We saw in the previous chapter that Rawls's theory of justice presupposes the existence of a state, with the legal apparatus to implement and enforce just terms of social cooperation. In this respect, Rawls's theory differs from the older social-contract theories expounded by Hobbes and Locke. Whereas the latter deployed contractualist arguments to justify the state itself, Rawls takes the state for granted and deploys them instead to specify and defend criteria of social justice that should ideally guide, and be integrated into, its daily operation. But this seems to skip a step, for one might question whether the authority claimed by states is legitimate in the first place. Is it?

The challenge of authority

So far we have mainly focused on political ideals like justice and the common good, but inquiring into the legitimacy of political authority raises a different sort of question. Authority is not an ideal but an existing social practice, one that we confront rather directly on a daily basis, when courts order us to pay a fine, when police officers pull us over, or when tax authorities command us to cough up. Does the state really have a right to our compliance with these expectations, and, if so, how far does it extend and how much weight does it carry?

Reflection on these questions is most likely to be prompted by cases in which states order us to do something of which we disapprove, or which seems wrong.