Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-zzh7m Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-27T16:56:57.579Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

13 - The Volcker Disinflation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 May 2010

Robert L. Hetzel
Affiliation:
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
Get access

Summary

The appointment of Paul Volcker as chairman of the Board of Governors on August 6, 1979, changed the policymaking environment of the Fed. Burns and Miller had taken the Fed on a detour away from Martin's belief that the Fed was responsible for inflation. Volcker made low inflation the objective of policy. Consistent with his early background in financial markets at the New York Fed and with his oversight of the Bretton Woods system at the treasury, Volcker focused on expectations. Moreover, he acted on the belief that credible monetary policy could shape those expectations.

With that belief, Volcker challenged Keynesian orthodoxy, which held that the “high” unemployment of the 1970s demonstrated that inflation arose from cost-push and supply shocks. Expectations in the form of a wage–price spiral propagated that inflation. Because of the nonmonetary origin and built-in propagation of inflation, an attempt to control it through monetary policy without incomes policies would create unacceptably high levels of unemployment. The rational expectations revolution became so only with the demonstrated success of the Volcker disinflation. The 1979 Joint Economic Report (U.S. Cong. March 22, 1979, 45) expressed the prevailing view:

Inflation … cannot be dealt with … through demand restriction alone without exacting intolerable costs in terms of lost output and high unemployment. … Clearly, demand restriction does not address supply-related inflation triggered by rising energy and food costs, increases in government regulation, substandard productivity gains, and a declining international value of the dollar – which is propelled onward by subsequent spirals of wages and prices attempting to keep up with each other.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2008

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×