These are the profound words of Schellingin his master work: First Outline of a System of Philosophy of Nature. In them lies that ultimate problem which, instead of being solved, is so often merely put off for future work – that problem which, instead of finally resulting in an inalterable axiom, has been treated only in intermediate and provisional propositions. At the heart of [this problem] is the question of [4] the bond between natureand concept, between lawand freedom, between dead mechanismand living dynamism. We are able to divine the meaning of these words from the author's work, yet for us to grasp their fully significance, we lack the master's finishing touches.

Schellingexpresses the problemitself at the end of his conclusions on p. 254:

The author found himself driven to this problem after grasping the concept of nature in its highest universality and charting its descent through its essential stages – and it is at precisely the point where the author breaks off that the problem surfaces. All the conclusions of this acute work press towards the articulation of this problem – and so they must, [for] Schellingworks from an unconditioned empiricism. That is, there should be no question of the first movensof nature within [5] empiricism, for the philosopher of nature, as he encounters nature, finds it already posited in becoming, and he can do nothing more than develop the already-active principles of nature in their activity. Empiricism is therefore unconditioned only for the philosopher of nature – unconditioned, that is, only under the condition of excluding that principleof becomingimplied in Schelling's questions above, questions that can only be answered in transcendental philosophy.