Introduction

Any analysis of the long nineteenth century (1801–1914) in terms of state finance has to consider first the issue of political instability and regime change. Three revolutions, two coups d'état, and three types of regime (monarchical, imperial, and republican) made for critical disjunctures in fiscal policy. To facilitate discussion, the data have been presented in separate tables according to regime. Bruno Théret (1995) argues for a different categorization of disjunctures, between the constitutional monarchies (1815–30, 1831–47, and 1851–70) and the Third Republic (1878–1939), with a significant transitional phase (1871–7) in between. These periods, he argues, can be further subdivided, notably into an opportunist Third Republic (1878–93) and a moderate (1894–1913) and then radical Third Republic (1914–39) (Théret 1995: 58–9). There is no doubt that political instability and regime change were important factors in limiting the possibilities for government innovation in state finance; but in this analysis, two long-term realities are emphasized as of primary importance – first, the failure of population growth in France, in comparison with its economic rivals; and second, the longevity of an oligarchic rentier social order, in spite of the various constitutional crises and regime changes. Thus in France, again in comparison with its two main European economic rivals, Germany and the United Kingdom, the growth of the state was regarded as a serious threat to the economic interests of the ruling social class.