This study was designed to investigate the contribution of nonnative (L2) patterns of pausing to the perceived effort of listening to speech. English-language speech samples from 10 native speakers of Korean and Mandarin Chinese 5 of each) previously assessed as having intermediate proficiency in English were manipulated by removing all nonjuncture silent pauses as well as all filled pauses. The original and manipulated speech samples, as well as samples of comparable but unmanipulated English speech produced by 10 native speakers of Korean and Mandarin Chinese with higher English proficiency, were evaluated in a between-groups design by 60 native speakers of American English. Although the removal of nonjuncture pauses did not significantly alter listeners’ ratings of the intermediate speech, results did suggest a subtle interaction between ratings of effort and measures of listeners’ working memory capacity, suggesting that the detrimental effects of pausing in nonnative accented speech may be related to increased demand on limited-capacity cognitive processing resources, such as working memory.

This chapter addresses the vital issue of which law which should apply to substantive proceedings between parties to derivatives contracts. The discussion presumes that the jurisdiction of the English courts has been chosen or otherwise settled, as discussed in the Chapter 8. Accordingly, the impact that a contractual choice of law may have on disputes about jurisdiction is not addressed here.

The idea of capacity is central to Godwin’s political theory. In spite of his assurance that equality is unrelated to physical or intellectual ability, Godwin makes individual and social liberty contingent upon the types of contributions one’s capacities allow. His political system inevitably produces exceptions (those who do not or cannot contribute to the general good) for which he needs to devise additional measures. People who lack the right kinds of mental and physical capacities prove to be an intractable difficulty. In his fiction, Godwin centralizes the idea that the mind should work in concert with the body, and sees incapacity in either of these as socially and personally problematic. We see this in his repeated use of automata, dolls, and characters who disengage from their bodies in various ways; and in his fictional use of rejuvenation and cure. Godwin speculates that when reason governs society, illness and incapacity will no longer be present. His attitude towards deformity is quite separate from his views on capacity. Deformity, in Godwin’s fiction, is usually a visual sign of an evil character, and he does not articulate the prodigious phase of disability.

Where a settlor creates a trust it will be enforceable once the requisite formalities are satisfied. A key feature of a trust is the separation of the legal and the beneficial title. The trustee holds the legal title and the beneficiaries hold the equitable interest. In order for the trust to be enforceable by the beneficiaries there must be no doubt that the property has been validly passed to the trustee or that the settlor has made a valid declaration of a trust. Anyone can create a trust of personalty unless he/she is shown to be mentally ill and unable to understand the nature of the gift and or in the case of land under under the age of eighteen. There are strict formalities where trust property comprises land the formalities are very specific and must conform with the Law of Property Act 1925 s.53. A distinction is drawn between trusts of land which must be evidenced in writing and trusts of equitable interests which must be in writing at the time of the disposition. There are some exceptions to this rule for instance there is no disposition if both the legal and equitable interest are transferred together. Emphasis is placed on the role of formalities. It is important to be able to locate the legal and equitable title in particular to prevent fraud.

This chapter examines the appointment, retirement and capacity of trustees. They are initially appointed under the trust instrument by the settlor but provision must be made for their replacement. The settlor can reserve the power to appoint new trustees in the trust instrument, alternatively a named person may have the power. There is a statutory power to appoint where no provision has been made by the settlor and the appointment may be made by the surviving or continuing trustees. On rare occasions appointment can be made by the court or by the beneficiaries. Anyone with legal capacity can be appointed as a trustee although a minor cannot be a trustee of land. Professional trustees are sometimes appointed. There is no limit on the number of trustees for a trust of personalty but for trusts of land the limit is four. The Trustee Act 1925 provides for when a trustee can retire or be removed. Trustees are not usually paid but in some circumstances payment is made subject to provisions in the common law or the Trustee Act 2000. This act widened the circumstances when remuneration will be made to the trustees.

Moving from the grand and abstract theme of international constitutionalization to the more tangible and observable process of international rule making, Chapter 5 analyzes states’ motives for cooperating over international rules that form the unintended basis of international constitutionalization. It lays out the logic of democratic power, according to which states that are both democratic and powerful (democratic powers) combine the willingness and ability to promote international rules. Because democracies are rule–based, they understand the value of operating through rules and doing so is consistent with their domestic operations. Insofar as they are also powerful, democracies are able to advance their rule–based approach at the international level to shape rules according to their interests and values, which makes it easier for them to commit to and follow those rules. Democratic powers are thus decisive for international rule–based cooperation. States that lack either one or both of these prerequisites are less supportive of institutionalized cooperation and thus constitutionalization in world politics.

The chapter concerns steps to consider in preparing to become party to a treaty. It examines the eligibility of States and IOs to participate in multilateral treaties, including scenarios in which eligibility to join a treaty is not clear and what procedures may be used to resolve such issues. The chapter explains the importance of understanding ‘modes of expressing consent to be bound’, and choosing the appropriate mode. It looks at how a treaty may be made by exchange of instruments. Lastly, the chapter considers internal preparations to give consent to be bound for States and IOs, including consultations with stakeholders.

This chapter considers how adopting a model of the relational self might impact on medical law. In particular, it considers how the issues of ownership of bodies and bodily material; the concept of mental capacity; the law's understanding of best interests; and the notion of personhood would be affected by understanding the self in a relational way.

Insurance has two basic theoretical motivations. First, for those parties holding a risky asset to purchase a commodity that reduces the overall expected risk of the two assets, being the original asset and the asset of the insurance policy. Insurance policies are available in various forms on the market, but two of the main types of policies for environmental accidents are first-party (damage to self and own assets) and third-party (damage to other parties and their assets) liability insurance. Moral hazard contains the idea that if you assume the risk for someone else, then they no longer face the costs of those risks and thus are more likely to undertake those risks. Market capacity to supply the necessary volume of insurance policies and to be able to pay them out when needed can be reinforced with several tools, including forms of co-insurance, reinsurance, and pooling. Again, it bears repeating that while some injuries, like a wrecked car, might be remedied by cash payouts, this is not often the case for material environmental injuries. Thus, the creation of moral hazard for environmental insurance policies, both first-party and third-party, is a serious concern.

In this chapter, we trouble the implicit and explicit assumptions tucked behind the phenomenon of the unsaid, actually the forbidden, by examining events that unfolded in a New Jersey (US) state courtroom where conflicting stories about sexual love/violence clashed in the fall of 2015. We examine the ideological and social functions of banished testimony in the context of the trial on aggravated sexual assault where “protection” was deployed to silence a sexual relationship that violated most normative taboos; where “denying voice” to the presumed victim was enforced; where reproducing an old story of “sexual violence” was used to bury another story of connection, love, and desire. Data we present derive from what was said and unsaid, who was and was not allowed to speak, and what evidence was admissible and excluded. It unpacks how voice, silence, protection, and exclusion operate at the delicate intersection of disability, science, law, and sexuality to reproduce hegemonic notions of power and the denial of desire. The binaries and boundaries that were crafted within this case allow us to theorize how the unsaid can sustain and mask injustice as if it is were normal, appropriate, and fair while it reproduces brutal exclusionary realities within our social world.