Utilitarian conservation focuses on a few ecological processes: population regulation in resource-limited systems, succession, predation, and competition. This approach assumes that nature tends toward equilibrium. According to this balance-of-nature mindset, populations are regulated by density-dependent processes. Exponential population growth can generate high numbers quickly, but competition for limiting resources generally keeps populations near the carrying capacity of their environment. In the absence of predation, however, populations may erupt, deplete their food supply, and crash. Similarly, plant associations go through predictable sequences of seral stages culminating in stable climatic climaxes that are able to reproduce themselves indefinitely unless in the absence of disturbances such as fire. Plant associations are groups of interdependent species that all react in the same way to their environment. Utilitarian conservation focuses on keeping populations of economically valuable species such as game animals and commercially harvested trees in balance with their environment.

New information and evidence challenge equilibrium models. Fluctuations among livestock in African rangelands and northern fur seals in the Pacific Ocean do not conform to models of competition for resources maintaining populations in equilibrium. Rather than the self-interested competition for resources predicted by the tragedy of the commons, many societies regulate resource use through cooperative arrangements. Evidence from several disciplines undermines the concept of a stable climax association that perpetuates itself indefinitely. Some so-called climax communities depend on disturbances, including natural or anthropogenic burning. Some ecosystems have multiple stable states, and some reach irreversible tipping points, which are becoming more likely because of climate change. Viewing nature as in flux rather than in balance addresses these issues, while the current scale of environmental change infuses a sense of urgency into these discussions.

Interorganizational coordination is increasingly viewed as crucial to frontline crisis response. Contemporary crises often require the collective action of multiple organizations. Many researchers recommend integrating frontline responders of diverse organizations to make good use of scarce resources and synchronize their actions. In practice, frontline responders frequently choose fragmentation by dividing responsibilities and limiting interactions instead. This allows them to implement a fast response without being dependent on others. At the same time, it can lead to safety risks and suboptimal outcomes. Frontline responders face a dilemma, because they have an interest in pursuing both integration and fragmentation. It is useful to note that coordination may not always be the right course of action in a crisis. Even if it is, it does not necessarily need to be formal, as much coordination emerges in the operational field. For more structured ways of coordinating, the nature of the crisis and existing interorganizational relations are useful guides in how to organize the coordination. Generally, it must be conditional upon the situation at hand.

In this chapter I first draw from the results of the study of the Byzantine icon to establish the definition of an “iconic mediation” in general. In a second move, I then dissolve the adequation model of mediation, or “seashell model” as inherently iconoclastic. I also outline key assumptions held by the “sonic resonance” model of mediation in Gadamer and the “window” mediation of Marion, concluding neither of them are adequate to account for the mediation of the icon. I thus develop a new schema of mediation, based on the model of a love letter, to guide our understanding of the paradoxical character of iconic mediation which preserves the visceral tension between “everything matters” and “nothing matters.” The love letter, like the icon, can be understood rigorously, but only from a higher point of view, from the horizon of love.

This chapter looks at the distribution of epichoric alphabets across the whole Aegean Basin, to the different styles of letter shapes used for writing the Greek language according to city of origin. The whole distribution is considered, and in comparing this to models used in previous generations the case is made that the situation is so complex that it cannot so easily be sketched out on a simple map. In focusing on case studies from sanctuaries and harbours, the long-held view is confirmed that these were places of hyper-connectivity, with communities and individuals competing for status – but that network analysis marks these patterns even more acutely. A wider point about data modelling is also made in this chapter. Depending on how representative one considers the data to be, very different patterns can be drawn (and very different conclusions can be reached).

Common ownership is the talk of the town in antitrust land. The competitive implications of rival firms being partially owned and controlled by a small set of overlapping owners are both fascinating and hotly contested. Could the source of potential harm be minority shareholder control in a setting of widely held companies? Critics question the extent and mechanisms of common owners’ influence driving any pro- or anticompetitive effects. This chapter aims to present a comprehensive account of partial ownership, capturing the incentives and effects of both individual and institutional investors and also cross- and common shareholding. It illustrates the early historical unity between corporate and competition laws in regulating shareholding acquisitions but also their progressive quiet disconnect. Triggered by the contemporary common ownership (hypo)thesis, it puts forward a taxonomy of shareholding types and their control characteristics from a competition law perspective, with emphasis on commonly thought passive and diversified investment holdings. The chapter concludes by urging competition and corporate governance and finance policymakers towards harmonic regulatory solutions to address common ownership. It also offers a quantum theory of the corporate property “atom”, drawing cautionary tales about the dynamic and ambiguous qualities of minority common shareholding for antitrust enforcers.

This chapter highlights the potential anti-competitive risks raised by interlocking directorates between competitors (companies having common board members). Although in the US, Section 8 of the Clayton Act specifically prohibits interlocks among competitors, there is no such prohibition in Europe. The main claim of this chapter is that there may be an enforcement gap around anti-competitive effects of interlocking directorates in Europe. A review of relevant provisions shows that interlocking directorates are likely to fall short of EU competition law. In addition, national corporate laws, as well as tools of corporate governance may be of limited use to remedy competitive concerns. This chapter concludes with a discussion of research avenues that would inform suggestions for reforms.

This paper provides a framework for evaluating policy proposals aimed at invigorating competition and improving corporate governance amid a high and increasing level of common ownership of product market competitors. In particular, I propose that any effective proposal must have the effect of separating the level at which diversification is achieved from the level at which corporate governance is exercised. Several extant proposals are likely to have that effect. I also discuss conceptual breakthroughs on several issues that regulators and industry stakeholders considered necessary to address before changing policy, including (i) the joint recognition of vertical and horizontal common ownership links, (ii) agency problems, (iii) informational and organizational frictions, (iv) methods to infer causality, (v) a better understanding of how investors portfolio choice depends on firms’ strategic interactions, and (vi) improving data quality.

If a firm is a nexus of contracts, then it is just the sum of its counterparties. It follows that when a firm monopolizes a particular market and exploits its power to impose unfavourable terms on a counterparty, the firm necessarily exploits one counterparty for the benefit of another, because the additional profits the firm generates from the unfavourable terms must be paid out eventually to some other counterparty of the firm. One alternative to attacking monopoly power through breakup of large firms or limits on anticompetitive conduct in the marketplace is therefore to prevent any one counterparty of the firm from so dominating firm governance as to be able to induce the firm to oppress other counterparties for its benefit. Creating a balance of power in firm governance, by giving each class of counterparties (i.e., workers, suppliers, investors, and consumers) an equal say over the choice of board members, would eliminate the internal forces that induce firms to exercise monopoly power. But it would not prevent firms from engaging in productive, pie-expanding, behaviour, because such behaviour tends to expand the business that the firm does with all of its counterparties—or at least enables the firm to use a share of the gains to compensate those counterparties that lose out—and therefore benefits them all.

This chapter is concerned with the question why conversational interaction has been described as orderly and supportive in some contexts but is perceived as chaotic or interruptive in others. After scrutinising the data for signs of ‘interruptiveness’ it can be shown that this concept is often confused with a preference for more direct turn-taking strategies. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the apparent dichotomy of cooperation and competition and suggests regarding turn-taking as an instance of coopetition instead.

With the exception of India and Pakistan, South Asian countries have yet to properly implement their competition laws and policies. This chapter explores ways in which the implementation gap may be bridged, focusing on factors which may motivate governments or competition authorities in these countries to engage more meaningfully with competition enforcement and also considering strategies for doing so. The chapter argues that governments and competition authorities are more likely to support competition enforcement in their contexts if they are convinced of its potential to help them realise their goals of economic and social developmental goals. It also observes these countries’ growing engagement in the digital economy for its potential for growth and development and explores the role of competition enforcement for regulating e-commerce platforms. Finally, the chapter considers how the South Asian countries may learn from each other, and strategies for competition enforcement.

India and Pakistan adopted modern competition legislations in 2002 and 2007 respectively. This chapter traces and compares the adoption of modern competition legislations in the two countries to understand how these shaped the schemes and ambits of these legislations as well as the extent of their compatibility with and legitimacy in their respective countries. The chapter appraises the pre-conditions of transfer in India and Pakistan focusing particularly on their legal and political institutional landscapes and evaluates their respective motivations for adopting modern competition legislations. It also identifies the transfer mechanisms and the nature and range of legal and political institutions engaged by these countries in the course of adoption, and examines how the interplay of these institutions impacts the compatibility, legitimacy, and content of the adopted legislations.