APPEARANCE AND REALITY

It is generally possible to distinguish between the appearance of an empirical phenomenon and the corresponding reality. Moreover, generally speaking, the appearance of an empirical phenomenon is ontologically and nomologically independent of the corresponding reality: it is possible for the phenomenon to exist without its appearing to anyone that it exists, and it is possible for it to appear to exist without its actually existing. It is remarkable, therefore, that our thought and talk about bodily sensations presupposes that the appearance of a bodily sensation is linked indissolubly to the sensation itself. This is true, in particular, of our thought and talk about pain. Thus, we presuppose that the following principles are valid:

1. (A) If x is in pain, then it seems to x that x is in pain, in the sense that x has an experiential ground for judging that x is in pain.

2. (B) If it seems to x that x is in pain, in the sense that x has an experiential ground for judging that x is in pain, then x really is in pain.

There are alternative ways of expressing these principles. For example, (A) can be expressed by saying that it is impossible for x to be in pain without x's being experientially aware that x is in pain, and (B) can be expressed by saying that it is impossible for x to have an experience of the sort that x has when x is aware of a pain without its being the case that x really is aware of a pain.