This chapter situates our analysis of the Indonesian labor movement within theoretical debates in comparative labor politics and Indonesian politics and presents the broad contours of our answers to the three overarching questions that guide the analysis in the book: Why did Indonesia’s labor movement combine contentious street politics with autonomous electoral engagement, why has the Indonesian labor movement been surprisingly effective in winning pro-labor policies, and why have unions have been less successful in the electoral arena than in the policy arena? In answering these questions, the chapter delineates three phases of the development of Indonesia’s labor movement, and emphasizes the role of authoritarian legacies, changing opportunity structures, organizational learning, the geographic concentration of the labor movement, and comparatively weak cooperation across organizational divides in the electoral arena. The chapter also outlines our research sites and methods, provides background information about the economic and political contexts, describes the union landscape, and concludes with a summary of the book’s chapters.

This chapter examines the first decade of worker mobilization in post-Suharto Indonesia. At the national level, the labor movement experienced stunning success in shaping labor law reform during this period. In the absence of strong ties to political parties, unions created mayhem in the streets to capture the attention of politicians and raise the cost of supporting laws that unions opposed. Since both the executive and the legislature had to approve labor legislation, unions could stop the enactment of antilabor laws by peeling away legislative support. This task was facilitated by government instability and weak presidential control over coalition partners and the fact that the Minister of Manpower was from a labor background in some years. At the local level, by contrast, unions had fewer points of entry and less leverage. Although newly created tripartite wage councils gave workers a voice in wage-setting, executives had the final authority to determine minimum wages increases, and they were relatively immune to pressure from workers until direct elections were phased in between mid-2005 and late 2008.

This chapter explores the question of whether the increased electoral engagement of Indonesia’s unions has fostered the development of a working-class constituency. After explaining the specific challenges of developing such a constituency, we utilize evidence from surveys conducted in working-class communities in four union-dense districts in Bekasi and Tangerang to assess workers’ views on political issues and to analyze their voting behavior in the 2009 and 2014 legislative and presidential races. We find evidence that there is a stable if not growing proportion of workers with politicized collective identities. In legislative races, we argue that these politicized collective identities have not resulted in the formation of a working-class constituency but rather an organizational constituency rooted in the membership of one union, FSPMI. In presidential races, however, we find stronger evidence that union engagement in politics has contributed to the formation of a working-class constituency that crosses organizational divides.

This chapter examines the forces that produced Indonesia’s highly mobilized but politically independent labor movement. It describes the authoritarian legacies that shaped the first phase of its evolution when the labor movement had no choice but to use street politics as its primary weapon in the struggle for more worker-friendly labor policy. In a second phase, new opportunities opened by the decentralization process led unions to experiment with electoral engagement. The focus of these efforts was at the local level where union activists backed executive candidates from many different parties, pragmatically trading their political support for pro-labor measures. In a third phase, unions drew on their past organizational learning and experimentation to extend their electoral engagement to the legislative arena. Reluctant to tie themselves directly to a single party, union strategists chose to place union cadres on legislative tickets of many different political parties. Autonomous electoral participation now complemented street politics as central features of labor’s political strategy.

This chapter examines the Indonesian labor movement’s unusual strategy of running union cadres as legislative candidates with a large number of non-programmatic parties. It begins by assessing parties’ motivations for entering into these partnerships with unions, tracking the evolving strategies of the two parties that engaged most systematically with unions. It then turns its attention to SPN and FSPMI, the two union federations that had the strongest organizational commitment to running legislative candidates in the period between 2004 and 2014. In both cases, the initial decision to engage in the legislative arena was necessarily taken by the central leadership. But, in SPN’s case, the poor showing of its candidates in the 2009 elections created internal friction, and the union quickly backed away from its organizational commitment to electoral politics. By contrast, FSPMI deepened its engagement in the 2014 legislative elections, resulting in the election of two union cadres to local legislative office in Bekasi. Unperturbed by the setbacks it experienced during the first Jokowi presidency, it again refined its institutional strategy for 2019.

This chapter focuses on the Indonesian labor movement’s increasingly assertive and offensive posture in the second decade after Suharto’s fall. At the national level, unions learned to lobby more effectively, generate favorable media attention, and leverage judicial institutions to complement street mobilization. They played a central role in the passage of a groundbreaking social security law. They made even greater strides at the local level, where they embarked on an unprecedented round of mobilizations around wages. Having consolidated their networks and their position on the wage councils, they transformed them into institutions that delivered sustained real wage gains. In doing so, they exploited the opportunities presented by direct local and provincial executive elections, leveraging electoral cycles, and harnessing regional patterns of wage-setting to win massive gains. Massive protests in several core industrial areas and stronger coordination among national confederations also allowed unions to nationalize local conflicts. Even after this support vanished, unions in some parts of Indonesia sustained substantial real minimum wage increases through their local organizing efforts.