John finnis has produced an elegant and closely argued case against euthanasia. The argument is complex and I would like to take issue with almost all of it, although I think that very often the differences between us are not so great as may at first appear. Of necessity I will have to confine myself to one or two key points.

The case against euthanasia, as Finnis presents it, rests upon three foundations. They are his account of the moral importance of intention, his account of personhood and the distinction he makes between two types of killing. We will accordingly look at these in turn, taking note of some tangential issues along the way.

Before doing so, however, it is good to be able to start with a point of agreement. We both agree that ‘there is no morally relevant distinction between employing deliberate omissions … in order to terminate life (“passive euthanasia”) and employing “a deliberate intervention” for the same purpose (“active euthanasia”)’. We disagree, however, as will be obvious, as to what precisely counts as ‘employing’ either acts or omissions to a particular end.

THE MORAL IMPORTANCE OF INTENTION

Few would deny that we are morally responsible for the acts that we intend. The crucial issue is whether we are also and equally responsible for things we, voluntarily, bring about, for the things that are the consequences of our free choices.