1980. Essays on Actions and Events. New York: Clarendon Press. Second edition published in 2001. The second edition adds two appendices, “Adverbs of Actions” and “Reply to Quine on Events.”

1984. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. New York: Clarendon Press. Second edition published in 2001. The second edition adds an appendix, “Replies to Lewis and Quine,” to Chapter 10, “Belief and the Basis of Meaning.”

2001. Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. New York: Clarendon Press

Forthcoming. Volume 4, Problems of Rationality. New York: Clarendon Press

Forthcoming. Volume 5, Truth, Language and History. New York: Clarendon Press

1952. Why Study Philosophy?View Point, 2, 22–4

1955. Outline of a Formal Theory of Value. Philosophy of Science, 22, 140–60. (With J. J. C. McKinsey and Patrick Suppes.)CrossRef

1955. The Return of Reason in Ethics. In T. Kimura (Ed.), Analysis of the American Way of Thinking. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press. (In Japanese.)

1956. A Finitistic Axiomatization of Subjective Probability and Utility. Econometrica, 24, 264–75. (With Patrick Suppes.)CrossRef

1959. Experimental Tests of a Stochastic Decision Theory. In C. W. Churchman and P. Ratoosh (Eds.), Measurement: Definitions and Theories (pp. 233–69). New York: Wiley and Sons. (With J. Marschak.)

1963. 1Actions, Reasons, and Causes. The Journal of Philosophy, 60, 685–99CrossRef

1963. The Method of Intension and Extension. In A. Schilpp (Ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (pp. 311–49). La Salle, Ill.: Open Court

1966. 1Emeroses by Other Names. The Journal of Philosophy, 63, 778–9CrossRef

1966.2 Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages. In Y. Bar-Hillel (Ed.), Proceedings of the 1964 International Congress for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (pp. 383–94). Amsterdam: North Holland

1967. 1Causal Relations. The Journal of Philosophy, 64, 691–703CrossRef

1967.1 The Logical Form of Action Sentences. In N. Rescher (Ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action (pp. 81–95). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press

1967. 2Truth and Meaning. Synthese, 17, 304–23CrossRef

1968. 2On Saying That. Synthese, 19, 130–46CrossRef

1969. Facts and Events. In J. Margolis (Ed.), Fact and Existence (pp. 74–84). Oxford: Blackwell

1969.1 The Individuation of Events. In N. Rescher (Ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel (pp. 216–34). Dordrecht: D. Reidel

1969. 2True to the Facts. The Journal of Philosophy, 66, 748–64CrossRef

1970. Action and Reaction. Inquiry, 13, 140–8CrossRef

1970. 1Events as Particulars. Nous, 4, 25–32CrossRef

1970.1 How Is Weakness of the Will Possible? In J. Feinberg (Ed.), Moral Concepts (pp. 93–113). Oxford: Oxford University Press

1970.1 Mental Events. In L. Foster and J. Swanson (Eds.), Experience and Theory (pp. 79–102). Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press

1970.2 Semantics for Natural Languages. In Linguaggi nella Societa e nella Tecnica. Milan: Comunita

1971.1 Agency. In R. Binkley, R. Bronaugh, and A. Marras (Eds.), Agent, Action, and Reason (pp. 3–37). Toronto: University of Toronto Press

1971. 1Eternal vs. Ephemeral Events. Nous, 5, 335–49CrossRef

1973.1 Freedom to Act. In T. Honderich (Ed.), Essays On Freedom of Action (pp. 137–56). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul

1973.2 In Defence of Convention T. In H. Leblanc (Ed.), Truth, Syntax and Modality (pp. 76–86). Dordretch: North-Holland

1973.1 The Material Mind. Paper presented at the Fourth International Congress for Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Dordrecht, Holland

1973. 2Radical Interpretation. Dialectica, 27, 314–28

1974. 2Belief and the Basis of Meaning. Synthese, 27, 309–23CrossRef

1974. 2On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 47, 5–20

1974.1 Psychology as Philosophy. In S. C. Brown (Ed.), Philosophy of Psychology (pp. 41–52). London: Macmillan

1974. 2Replies to David Lewis and W. V. Quine. Synthese, 27, 345–9CrossRef

1975.2 Thought and Talk. In S. Guttenplan (Ed.), Mind and Language (pp. 7–23). Oxford: Oxford University Press

1976. 1Hempel on Explaining Action. Erkenntnis, 10, 239–53

1976. 1Hume's Cognitive Theory of Pride. The Journal of Philosophy, 73, 744–56CrossRef

1976.2 Reply to Foster. In G. Evans and J. McDowell (Eds.), Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics (pp. 33–41). Oxford: Oxford University Press

1977. 2The Method of Truth in Metaphysics. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 2, 244–54CrossRef

1977. 2Reality without Reference. Dialectica, 31, 247–53CrossRef

1978.1 Intending. In Y. Yovel (Ed.), Philosophy of History and Action (pp. 41–60). Dordretch: D. Reidel and The Magnes Press

1978. 2What Metaphors Mean. Critical Inquiry, 5, 31–47CrossRef

1979. 2The Inscrutability of Reference. The Southwest Journal of Philosophy, 10, 7–20CrossRef

1979.2 Moods and Performances. In A. Margalit (Ed.), Meaning and Use (pp. 9–20). Dordrecht: D. Reidel

1979. 2Quotation. Theory and Decision, 11, 27–40CrossRef

1980.1 Comments and Replies. In Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 239–44). New York: Clarendon Press

1980. 5Toward a Unified Theory of Meaning and Action. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 11, 1–12CrossRef

1982. 3Empirical Content. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 17, 471–89

1982.4 Paradoxes of Irrationality. In R. Wollheim et al. (Eds.), Philosophical Essays on Freud (pp. 289–305). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

1982. 3Rational Animals. Dialectica, 36, 317–28CrossRef

1983.3 A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge. In D. Henrich (Ed.), Kant oder Hegel? (pp. 423–38). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta

1983. 2Communication and Convention. The Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1, 13–25. Published in 1984 in Synthese, 59, 3–18

1984.4Expressing Evaluations. Lawrence, Kan.: Lindley

1984. 3First Person Authority. Dialectica, 38, 101–12CrossRef

1985.1 Adverbs of Action. In B. Vermazen (Ed.), Essays on Davidson (pp. 230–41). Oxford: Clarendon Press

1985.4 Deception and Division. In E. Lepore (Ed.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (pp. 138–48). Oxford: Blackwell. Also published in 1986 in J. Elster (Ed.), The Multiple Self (pp. 79–92). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

1985. 4Incoherence and Irrationality. Dialectica, 39, 345–54

1985. A New Basis for Decision Theory. Theory and Decision, 18, 87–98CrossRef

1985.1 Reply to Quine on Events. In E. Lepore (Ed.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (pp. 172–6). Oxford: Blackwell

1986.4 Judging Interpersonal Interests. In J. Elster and A. Hylland (Eds.), Foundations of Social Choice Theory (pp. 195–211). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

1986.5 A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs. In E. Lepore (Ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell. Also published in 1986 in R. E. Grandy (Ed.), Philosophical Grounds of Rationality (pp. 157–74). Oxford: Oxford University Press

1987.3 Afterthoughts, 1987. In A. Malichowski (Ed.), Reading Rorty (pp. 120–38). Cambridge: Blackwell

1987. 3Knowing One's Own Mind. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 60(3), 441–58CrossRef

1987.4 Problems in the Explanation of Action. In P. Pettit (Ed.), Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J. J. C. Smart (pp. 35–49). New York: Blackwell

1988.3 Epistemology and Truth. Proceedings of the Fourth Panamerican Philosophy Conference, Cordoba, Argentina

1988. Reply to Burge. The Journal of Philosophy, 85, 664–5CrossRef

1989. The Conditions of Thought. In J. Brandl and W. L. Gombocz (Eds.), The Mind of Donald Davidson (pp. 193–200). Amsterdam: Rodopi

1989.3 The Myth of the Subjective. In M. Krausz (Ed.), Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation (pp. 159–72). Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press

1989.3 What Is Present to the Mind? In J. Brandl and W. Gombocz (Eds.), The Mind of Donald Davidson (pp. 3–18). Amsterdam: Rodopi

1990.5 Meaning, Truth and Evidence. In R. Barret and R. F. Gibson (Eds.), Perspectives on Quine (pp. 68–79). Cambridge: Blackwell

1990.4 Representation and Interpretation. In W. H. Newton-Smith and K. V. Wilkes (Eds.), Modelling the Mind (pp. 12–26). Oxford: Oxford University Press

1990. The Structure and Content of Truth. The Journal of Philosophy, 87(6), 279–328CrossRef

1990.4 Turing's Test. In W. H. Newton-Smith and K. V. Wilkes (Eds.), Modelling the Mind (pp. 1–11). Oxford: Oxford University Press

1991. 3Epistemology Externalized. Dialectica, 45(2–3), 191–202CrossRef

1991. 5James Joyce and Humpty Dumpty. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 16, 1–12CrossRef

1991.3 Three Varieties of Knowledge. Philosophy, 30(supp.), 153–66. Also published in 1991 in A. P. Griffiths (Ed.), A. J. Ayer: Memorial Essays (pp. 153–66). New York: Cambridge University Press

1991.3 What Is Present to the Mind. In E. Villanueva (Ed.), Consciousness (Vol. 6) (pp. 97–214). Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview

1992. 3The Second Person. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 17, 255–67CrossRef

1992.5 The Socratic Conception of Truth. In K. J. Boudouris (Ed.), The Philosophy of Socrates: Elenchus, Ethics and Truth (pp. 51–8). Athens: International Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture

1993.5 Locating Literary Language. In R. W. Dasenbrock (Ed.), Literary Theory after Davidson (pp. 295–308). University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press

1993. 5Method and Metaphysics. Deucalion, 11, 239–48

1993.5 Plato's Philosopher. In R. W. Sharples (Ed.), Modern Thinkers and Ancient Thinkers (pp. 1–15). Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. Also published in 1993 in Apeiron, 26(3–4), 179–94

1993. Reply to Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore's ‘Is Radical Interpretation Possible?’ In R. Stoecker (Ed.), Reflecting Davidson (pp. 77–84). New York: de Gruyter

1993. Thinking Causes. In J. Heil and A. Mele (Eds.), Mental Causation (pp. 3–17). New York: Clarendon Press

1993. 5The Third Man. Critical Inquiry, 19(4), 607–16CrossRef

1994.5 Dialectic and Dialogue. In G. Preyer (Ed.), Language, Mind, and Epistemology: On Donald Davidson's Philosophy (pp. 429–37). Dordrecht: Kluwer

1994. Donald Davidson. In S. Guttenplan (Ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (pp. 231–6). Oxford: Blackwell

1994. Exchange between Donald Davidson and W. V. Quine following Davidson's Lecture. Theoria, 60(3), 226–31

1994. On Quine's Philosophy. Theoria, 60(3), 184–92

1994. Radical Interpretation Interpreted. In J. Tomberlin (Ed.), Philosophical Perspectives: Logic and Language (Vol. 8) (pp. 121–28). Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview

1994.5 The Social Aspect of Language. In B. McGuinness (Ed.), The Philosophy of Michael Dummett (pp. 1–16). Dordrecht: Kluwer

1994. 5What Is Quine's View of Truth?Inquiry, 37(4), 437–40CrossRef

1995. 4Could There Be a Science of Rationality?International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 3(1), 1–16CrossRef

1995. Laws and Cause. Dialectica, 49(2–4), 263–79

1995.4 The Objectivity of Values. In C. Gutiérrez (Ed.), El Trabajo Filosófico de Hoy en el Continente (pp. 59–69). Bogatá: Editorial ABC

1995. 4The Problem of Objectivity. Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 57(2), 203–20

1995.5 Pursuit of the Concept of Truth. In P. Leonardi and M. Santambrogio (Eds.), On Quine: New Essays (pp. 7–21). New York: Cambridge University Press

1996. 5The Folly of Trying to Define Truth. The Journal of Philosophy, 93, 263–78CrossRef

1996.3 Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. In P. Coates and D. Ituito (Eds.), Current Issues in Idealism (pp. 155–76). Bristol: Thoemmes

1997. The Centrality of Truth. In J. Peregrin (Ed.), The Nature of Truth: Proceedings of the International Colloquium (pp. 3–14). Prague: Filosofia

1997.5 Gadamer and Plato's Philebus. In L. Hahn (Ed.), The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer (pp. 421–32). Chicago: Open Court

1997.3 Indeterminism and Antirealism. In C. B. Kulp (Ed.), Realism/Antirealism and Epistemology (pp. 109–22). Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield

1997.5 Seeing through Language. In J. Preston (Ed.), Thought and Language (pp. 15–28). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

1997.4 Who Is Fooled? In J.-P. Dupuy (Ed.), Self-Deception and Paradoxes of Rationality (pp. 1–18). Stanford: CSLI Publications

1998.3 The Irreducibility of the Concept of the Self. In M. Stamm (Ed.), Philosophie in Synthetisher Absicht (pp. 123–30). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta

1998.5 Replies. Crítica, 30, 97–112. Replies to articles by Barry Stroud, John McDowell, Richard Rorty, and Carlos Pereda in Crítica, 28 (1998)

1999. 3The Emergence of Thought. Erkenntnis, 51(1), 7–17

1999. Intellectual Autobiography. In L. E. Hahn (Ed.), The Philosophy of Donald Davidson (pp. 3–70). Chicago: Open Court

1999. Interpretation: Hard in Theory, Easy in Practice. In M. D. Caro (Ed.), Interpretations and Causes: New Perspectives on Donald Davidson's Philosophy (pp. 31–44). Dordrecht: Kluwer

1999. Spinoza's Causal Theory of the Affects. In Y. Yovel (Ed.), Desire and Affect: Spinoza as Psychologist (pp. 95–112). New York: Little Room Press

1999. Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry? Discussion with Rorty. In U. M. Zeglen (Ed.), Donald Davidson: Truth, Meaning and Knowledge (pp. 17–19). London: Routledge

2000.4 Objectivity and Practical Reason. In E. Ullmann-Margalit (Ed.), Reasoning Practically (pp. 17–26). Oxford: Oxford University Press

2000. Perils and Pleasures of Interpretation. Ars Interpretandi, 5, 21–37

2000.5 Truth Rehabilitated. In R. B. Brandom (Ed.), Rorty and His Critics (pp. 65–74). Cambridge: Blackwell

2001. Externalisms. In P. Kotatko, P. Pagin, and G. Segal (Eds.), Interpreting Davidson (pp. 1–16). Stanford: CSLI Publications

1957. Decision Making: An Experimental Approach. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. (With Patrick Suppes.)

1990. Plato's Philebus. New York: Garland. (1949 Harvard dissertation.)

1969. Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine. Dordrecht: Reidel. (With Jaakko Hintikka.) Rev. ed. 1975. (With Jaakko Hintikka and W. V. Quine.)

1970. Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. (With Carl Hempel and Nicholas Rescher.)

1972. Semantics of Natural Language. Boston: D. Reidel. (With Gilbert Harman.) A second edition was published in 1977 with additional essays by Saul Kripke and others

1975. The Logic of Grammar. Encino, Calif.: Dickenson. (With Gilbert Harman.)

1997. In Conversation: Donald Davidson (19 videocassettes, 1460 min.). Introduced and edited by R. Fara. London: Philosophy International Centre for Philosophy of the Natural and Social Sciences, London School of Economics

1980. Essays on Actions and Events. New York: Clarendon Press. Second edition published in 2001. The second edition adds two appendices, “Adverbs of Actions” and “Reply to Quine on Events.”

1984. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. New York: Clarendon Press. Second edition published in 2001. The second edition adds an appendix, “Replies to Lewis and Quine,” to Chapter 10, “Belief and the Basis of Meaning.”

2001. Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. New York: Clarendon Press

Forthcoming. Volume 4, Problems of Rationality. New York: Clarendon Press

Forthcoming. Volume 5, Truth, Language and History. New York: Clarendon Press

1952. Why Study Philosophy?View Point, 2, 22–4

1955. Outline of a Formal Theory of Value. Philosophy of Science, 22, 140–60. (With J. J. C. McKinsey and Patrick Suppes.)CrossRef

1955. The Return of Reason in Ethics. In T. Kimura (Ed.), Analysis of the American Way of Thinking. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press. (In Japanese.)

1956. A Finitistic Axiomatization of Subjective Probability and Utility. Econometrica, 24, 264–75. (With Patrick Suppes.)CrossRef

1959. Experimental Tests of a Stochastic Decision Theory. In C. W. Churchman and P. Ratoosh (Eds.), Measurement: Definitions and Theories (pp. 233–69). New York: Wiley and Sons. (With J. Marschak.)

1963. 1Actions, Reasons, and Causes. The Journal of Philosophy, 60, 685–99CrossRef

1963. The Method of Intension and Extension. In A. Schilpp (Ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (pp. 311–49). La Salle, Ill.: Open Court

1966. 1Emeroses by Other Names. The Journal of Philosophy, 63, 778–9CrossRef

1966.2 Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages. In Y. Bar-Hillel (Ed.), Proceedings of the 1964 International Congress for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (pp. 383–94). Amsterdam: North Holland

1967. 1Causal Relations. The Journal of Philosophy, 64, 691–703CrossRef

1967.1 The Logical Form of Action Sentences. In N. Rescher (Ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action (pp. 81–95). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press

1967. 2Truth and Meaning. Synthese, 17, 304–23CrossRef

1968. 2On Saying That. Synthese, 19, 130–46CrossRef

1969. Facts and Events. In J. Margolis (Ed.), Fact and Existence (pp. 74–84). Oxford: Blackwell

1969.1 The Individuation of Events. In N. Rescher (Ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel (pp. 216–34). Dordrecht: D. Reidel

1969. 2True to the Facts. The Journal of Philosophy, 66, 748–64CrossRef

1970. Action and Reaction. Inquiry, 13, 140–8CrossRef

1970. 1Events as Particulars. Nous, 4, 25–32CrossRef

1970.1 How Is Weakness of the Will Possible? In J. Feinberg (Ed.), Moral Concepts (pp. 93–113). Oxford: Oxford University Press

1970.1 Mental Events. In L. Foster and J. Swanson (Eds.), Experience and Theory (pp. 79–102). Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press

1970.2 Semantics for Natural Languages. In Linguaggi nella Societa e nella Tecnica. Milan: Comunita

1971.1 Agency. In R. Binkley, R. Bronaugh, and A. Marras (Eds.), Agent, Action, and Reason (pp. 3–37). Toronto: University of Toronto Press

1971. 1Eternal vs. Ephemeral Events. Nous, 5, 335–49CrossRef

1973.1 Freedom to Act. In T. Honderich (Ed.), Essays On Freedom of Action (pp. 137–56). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul

1973.2 In Defence of Convention T. In H. Leblanc (Ed.), Truth, Syntax and Modality (pp. 76–86). Dordretch: North-Holland

1973.1 The Material Mind. Paper presented at the Fourth International Congress for Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Dordrecht, Holland

1973. 2Radical Interpretation. Dialectica, 27, 314–28

1974. 2Belief and the Basis of Meaning. Synthese, 27, 309–23CrossRef

1974. 2On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 47, 5–20

1974.1 Psychology as Philosophy. In S. C. Brown (Ed.), Philosophy of Psychology (pp. 41–52). London: Macmillan

1974. 2Replies to David Lewis and W. V. Quine. Synthese, 27, 345–9CrossRef

1975.2 Thought and Talk. In S. Guttenplan (Ed.), Mind and Language (pp. 7–23). Oxford: Oxford University Press

1976. 1Hempel on Explaining Action. Erkenntnis, 10, 239–53

1976. 1Hume's Cognitive Theory of Pride. The Journal of Philosophy, 73, 744–56CrossRef

1976.2 Reply to Foster. In G. Evans and J. McDowell (Eds.), Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics (pp. 33–41). Oxford: Oxford University Press

1977. 2The Method of Truth in Metaphysics. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 2, 244–54CrossRef

1977. 2Reality without Reference. Dialectica, 31, 247–53CrossRef

1978.1 Intending. In Y. Yovel (Ed.), Philosophy of History and Action (pp. 41–60). Dordretch: D. Reidel and The Magnes Press

1978. 2What Metaphors Mean. Critical Inquiry, 5, 31–47CrossRef

1979. 2The Inscrutability of Reference. The Southwest Journal of Philosophy, 10, 7–20CrossRef

1979.2 Moods and Performances. In A. Margalit (Ed.), Meaning and Use (pp. 9–20). Dordrecht: D. Reidel

1979. 2Quotation. Theory and Decision, 11, 27–40CrossRef

1980.1 Comments and Replies. In Essays on Actions and Events (pp. 239–44). New York: Clarendon Press

1980. 5Toward a Unified Theory of Meaning and Action. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 11, 1–12CrossRef

1982. 3Empirical Content. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 17, 471–89

1982.4 Paradoxes of Irrationality. In R. Wollheim et al. (Eds.), Philosophical Essays on Freud (pp. 289–305). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

1982. 3Rational Animals. Dialectica, 36, 317–28CrossRef

1983.3 A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge. In D. Henrich (Ed.), Kant oder Hegel? (pp. 423–38). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta

1983. 2Communication and Convention. The Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1, 13–25. Published in 1984 in Synthese, 59, 3–18

1984.4Expressing Evaluations. Lawrence, Kan.: Lindley

1984. 3First Person Authority. Dialectica, 38, 101–12CrossRef

1985.1 Adverbs of Action. In B. Vermazen (Ed.), Essays on Davidson (pp. 230–41). Oxford: Clarendon Press

1985.4 Deception and Division. In E. Lepore (Ed.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (pp. 138–48). Oxford: Blackwell. Also published in 1986 in J. Elster (Ed.), The Multiple Self (pp. 79–92). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

1985. 4Incoherence and Irrationality. Dialectica, 39, 345–54

1985. A New Basis for Decision Theory. Theory and Decision, 18, 87–98CrossRef

1985.1 Reply to Quine on Events. In E. Lepore (Ed.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (pp. 172–6). Oxford: Blackwell

1986.4 Judging Interpersonal Interests. In J. Elster and A. Hylland (Eds.), Foundations of Social Choice Theory (pp. 195–211). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

1986.5 A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs. In E. Lepore (Ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell. Also published in 1986 in R. E. Grandy (Ed.), Philosophical Grounds of Rationality (pp. 157–74). Oxford: Oxford University Press

1987.3 Afterthoughts, 1987. In A. Malichowski (Ed.), Reading Rorty (pp. 120–38). Cambridge: Blackwell

1987. 3Knowing One's Own Mind. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 60(3), 441–58CrossRef

1987.4 Problems in the Explanation of Action. In P. Pettit (Ed.), Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J. J. C. Smart (pp. 35–49). New York: Blackwell

1988.3 Epistemology and Truth. Proceedings of the Fourth Panamerican Philosophy Conference, Cordoba, Argentina

1988. Reply to Burge. The Journal of Philosophy, 85, 664–5CrossRef

1989. The Conditions of Thought. In J. Brandl and W. L. Gombocz (Eds.), The Mind of Donald Davidson (pp. 193–200). Amsterdam: Rodopi

1989.3 The Myth of the Subjective. In M. Krausz (Ed.), Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation (pp. 159–72). Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press

1989.3 What Is Present to the Mind? In J. Brandl and W. Gombocz (Eds.), The Mind of Donald Davidson (pp. 3–18). Amsterdam: Rodopi

1990.5 Meaning, Truth and Evidence. In R. Barret and R. F. Gibson (Eds.), Perspectives on Quine (pp. 68–79). Cambridge: Blackwell

1990.4 Representation and Interpretation. In W. H. Newton-Smith and K. V. Wilkes (Eds.), Modelling the Mind (pp. 12–26). Oxford: Oxford University Press

1990. The Structure and Content of Truth. The Journal of Philosophy, 87(6), 279–328CrossRef

1990.4 Turing's Test. In W. H. Newton-Smith and K. V. Wilkes (Eds.), Modelling the Mind (pp. 1–11). Oxford: Oxford University Press

1991. 3Epistemology Externalized. Dialectica, 45(2–3), 191–202CrossRef

1991. 5James Joyce and Humpty Dumpty. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 16, 1–12CrossRef

1991.3 Three Varieties of Knowledge. Philosophy, 30(supp.), 153–66. Also published in 1991 in A. P. Griffiths (Ed.), A. J. Ayer: Memorial Essays (pp. 153–66). New York: Cambridge University Press

1991.3 What Is Present to the Mind. In E. Villanueva (Ed.), Consciousness (Vol. 6) (pp. 97–214). Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview

1992. 3The Second Person. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 17, 255–67CrossRef

1992.5 The Socratic Conception of Truth. In K. J. Boudouris (Ed.), The Philosophy of Socrates: Elenchus, Ethics and Truth (pp. 51–8). Athens: International Center for Greek Philosophy and Culture

1993.5 Locating Literary Language. In R. W. Dasenbrock (Ed.), Literary Theory after Davidson (pp. 295–308). University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press

1993. 5Method and Metaphysics. Deucalion, 11, 239–48

1993.5 Plato's Philosopher. In R. W. Sharples (Ed.), Modern Thinkers and Ancient Thinkers (pp. 1–15). Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. Also published in 1993 in Apeiron, 26(3–4), 179–94

1993. Reply to Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore's ‘Is Radical Interpretation Possible?’ In R. Stoecker (Ed.), Reflecting Davidson (pp. 77–84). New York: de Gruyter

1993. Thinking Causes. In J. Heil and A. Mele (Eds.), Mental Causation (pp. 3–17). New York: Clarendon Press

1993. 5The Third Man. Critical Inquiry, 19(4), 607–16CrossRef

1994.5 Dialectic and Dialogue. In G. Preyer (Ed.), Language, Mind, and Epistemology: On Donald Davidson's Philosophy (pp. 429–37). Dordrecht: Kluwer

1994. Donald Davidson. In S. Guttenplan (Ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (pp. 231–6). Oxford: Blackwell

1994. Exchange between Donald Davidson and W. V. Quine following Davidson's Lecture. Theoria, 60(3), 226–31

1994. On Quine's Philosophy. Theoria, 60(3), 184–92

1994. Radical Interpretation Interpreted. In J. Tomberlin (Ed.), Philosophical Perspectives: Logic and Language (Vol. 8) (pp. 121–28). Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview

1994.5 The Social Aspect of Language. In B. McGuinness (Ed.), The Philosophy of Michael Dummett (pp. 1–16). Dordrecht: Kluwer

1994. 5What Is Quine's View of Truth?Inquiry, 37(4), 437–40CrossRef

1995. 4Could There Be a Science of Rationality?International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 3(1), 1–16CrossRef

1995. Laws and Cause. Dialectica, 49(2–4), 263–79

1995.4 The Objectivity of Values. In C. Gutiérrez (Ed.), El Trabajo Filosófico de Hoy en el Continente (pp. 59–69). Bogatá: Editorial ABC

1995. 4The Problem of Objectivity. Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 57(2), 203–20

1995.5 Pursuit of the Concept of Truth. In P. Leonardi and M. Santambrogio (Eds.), On Quine: New Essays (pp. 7–21). New York: Cambridge University Press

1996. 5The Folly of Trying to Define Truth. The Journal of Philosophy, 93, 263–78CrossRef

1996.3 Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. In P. Coates and D. Ituito (Eds.), Current Issues in Idealism (pp. 155–76). Bristol: Thoemmes

1997. The Centrality of Truth. In J. Peregrin (Ed.), The Nature of Truth: Proceedings of the International Colloquium (pp. 3–14). Prague: Filosofia

1997.5 Gadamer and Plato's Philebus. In L. Hahn (Ed.), The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer (pp. 421–32). Chicago: Open Court

1997.3 Indeterminism and Antirealism. In C. B. Kulp (Ed.), Realism/Antirealism and Epistemology (pp. 109–22). Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield

1997.5 Seeing through Language. In J. Preston (Ed.), Thought and Language (pp. 15–28). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

1997.4 Who Is Fooled? In J.-P. Dupuy (Ed.), Self-Deception and Paradoxes of Rationality (pp. 1–18). Stanford: CSLI Publications

1998.3 The Irreducibility of the Concept of the Self. In M. Stamm (Ed.), Philosophie in Synthetisher Absicht (pp. 123–30). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta

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1999. Intellectual Autobiography. In L. E. Hahn (Ed.), The Philosophy of Donald Davidson (pp. 3–70). Chicago: Open Court

1999. Interpretation: Hard in Theory, Easy in Practice. In M. D. Caro (Ed.), Interpretations and Causes: New Perspectives on Donald Davidson's Philosophy (pp. 31–44). Dordrecht: Kluwer

1999. Spinoza's Causal Theory of the Affects. In Y. Yovel (Ed.), Desire and Affect: Spinoza as Psychologist (pp. 95–112). New York: Little Room Press

1999. Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry? Discussion with Rorty. In U. M. Zeglen (Ed.), Donald Davidson: Truth, Meaning and Knowledge (pp. 17–19). London: Routledge

2000.4 Objectivity and Practical Reason. In E. Ullmann-Margalit (Ed.), Reasoning Practically (pp. 17–26). Oxford: Oxford University Press

2000. Perils and Pleasures of Interpretation. Ars Interpretandi, 5, 21–37

2000.5 Truth Rehabilitated. In R. B. Brandom (Ed.), Rorty and His Critics (pp. 65–74). Cambridge: Blackwell

2001. Externalisms. In P. Kotatko, P. Pagin, and G. Segal (Eds.), Interpreting Davidson (pp. 1–16). Stanford: CSLI Publications

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