In this last chapter I shall attempt a very brief assessment of the Bohr–Einstein debate. Who won it in the view of the audience? Who actually had the better case? I will also ask two rather more specific questions. The first is ‘Have the contributions of John Bell favoured the position of either of the protagonists?’ The second is ‘Has the dramatic arrival and progress of quantum information theory anything to tell us about the Bohr–Einstein debate?’

To help to answer these questions, let me first re-assemble a few points, putting together in turn an argument for each of the protagonists against a rather hostile critic. First Bohr, and I take as his critic John Bell himself. Bell was prepared, in fact, to give Bohr great credit for what Bell called the pragmatic approach to quantum theory, which I discussed earlier. This approach says that the world must be divided into ‘classical’ and ‘quantum’ parts, with an arbitrarily placed cut between them; that the macroscopic measuring device must be described in classical terms, but that we should not expect to picture the ‘quantum’ system in physical terms, and should be content just to possess rules of calculation that work well. But Bell regarded Bohr's philosophy of what lay behind pragmatism, complementarity, as ill-defined, unsatisfactory and bizarre.