuously reached Budapest since the late nineteenth century. Focusing on the 1924 event, the article argues that the bullfights organized in Budapest that year need to be understood from the perspective of interactions between postwar European authoritarian cultural politics, the domestic political scene in Hungary, and Spanish attempts to turn the bullfights into a transnational spectacle rivaling the popularity of British football. Although the bullfights did not take root in Hungary, their organization in Budapest represents an important chapter in the global advance of twentieth-century popular culture, a historically informed understanding of the formation of which requires consideration not just of successful but also failed processes of cultural transfer.
This chapter focuses on the rise and fall of growth and the incidence of recessions in centrally planned socialist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union. It studies the period of rapid growth and socialist industrialization in the 1950s and 1960s, the socialist stagnation of the 1970s, and the terminal decade of the 1980s. It discusses the rapid accumulation of foreign debt in convertible currencies in some socialist countries as an attempt to revert symptoms of stagnation and the effect of the debt crises of the early 1980s, with responses ranging from full repayment under extreme self-imposed austerity (in Romania) and attempted rescheduling in other countries. It examines the causes for deep contractions in several CEE countries, Russia, and Ukraine in the early 1990s and the impact of the crisis of 2008–09.
The issue of “constitutional identity” is a topic the relevance of which emerges in contemporary constitutional democracies in the context of constitutional changes. It has already attracted multilayered approaches, but its legal conceptualization is still underexposed. Based on regional European jurisprudence and doctrinal works, “constitutional identity” in a legal context is suggested to be viewed as the “identity of the constitution.” The identity of the constitution is found among provisions of constitutional texts and related jurisprudence that specifically and exclusively feature a status that was constituted during the constitution-making process and shaped by either formal or informal constitutional amendments. The legally applicable “identity of the constitution” comprises those articles that can be employed vis-à-vis EU law and unconstitutional amendments, and which are arguably intended to be applied in the face of international human rights obligations. It is posited that Germany and Hungary exemplify the “confrontational with EU law model,” while the model that emerged in the jurisprudence of the Italian Constitutional Court should be called the “cooperative model with embedded identity.” Today, it seems that the very content of the identity of the constitution of a particular Member State may be shaped and preserved through an active and cooperative dialogue between the supranational and national courts, if there is an inclination to find uniqueness in a community based on common legal traditions and values—Germany and Italy. Another way of determining the content of “constitutional identity” is to fiercely try to demonstrate that uniqueness. This is what Hungary seems to be engaged in, and that is why it may be proposed to call the Hungarian model a model of confrontational individualistic detachment.
In this interview, Paul Kahn discusses central aspects of his approach to the academic study of law. On the one hand, he reflects on the identity of the cultural analysis of law. In this regard, he points out how his approach differs from other forms of legal scholarship, in general, and from other cultural perspectives of law, in particular. He also makes explicit the philosophical tradition within which the cultural analysis of law is immersed and identifies his main theoretical influences. On the other hand, Kahn discusses the methods of the cultural analysis of law—that is, genealogy and architecture. Finally, Kahn examines the aims pursued by cultural analysis, as well as its contributions to the description and analysis of law. He also responds to some of the main objections that critics have offered against this form of scholarship.
Since the late 1980s, the interpretations of policy toward Hungary’s minorities—most notably the country’s 1993 minority law and the minority self-governments established as part of a system of nonterritorial autonomy (NTA)—have been the subject of debates in politics and academia in at least two critical respects. Aside from the declarative character of the law, foremost has been the question of Hungary’s kin-state activism toward Hungarians abroad and the implications this has carried for domestic minority issues. A second—and related—question has concerned the extent to which cultural autonomy and minority rights are in accordance with the needs of the Roma, by far the country’s largest ethnic minority group. A growing number of scholars have accepted the argument that the minority law was enacted because of concerns regarding Hungarian minorities living in the neighboring countries. In our view, it is more appropriate to ask instead how Hungary’s kin-state policies have influenced the opportunities for domestic groups, and, in particular, how Hungary fits into the broader context of post-Communist state- and nation-building projects. This is the approach we take in this article, which aims to unpack and reconcile the complex and seemingly contradictory findings on the Hungarian case. Our conclusions are drawn from a content analysis of parliamentary debates on the minority law—something that has never previously been undertaken. This is supplemented by semi-structured interviews with former and current politicians and minority activists.
Analyzing the newly emerged Trianon cult, this article argues that the current wave of memory politics became the engine of new forms of nationalism in Hungary constituted by extremist and moderate right-wing civic and political actors. Following social anthropologists Gingrich and Banks, the term neonationalism will be applied and linked with the concept “mythomoteur” of John Armstrong and Anthony D. Smith, emphasizing the role of preexisting ethno-symbolic resources or mythomoteurs in the resurgence of nationalism. Special attention will be given to elites who play a major role in constructing new discourses of the nation and seek to control collective memories, taking their diverse intentions, agendas, and strategies specifically into consideration. This “view from above” will be complemented with a “view from below” by investigating the meanings that audiences give to and the uses they make of these memories. Thus, the analysis has three dimensions: it starts with the analysis of symbols, topics, and arguments applied by public Trianon discourses; it continues with the analysis of everyday perceptions, memory, and identity concerns; and finally ends with an anthropological interpretation of memory politics regarding a new form of nationalism arising in the context of propelling and mainstreaming populist right-wing politics. The main argument of this article is that although the Hungarian Trianon cult, identified as national mythomoteur, invokes a historical trauma, it rather speaks to current feelings of loss and disenfranchisement, offering symbolic compensation through the transference of historical glory, pride, and self-esteem within a mythological framework. This article is part of a larger effort to understand the cultural logic and social support of new forms of nationalism in Hungary propelled by the populist far right.
This chapter provides an overview of the development of Hungary’s operetta scene and analyses the contrasts between shows written for a Hungarian audience and those created with an international public in mind. In Budapest, operetta shared the Hungarian lyric stage with the népszínmű (‘folk plays’ with music), a genre descended from the Austrian Volksstück, usually featuring more rural plots and simpler music. As time went on, operetta increasingly displaced népszínmű but continued to support shows with local plots. The latter did not serve composers well if they wished to expand their horizons beyond Hungary. I discuss Kálmán’s use of contrasting character types, such as the sophisticated European and exotic Hungarian and Gipsy, and contrast his approach with that of other Hungarian composers who wrote shows that were popular in Hungary but did not travel well. An example of a Hungarian work that draws on the operetta and népszínmű traditions is Zoltán Kodály’s Háry János. Generally labelled as a singspiel ‘symbolizing the poetic power of folklore’, using ‘genuine’ Hungarian folksong materials, it was, in fact, written and performed for the opera house rather than the commercial theatre. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of Hungarian operetta since World War II.