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Previous literature suggests that economic performance affects government approval asymmetrically, either because voters are quicker to blame incompetence than to credit ability (grievance asymmetry) or because they understand that the degree to which policy-makers can affect the economy varies depending on economic openness (clarity of responsibility asymmetry). We seek to understand whether these asymmetries coexist, arguing that these theories conjointly imply that globalization may have the capacity to mitigate blame for bad outcomes but should neither promote nor reduce credit to policy-makers for good economic outcomes. We look for evidence of these asymmetries in three survey experiments carried out in the USA and Canada in 2014 and 2015. We find ample experimental evidence in support of the grievance asymmetry, but our results are mixed on the impact of economic openness on blame mitigation, with some evidence of this phenomenon in the USA, but not in Canada.
Policies targeting individual companies for economic development incentives, such as tax holidays and abatements, are generally seen as inefficient, economically costly, and distortionary. Despite this evidence, politicians still choose to use these policies to claim credit for attracting investment. Thus, while fiscal incentives are economically inefficient, they pose an effective pandering strategy for politicians. Using original surveys of voters in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, as well as data on incentive use by politicians in the US, Vietnam and Russia, this book provides compelling evidence for the use of fiscal incentives for political gain and shows how such pandering appears to be associated with growing economic inequality. As national and subnational governments surrender valuable tax revenue to attract businesses in the vain hope of long-term economic growth, they are left with fiscal shortfalls that have been filled through regressive sales taxes, police fines and penalties, and cuts to public education.
International relations scholarship has made great progress on the study of compliance with international agreements. While persuasive, most of this work has focused on states’ de jure compliance decisions, largely excluding the de facto behavior of nonstate actors whose actions the agreement hopes to constrain. Of particular interest has been whether the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (ABC) might reduce the propensity of multinational corporations (MNCs) to bribe officials in host countries through its mechanisms of extraterritoriality and extensive peer review. Unfortunately, research is hampered by reporting bias. Since the convention raises the probability of investors’ punishment for bribery in their home countries, it reduces both the incentives for bribery and willingness to admit to the activity. This generates uncertainty over which of these incentives drives any correlation between signing the convention and reductions in reported bribery. We address this problem by employing a specialized survey experiment that shields respondents and reduces reporting bias. We find that after the onset of Phase 3 in 2010, when the risk of noncompliance increased for firms subject to the OECD-ABC, those MNCs reduced their actual bribery relative to their nonsignatory competitors.
Government economic development programmes provide opportunities for firms to leverage financial incentives for business expansion and relocation. This article examines the ability of these incentives to promote employment. Using establishment-level data from the state of Kansas as well as original firm-level survey data, I evaluate the effectiveness of financial incentives in creating jobs through recipient firms. My findings from the establishment-level data indicate that incentive programmes have no discernable impact on firm expansion, measured by job creation. In addition, the survey data suggest that incentive recipients highly recommend this programme to other firms, but few firms actually increased their employment in Kansas because of these incentives; similarly, very few firms would have left the state if they had not benefited from this programme. Thus, incentives have little impact on the relocation or expansion decisions of firms.
Other considerations and issues in pediatric hepatology
M. Kyle Jensen, University of Utah, Primary Children’s Medical Center, Salt Lake City, UT, USA,
Maria H. Alonso, Department of Pediatrics, Northwestern University, Chicago, and Director of Hepatology, Department of Gastroenterology, Hepatology and Nutrition, Children’s Memorial Hospital, Chicago, IL, USA,
Jaimie D. Nathan, Department of Surgery, University of Cincinnati College of Medicine, Cincinnati, OH, USA,
Frederick C. Ryckman, Pediatric Surgery Training Program, Pediatric Liver Care Center, Cincinnati Children’s Hospital, Cincinnati, OH, USA,
Gregory M. Tiao, Cincinnati Children’s Hospital Medical Center, Cincinnati, OH, USA,
William F. Balistreri, University of Cincinnati College of Medicine
Liver transplantation has become the standard of care for end-stage liver disease in children and successful outcomes are now achieved in the vast majority of transplant recipients. Progressive improvement has occurred through better preoperative care of patients with liver disease, improved operative techniques that has allowed the donor pool to expand, and improved immunosuppression strategies to prevent rejection while avoiding complications of over-immunosuppression. The success of the past, however, has also bred unique challenges for the future. With the increasing number of liver transplant candidates, improved donor awareness and organ availability must occur. A delicate balance between the risks assumed by living donors and the needs of their children must be struck. The increasing numbers of surviving patients present unique challenges and complications related to lifelong immunosuppression. The future success of pediatric liver transplantation will require appreciation of the increasingly complex care needs of this population and a national focus on donor organ shortages.
The evaluation process
Collective experience suggests that the progression of chronic liver disease is not linear, but rather exponential, suggesting that early warning signs of hepatic compromise, such as deteriorating synthetic function or refractory nutritional failure should lead to prompt evaluation. In children with acute liver failure (ALF) or rapidly progressive decompensation of chronic disease, aggressive critical care intervention is essential to maintain all other physiologic systems until a suitable donor organ becomes available.