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21 - Counterfactual Thought, Regret, and Superstition: How to Avoid Kicking Yourself

from PART ONE - THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL EXTENSIONS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Dale T. Miller
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology Princeton University
Brian R. Taylor
Affiliation:
Albert Einstein College of Medicine
Thomas Gilovich
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Dale Griffin
Affiliation:
Stanford University, California
Daniel Kahneman
Affiliation:
Princeton University, New Jersey
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Summary

Some years ago, a charismatic 19-year-old Spanish matador nicknamed “Yiyo” was gored to death. Yiyo's death evoked considerable public anguish and debate (Schumacher, 1985). Making his fans' reaction especially intense was the circumstance of his death: He was killed while serving as a last-minute substitute for another matador. Students of counterfactual thinking can be forgiven sly smiles and knowing nods as they read this story, for it contains all the elements necessary to provide a dramatic test of the oft-cited hypothesis that events preceded by exceptional actions, such as substituting for another matador, are more easily imagined otherwise and generate more affect than events preceded by routine actions. A simple test of this hypothesis, first proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1982b), would contrast the highly “mutable” fate of poor Yiyo with the less mutable fate of some other unfortunate “Yiyo” who had been killed by a bull he had long been scheduled to face. The two versions of the event could be presented to participants in scenario format and their reactions probed through a list of questions that might include the following: Did you have any “if only” thoughts when reading of Yiyo's death? How intense was your affective reaction to Yiyo's death? What degree of regret do you think Yiyo would have experienced if he had suffered only serious injuries rather than death?

Type
Chapter
Information
Heuristics and Biases
The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
, pp. 367 - 378
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2002

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