Psychiatrists depend on their patients for clinical information and are obligated to regard them as trustworthy, except in special circumstances. Nevertheless, some critics of psychiatry have argued that psychiatrists frequently perpetrate epistemic injustice against patients. Epistemic injustice is a moral wrong that involves unfairly discriminating against a person with respect to their ability to know things because of personal characteristics like gender or psychiatric diagnosis.

We review the concept of epistemic injustice and several claims that psychiatric practice is epistemically unjust.

While acknowledging the risk of epistemic injustice in psychiatry and other medical fields, we argue that most concerns that psychiatric practice is epistemically unjust are unfounded.

The concept of epistemic injustice does not add significantly to existing standards of good clinical practice, and that it could produce changes in practice that would be deleterious. Psychiatrists should resist calls for changes to clinical practice based on this type of criticism.

Irremediability is a key requirement for euthanasia and assisted suicide for psychiatric disorders (psychiatric EAS). Countries like the Netherlands and Belgium ask clinicians to assess irremediability in light of the patient's diagnosis and prognosis and ‘according to current medical understanding’. Clarifying the relevance of a default objective standard for irremediability when applied to psychiatric EAS is crucial for solid policymaking. Yet so far, a thorough examination of this standard is lacking.

Using treatment-resistant depression (TRD) as a test case, through a scoping review in PubMed, we analyzed the state-of-the-art evidence for whether clinicians can accurately predict individual long-term outcome and single out irremediable cases, by examining the following questions: (1) What is the definition of TRD; (2) What are group-level long-term outcomes of TRD; and (3) Can clinicians make accurate individual outcome predictions in TRD?

A uniform definition of TRD is lacking, with over 150 existing definitions, mostly focused on psychopharmacological research. Available yet limited studies about long-term outcomes indicate that a majority of patients with long-term TRD show significant improvement over time. Finally, evidence about individual predictions in TRD using precision medicine is growing, but methodological shortcomings and varying predictive accuracies pose important challenges for its implementation in clinical practice.

Our findings support the claim that, as per available evidence, clinicians cannot accurately predict long-term chances of recovery in a particular patient with TRD. This means that the objective standard for irremediability cannot be met, with implications for policy and practice of psychiatric EAS.

Euthanasia and assisted suicide (EAS) based on a psychiatric disorder (psychiatric EAS) continue to pose ethical and policy challenges, even in countries where the practice has been allowed for years. We conducted a systematic review of reasons, a specific type of review for bioethical questions designed to inform rational policy-making. Our aims were twofold: (1) to systematically identify all published reasons for and against the practice (2) to identify current gaps in the debate and areas for future research.

Following the PRISMA guidelines, we performed a search across seven electronic databases to include publications focusing on psychiatric EAS and providing ethical reasons. Reasons were grouped into domains by qualitative content analysis.

We included 42 articles, most of which were written after 2013. Articles in favor and against were evenly distributed. Articles in favor were mostly full-length pieces written by non-clinicians, with articles against mostly reactive, commentary-type pieces written by clinicians. Reasons were categorized into eight domains: (1) mental and physical illness and suffering (2) decisional capacity (3) irremediability (4) goals of medicine and psychiatry (5) consequences for mental health care (6) psychiatric EAS and suicide (7) self-determination and authenticity (8) psychiatric EAS and refusal of life-sustaining treatment. Parity- (or discrimination-) based reasons were dominant across domains, mostly argued for by non-clinicians, while policy reasons were mostly pointed to by clinicians.

The ethical debate about psychiatric EAS is relatively young, with prominent reasons of parity. More direct engagement is needed to address ethical and policy considerations.

Euthanasia or assisted suicide (EAS) for psychiatric disorders, legal in some countries, remains controversial. Personality disorders are common in psychiatric EAS. They often cause a sense of irremediable suffering and engender complex patient–clinician interactions, both of which could complicate EAS evaluations.

We conducted a directed-content analysis of all psychiatric EAS cases involving personality and related disorders published by the Dutch regional euthanasia review committees (N = 74, from 2011 to October 2017).

Most patients were women (76%, n = 52), often with long, complex clinical histories: 62% had physical comorbidities, 97% had at least one, and 70% had two or more psychiatric comorbidities. They often had a history of suicide attempts (47%), self-harming behavior (27%), and trauma (36%). In 46%, a previous EAS request had been refused. Past psychiatric treatments varied: e.g. hospitalization and psychotherapy were not tried in 27% and 28%, respectively. In 50%, the physician managing their EAS were new to them, a third (36%) did not have a treating psychiatrist at the time of EAS request, and most physicians performing EAS were non-psychiatrists (70%) relying on cross-sectional psychiatric evaluations focusing on EAS eligibility, not treatment. Physicians evaluating such patients appear to be especially emotionally affected compared with when personality disorders are not present.

The EAS evaluation of persons with personality disorders may be challenging and emotionally complex for their evaluators who are often non-psychiatrists. These factors could influence the interpretation of EAS requirements of irremediability, raising issues that merit further discussion and research.

Although placebo-control clinical trials that withhold effective treatments can be permissible, how best to inform participants of the placebo design has received little attention.

To determine the effect of disclosing quantitative outcome estimates of individual treatment v. entering placebo-control randomised control trial (RCT) on willingness to enrol in such an RCT.

We randomised 278 adult patients at a depression clinic to receive standard disclosure (n = 129) or enhanced (n = 149) quantitative outcome estimates (based on decision analysis) of individual treatment v. RCT, and assessed their willingness to enrol in the RCT.

A greater proportion of those in the standard arm preferred enrolling in RCT (41.3% v. 23.8%, P = 0.002). Those in the standard arm preferred RCT more for direct benefit than altruism reasons, whereas the opposite was true in the enhanced arm.

Disclosing the quantitative outcome implications of placebos may select for fewer but more altruistic participants.

Although people with schizophrenia display impaired abilities for consent, it is not known how much impairment constitutes incapacity.

To assess a method for determining the categorical capacity status of potential participants in schizophrenia research.

Expert-judgement validation of capacity thresholds on the sub-scales of the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool – Clinical Research (MacCAT–CR) was evaluated using receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis in 91 people with severe mental illness and 40 controls.

The ROC areas under the curve for the understanding, appreciation and reasoning sub-scales of the MacCAT–CR were 0.94 (95% CI 0.88–0.99), 0.85 (95% CI 0.76–0.94) and 0.80 (95% CI 0.70–0.90). These findings yielded negative and positive predictive values of incapacity that can guide the practice of investigators and research ethics committees.

By performing such validation studies for a few categories of research with varying risks and benefits, it might be possible to create evidence-based capacity determination guidelines for most schizophrenia research.