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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2015

Genevieve Lester
Affiliation:
Georgetown University School of Foreign Service
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Chapter
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When Should State Secrets Stay Secret?
Accountability, Democratic Governance, and Intelligence
, pp. 215 - 228
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2015

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  • Bibliography
  • Genevieve Lester
  • Book: When Should State Secrets Stay Secret?
  • Online publication: 05 May 2015
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107337015.007
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  • Bibliography
  • Genevieve Lester
  • Book: When Should State Secrets Stay Secret?
  • Online publication: 05 May 2015
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107337015.007
Available formats
×

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  • Bibliography
  • Genevieve Lester
  • Book: When Should State Secrets Stay Secret?
  • Online publication: 05 May 2015
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107337015.007
Available formats
×