This chapter details the increasingly indispensable part German big business played in expelling German Jews from economic life and dispossessing them, including in the annexed regions of Austria and the Czech lands. Avarice and self-defense were the principal motivators, with the latter becoming increasingly important as time passed.

The chapter traces the process by which German corporations largely, though still partially, abandoned their Jewish colleagues in the first eighteen months of Nazi rule and simultaneously shed their earlier, recurrent demands for a “state-free” economy in favor of accepting the Nazi statist one. The account places more than customary emphasis on the role of intimidation.

The chapter argues that prior to Hitler’s accession, Germany’s corporate elite was fatefully ambivalent toward Jews: sympathetic to those who were part of it, suspicious of those who were critical of it or newly arrived in the country. This ambivalence meant that corporate executives were generally neither antisemites nor anti-antisemites or that they were simultaneously both.

This chapter demonstrates the routine prevalence of forced labor in Germany prior to World War II, its expansion during the early years of the fighting, the slow introduction of concentration camp slave labor to the German economy, and the reasons for its adoption by nearly every major German enterprise. Contrary to common belief, the chief motivation driving both processes was the shortage of German workers, thanks to conscription and wartime demand for output, not the cost of the forced and slave laborers. But the great growth of German industrial capacity during the war owed much to these labor inputs.

The argument here is that German industry and finance were preprogrammed to participate in the murder of the Jews by decisions made before the war that could not be reversed. Big business thus collaborated fully in the process, becoming “bagmen” and “fences” for stolen Jewish property and providers of goods and services to death camps.

This short summary chapter recalls the “arc of corruption” that the book depicts, the caricatures of German corporate behavior that the Nuremberg trials fostered, and their consequences for historical interpretation. The book concludes by recentering the consequences of business leaders’ actions, rather than the pragmatic motivations that produced these actions, in any judgment of their conduct.

This chapter explains why and how the Nazi regime created a mixed economy in which property remained private but profits were largely controlled by government policy. As Germany became a monopsony, an economy dominated by a single buyer, in this case the German state, large firms adapted their business to serving the state’s desires and demands, thus becoming agents and servants of them.

The chapter argues that Germany’s major corporate leaders largely agreed between 1918 and 1932 on a self-serving analysis of Germany’s economic problems and an unpopular approach to dealing with them (the Consensus) but splintered and dithered in identifying an appropriate political vehicle for these views (the Dissensus). As a result, they neither defended the Republic nor brought Hitler to power.