In this chapter we shall present Goodman's “irrealism”, according to which he rejects the notion of one single, neutral reality that underlies our true versions of what the world is like. Such a reality is neither sufficient nor necessary to explain matters of epistemology or to distinguish true from false versions. We explain how this view is a consequence of Goodman's pluralism, constructionalism and anti-foundationalism, which we have encountered in the preceding chapters. It is also worth emphasizing that this obviously relativistic position does not collapse into an “anything goes”. “Irrealism” is not to be confused with “irrationalism”.

The plurality of versions

Throughout the book we have emphasized that Goodman is a pluralist in many regards. Like Carnap he thinks that we can build up the world in many ways. What we take as primitive – as the foundation of our construction – is not settled once and for all. Depending on purposes and interests we can build up the world out of qualia, erlebs or physical objects. In this way, Goodman had already rejected absolutism in A Study of Qualities: