Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Preface
- 1 The Pragmatic Evolution of the Monetary Standard
- 2 Learning and Policy Ambiguity
- 3 From Gold to Fiat Money
- 4 From World War II to the Accord
- 5 Martin and Lean-against-the-Wind
- 6 Inflation Is a Nonmonetary Phenomenon
- 7 The Start of the Great Inflation
- 8 Arthur Burns and Richard Nixon
- 9 Bretton Woods
- 10 Policy in the Ford Administration
- 11 Carter, Burns, and Miller
- 12 The Political Economy of Inflation
- 13 The Volcker Disinflation
- 14 Monetary Policy after the Disinflation
- 15 Greenspan's Move to Price Stability
- 16 International Bailouts and Moral Hazard
- 17 Monetary Policy Becomes Expansionary
- 18 Departing from the Standard Procedures
- 19 Boom and Bust: 1997 to 2001
- 20 Backing Off from Price Stability
- 21 The Volcker–Greenspan Regime
- 22 The Fed: Inflation Fighter or Inflation Creator?
- 23 The Stop–Go Laboratory
- 24 Stop–Go and Interest Rate Inertia
- 25 Monetary Nonneutrality in the Stop–Go Era
- 26 A Century of Monetary Experiments
- Appendix: Data Seen by FOMC for the Stop–Go Period Shown in Figures 24.1, 24.2, and 24.3
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
- Titles in the series
12 - The Political Economy of Inflation
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 May 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Preface
- 1 The Pragmatic Evolution of the Monetary Standard
- 2 Learning and Policy Ambiguity
- 3 From Gold to Fiat Money
- 4 From World War II to the Accord
- 5 Martin and Lean-against-the-Wind
- 6 Inflation Is a Nonmonetary Phenomenon
- 7 The Start of the Great Inflation
- 8 Arthur Burns and Richard Nixon
- 9 Bretton Woods
- 10 Policy in the Ford Administration
- 11 Carter, Burns, and Miller
- 12 The Political Economy of Inflation
- 13 The Volcker Disinflation
- 14 Monetary Policy after the Disinflation
- 15 Greenspan's Move to Price Stability
- 16 International Bailouts and Moral Hazard
- 17 Monetary Policy Becomes Expansionary
- 18 Departing from the Standard Procedures
- 19 Boom and Bust: 1997 to 2001
- 20 Backing Off from Price Stability
- 21 The Volcker–Greenspan Regime
- 22 The Fed: Inflation Fighter or Inflation Creator?
- 23 The Stop–Go Laboratory
- 24 Stop–Go and Interest Rate Inertia
- 25 Monetary Nonneutrality in the Stop–Go Era
- 26 A Century of Monetary Experiments
- Appendix: Data Seen by FOMC for the Stop–Go Period Shown in Figures 24.1, 24.2, and 24.3
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
- Titles in the series
Summary
Macroeconomic miscalculations by policymakers cannot alone account for the decade and a half of high inflation following 1965. The desire of the political system to use inflation as a tax was a major factor. Friedman (1975, 149) explained: “From time immemorial, the major source of inflation has been the sovereign's attempt to acquire resources. … Inflation has been irresistibly attractive to sovereigns because it is a hidden tax that at first appears painless or even pleasant, and above all because it is a tax that can be imposed without specific legislation. It is truly taxation without representation.”
The political environment within which the Fed operated changed radically after the November 3, 1964, election. The election provided the mandate and the congressional votes to undertake a broad expansion of income redistribution programs. In the election, Democrats had campaigned for a national medical care program (Medicare) and a strong Social Security program. Republicans had campaigned for Social Security coverage limited to the needy elderly and financed out of general revenues. The elections gave the Democrats a 295–140 majority in the House and a net increase of 42 northern Democrats. The conservative coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats that had blocked social legislation crumbled. In 1965, the Vietnam War defense buildup began. The political system demanded a rapidly growing economy that would generate continuous increases in revenue. For the Fed, that concern translated into pressure for “low” interest rates.
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- Information
- The Monetary Policy of the Federal ReserveA History, pp. 132 - 149Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2008