In his fascinating book, Literacy, Law, and Social Order, Edward Stevens (1988) explored the difficult relationship between literacy and justice in U.S. legal history. Literacy came to be presumed of the citizen in both political and economic dimensions. Voting, serving on a jury, and seeking entitlements all required access to information that was embodied in writing. Likewise, under the rules of contract, signers were expected to know what they were signing and were bound by it. Although in principle literacy is a foundation of American democracy, it is in practice a troublesome source of inequity and disequilibrium in the administration of justice. Knowing how to read enhances political and economic rights, whereas not knowing how to read diminishes them. In relationship to illiterates, literates enjoy more autonomy and prerogative; in a practical sense, their liberties are worth more. What happens to fairness and equality under the law under such conditions? Stevens explored the crises for individuals and public institutions in a society where justice depends so heavily on the printed word. Drawing on case law, Stevens showed how, at times, U.S. courts tried to protect illiterates from political exclusion and economic exploitation. However, the rights of illiterates gradually lost out to what Stevens called the “ideal of the contract” in American thought – a belief in the unfettered right to pursue private interests by engaging freely in mutual exchanges and obligations.