Why are arguments such as the rivet argument, the alleged tragedy of the commons, and the population explosion argument so compelling for so many, despite their faulty premises and, in the case of the rivet argument, faulty logic? At a superficial level, it is simply because many of us want to believe the most dire implication of their conclusions: that there is something radically wrong with our present relationship with the world around us, that is, in the widest sense, with our “environment.” For those who do not have to worry about food today and shelter tomorrow, this sometimes results in a long-term worry about the future. However, once we enter the context of philosophical analysis, our concern for the future deserves a deeper scrutiny. Is our worry appropriate? This will be an underlying, though often only implicit, concern of much of this book, particularly Chapters 3 and 4. Equally importantly, how and why does such a worry arise? This is the problem broached in this chapter, though no definitive answer will even be attempted. It will be suggested that two deeply influential myths, which impinge upon our conscious ideologies (broad sociopolitical normative frameworks for interpreting the world), modulate the nature of our concern for the environment.

The discussions of this chapter are not strictly necessary in order to follow the development of the main theme of this book as outlined in Chapter 1 (§ 1.2).