The end of the Cold War has had contradictory effects on African
security. Southern Africa and Ethiopia clearly benefitted from the end
of superpower rivalry, whereas central and western Africa have seen an
upswing of violence during the 1990s. The withdrawal of foreign
patronage, the post-Somalia reluctance of the West and the UN to
intervene militarily, heightened external demands for economic and
political reform, and the changing nature of African insurgencies, have
placed additional pressure on already weak governments. Many
African states have only weak militaries to defend their security, the
collapse of Mobutu Sese Seko's Armed Forces of Zaïre providing
the
most recent example.
As recently as 1990, the idea of African states relying upon
mercenaries from the former South African Defence Force (SADF)
would have seemed both preposterous and insulting. Yet since 1993,
Executive Outcomes (EO), the world's largest and best known
‘mercenary’ group, has marketed itself as a defender of African
state
security in this post-Cold War era. A private army with access to some
2,000 ex-South African Defence Force (SADF) combat veterans, EO
has helped to defeat discredited insurgencies in Angola and Sierra
Leone. Large sections of Africa need effective militaries and EO, which
claims to fight only for sovereign governments, presents itself as a
stabilising force for African development. To some observers, EO is
‘with the possible exception of the South African army, the most
deadly
and efficient army operating in sub-Saharan Africa today’.
This article examines the controversial Executive Outcomes military
as a security option for African governments. It sketches EO's history,
its military effectiveness, and its political loyalty, to assess whether
EO
threatens or assists African state stability. The article concludes by
looking at EO's possible future, and the lessons which it offers about
African security.