In this chapter I will have three main concerns. First, I will propose a principle about awareness that takes it to be essentially representational in character. Second, I will take the first steps toward making a case for this principle. Later chapters will complete the case by showing that the theory is epistemologically and metaphysically fruitful. Finally, I will introduce and attempt to explain a form of awareness that I call purely experiential awareness. It stands opposed to all forms of awareness that involve conceptualization, and a fortiori, to all forms that involve judgment. It will play a large role in later chapters.

THE NATURE OF AWARENESS

Whatever else may be true of awareness, it is clear to all of us that it is a cognitive relation. It is also reasonably clear that it can link agents to entities of four types – objects, properties, events, and facts. Thus, it is perfectly natural, and also perfectly appropriate, to say that Jones is aware of the table in front of him, that he is aware of the pattern of the oriental carpet he is standing on, that he is aware of the double play that is currently in progress, and that he is aware of the fact that the refrigerator is empty. Unfortunately, beyond these easy, rather superficial observations, the nature of awareness is highly controversial. It is not at all clear what it consists in.