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4 results

  • Compatibilism, Indeterminism, and Chance
  • Penelope Mackie
  • Journal: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements / Volume 82 / July 2018
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 July 2018, pp. 265-287
  • Print publication: July 2018
  • View abstract

    Many contemporary compatibilists about free will and determinism are agnostic about whether determinism is true, yet do not doubt that we have free will. They are thus committed to the thesis that free will is compatible with both determinism and indeterminism. This paper explores the prospects for this version of compatibilism, including its response to the argument (traditionally employed against incompatibilist accounts of free will) that indeterminism would introduce an element of randomness or chance or luck that is inimical to free will and moral responsibility.

  • Coincidence and Identity
  • Penelope Mackie
  • Journal: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements / Volume 62 / July 2008
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 June 2008, pp. 151-176
  • Print publication: July 2008
  • View extract

    This paper is about a puzzle concerning the metaphysics of material objects: a puzzle generated by cases where material objects appear to coincide, sharing all their matter. As is well known, it can be illustrated by the example of a statue. In front of me now, sitting on my desk, is a (small) statue – a statue of a lion. The statue is made of clay. So in front of me now is a piece of clay. But what is the relation between the statue and the piece of clay? Are they identical, or are they distinct?