This article analyses the structure and changes of large companies based on a new database of the 200 largest non-financial firms operating from 1913 to 1971 in Argentina. The main contribution of the research consists of the elaboration of the rankings of the 200 largest companies according to their paid-up capital between 1913 and 1971 and the construction of a database of large companies based on homogeneous sources and criteria. The study identifies the long-lasting presence of family-based diversified business groups and foreign multinationals from the first global period to the end of Import Substitution Industrialisation. It also shows that the presence of foreign companies among the 200 largest firms is higher than that identified in other countries. The study constitutes the first comprehensive research into big business in Argentina until the 1970s and a first attempt to identify the life cycles of the largest companies in Argentina.

A large body of literature on state–business relations in China has examined the political role of capitalists and collusion between the state and the private sector. This paper contributes to that literature and understanding of the internal differentiation among China's business elites by documenting the emergence of a particular kind of large, non-state business group that we argue is more akin to a mafia system than any standard definition of a firm. Drawing on large-N descriptive data as well as deep ethnographic and documentary research, we argue that mafia-like business systems share organizational principles (plunder and obfuscation) and means of growth and survival (relations of mutual endangerment and manipulation of the financial system). Understanding the particular moral economy that underlies mafia-like business systems and their interactions with the state challenges methodological foundations of research on China's political economy and helps to explain recent conflict between high-profile business people and the state.

We use community detection analysis to investigate the structure of Bengaluru's ICT cluster's inter-organizational network during the period 2015–2017. Building on the knowledge sourcing literature, we conjecture that cluster firms primarily build knowledge-seeking horizontal linkages with technologically similar companies, and that this splits the network into multiple technological communities within which firms are tightly connected, but between which linkages are scarce. We further propose that community-spanning firms which build horizontal linkages that bridge technological communities are more likely to conduct radical innovation than their peers. We finally argue that no relation exists between technological proximity and community formation in the network of vertical buyer-supplier relations. Using a voltage-based algorithm for community discovery, we draw empirical support for these predictions. We discuss the implications of our findings for Bengaluru's upgrading potential.

We argue that vertical interlocks in Chinese state-owned business groups are important mechanisms for coordination and information exchange between the apex firm and affiliated firms, and that they are also mechanisms for government owners of the business groups to exercise control. By combining resource dependence theory with elements from transaction cost economics and agency theory, we propose that the need for interlocks increases the higher the level of government ownership. The central government is therefore more likely to use vertical interlocks than the provincial governments, which again are more likely to use vertical interlocks than the municipal governments. We develop three hypotheses based on these arguments. A regression analysis of a hand-collected data set finds strong support for our hypotheses. Our results shed light on coordination and governance issues within the state-owned sector in China and on an important means for mitigating these issues used by the government owners and firms affiliated with state-owned groups.

This article suggests that the business history of emerging markets should be seen as an alternative business history, rather than merely adding new settings to explore established core debates. The discipline of business history evolved around the corporate strategies and structures of developed economies. The growing literature on the business history of emerging markets addresses contexts that are different from those of developed markets. These regions had long eras of foreign domination, had extensive state intervention, faced institutional inefficiencies, and experienced extended turbulence. This article suggests that this context drove different business responses than are found in the developed world. Entrepreneurs counted more than managerial hierarchies; immigrants and diaspora were critical sources of entrepreneurship; illegal and informal forms of business were common; diversified business groups rather than the M-form became the major form of large-scale business; corporate strategies to deal with turbulence were essential; and radical corporate social-responsibility concepts were pursued by some firms.

Using new product announcement events made by group member firms in Taiwan, this study examines whether the firms’ multiple network ties within business groups benefit member firms or whether they provide a channel for controlling shareholders to tunnel. We find that the announcement of new products by group member firms has a positive effect on the market value of other, non-announcing group peers. This evidence is consistent with the value-added hypothesis. More importantly, this effect is stronger when member firms are connected via equity ties. Furthermore, we also offer an original analysis of how family control in business groups affects the impact of network ties on value creation. Our results suggest that the controlling family may discount the market value of member firms.

Prior research on the internationalization of emerging market firms focused either on established incumbent firms or peripheral latecomer firms. However, an increase in outward foreign direct investment from emerging markets such as China has benefitted from a new organizational form – business groups. Given that new organizational forms pose fundamental challenges to existing theories on multinational enterprise, an examination of business group internationalization will bring the literature of multinational enterprise theories forward. Adopting an organizational approach, I propose that business groups, an organizational form that emerged to substitute market imperfections in China, constitute a micro-institutional environment for generating ownership, location, and internalization advantages, as well as for capitalizing on the linkage, leverage, and learning opportunities for internationalization. I posit that Chinese business groups facilitate such an internationalization process via their unique attributes including internal market, inward linkages, and institutional support. The article aims to provide a theoretical framework that generates insights for China's policy makers and managers, and to guide future research.

We address the institutional voids hypothesis, which suggests affiliation with a business group will improve a firm's performance in circumstances of poor-quality institutions and extensive market failures. We hypothesize that initial positive effects of group affiliation should decline as the quality of market institutions improves. Further, we hypothesize that differences in state and private ownership will influence the value and persistence of firm affiliation. Using data on 476 publicly listed firms in 1999 and 467 matched firms in 2004, we find support for a temporal hypothesis that affiliation with a business group improves performance, but the value of group affiliation declines over time. We also find support for a state ‘helping hand’ hypothesis that suggests firms with high levels of state ownership initially experienced an amplified value effect from their group affiliation, which disappeared by 2004. The results suggest that China's policy makers are beginning to establish an institutional and market infrastructure that is conducive to entry by unaffiliated, freestanding firms.

The initiation of market liberalization resulted in a sharp decline in economic output and market disorganization across the former Soviet Union. Inadequate physical, financial, and human capital are among the explanations for the slow pace of enterprise restructuring and market development. The role of social networks, however, is less understood. Using survey data from a management-training programme in Russia, we examine the effects of entrepreneurial networks on both individual's professional advancement and firm's business development. We find that their participation in work-and association-based social networks varied and differentially affected outcomes at the individual and firm levels. We conclude that active participation in social capital networks catalyses returns on investments in human capital. Implications of this study for research on Chinese social networks are discussed.

Prior research has suggested a number of potential benefits to firm membership in business groups. These benefits include availability of capital and other resources not readily accessible in an open market, the facilitation of entrepreneurship, plus information and risk sharing advantages. We suggest that another important benefit is the assistance of group control systems in helping the firm to manage conflicting pressures in the institutional environment and facilitate coevolution of these conflicting pressures. To empirically demonstrate the relevance of this viewpoint, we examine the case of China where business groups facilitate institutional transition, actively balancing market pressures to increase levels of innovativeness in firms with institutional pressures emanating from the government to maintain high employment levels. Using data from a broad sample of more than 1,000 Chinese affiliate firms in more than 200 business groups, we find that government policy, ownership and managerial mindset influence the political goal of maintaining high employment levels, while interdependence among group affiliate firms is related to lower employment levels. However, while government ownership and the government managerial mindset were negatively related to market innovation activities, group financial and cultural control systems positively affected the tendency of affiliate firms to focus on market innovation.

El Salvador has undergone a deep economic transformation over recent decades, from a model based on agro-exports to an open, transnational service-based economy. This transformation has occurred in a context dominated historically by a small group of elite families that formed family-owned diversified business groups (DBGs). This paper studies the leading groups' strategies in confronting transnationalisation. It shows that the DBGs have adapted to the new realities through a combination of sector shifts, internationalisation and the adoption of different kinds of relationships with multinationals. In spite of this, there is little evidence that the DBGs have become less important or subordinate to multinational corporations. Rather, they have, in different ways, exploited their local and regional knowledge and networks to confront competition at home and expand at the regional level.

The extensive scholarship on ‘varieties of capitalism’ offers some conceptual and theoretical innovations that can be fruitfully employed to analyse the distinctive institutional foundations of capitalism in Latin America, or what could be called hierarchical market economies (HMEs). This perspective helps identify four core features of HMEs in Latin America that structure business access to essential inputs of capital, technology and labour: diversified business groups, multinational corporations (MNCs), low-skilled labour, and atomistic labour relations. Overall non-market, hierarchical relations in business groups and MNCs are central in organising capital and technology in Latin America, and are also pervasive in labour market regulation, union representation and employment relations. Important complementarities exist among these features, especially between MNCs and diversified business groups, as well as mutually reinforcing tendencies between these dominant corporate forms and general under-investment in skills and in well-mediated employment relations. These four features of HMEs, their common reliance on hierarchy, and the particular interactions among them add up to a distinct variety of capitalism, different from those identified in developed countries and other developing regions.

This article deals with the process of decision-making in the sphere of taxation in Argentina between 1920 and 1945, focusing on the possible influence of the economic elites in that process. Given the central role of decisions over taxation in any fiscal policy and the momentous transformations that occurred in the Argentine system during this period, analysis of this subject can provide a better understanding of the political role that economic elites in Argentina played between the first presidency of Hipólito Yrigoyen (1916–22) and the ascent of Juan Domingo Perón to the presidency in 1946. Drawing on three key episodes in Argentina policy-making – the attempt to introduce an income tax in 1923, the response to the Depression in 1931–32, and the crisis of 1942–43, this article suggests that parliamentary institutions had stronger resilience in Argentina than is usually believed, and corporatist arrangements became rooted in Argentina only with difficulties.