Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Editor's preface
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I The semantic tradition
- Part II Vienna, 1925–1935
- 9 Schlick before Vienna
- 10 Philosophers on relativity
- 11 Carnap before Vienna
- 12 Scientific idealism and semantic idealism
- 13 Return of Ludwig Wittgenstein
- 14 A priori knowledge and the constitution of meaning
- 15 The road to syntax
- 16 Syntax and truth
- 17 Semantic conventionalism and the factuality of meaning
- 18 The problem of induction: theories
- 19 The problem of experience: protocols
- Notes
- References
- Index
12 - Scientific idealism and semantic idealism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 March 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Editor's preface
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I The semantic tradition
- Part II Vienna, 1925–1935
- 9 Schlick before Vienna
- 10 Philosophers on relativity
- 11 Carnap before Vienna
- 12 Scientific idealism and semantic idealism
- 13 Return of Ludwig Wittgenstein
- 14 A priori knowledge and the constitution of meaning
- 15 The road to syntax
- 16 Syntax and truth
- 17 Semantic conventionalism and the factuality of meaning
- 18 The problem of induction: theories
- 19 The problem of experience: protocols
- Notes
- References
- Index
Summary
Positivism and realism can to a considerable extent run a parallel course. In particular, the realist can adopt the idea of the process of constitution, i.e., the definition of constructs by means of coordinating propositions. Yet this idea does not lead him to a theory of objects, but to a theory of concepts.
Reichenbach, ‘The Aims and Methods of Physical Knowledge,” Selected Writings, 1909–1953, vol. 2Carnap's Aufbau and Pseudoproblems display the first explicit statement of what seemed an unprecedented attitude concerning realism. Around 1930 Wittgenstein explained a related doctrine to audiences in Vienna and Cambridge. Under the pressure of these two authorities, the view became a characteristically Viennese product in that it was widely accepted in Vienna and widely regarded as absurd most everywhere else. Kaila was expressing a not uncommon reaction among the non-Viennese when he spoke of the “catastrophic results” of Carnap's philosophy on that particular issue and observed that Carnap's ideas, if correct, “are apt to deprive even empirical research of its élan” (“Logistic Neopositivism” [1930], p. 4). Planck had raised similar charges against Machian positivism in “The Unity of the Physical World-Picture,” and in the early 1930s he thought he was witnessing a revival of the attempt to deny the existence of the external world (“Positivismus und reale Aussenwelt”).
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Semantic Tradition from Kant to CarnapTo the Vienna Station, pp. 223 - 239Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1991