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Appendix 2 - Principles of Nature-Metaphysics Applied to Chemical and Medical Subjects [Extracts]

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 October 2020

Benjamin Berger
Affiliation:
Kent State University
Daniel Whistler
Affiliation:
Royal Holloway, University of London
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Summary

On Chemistry

[1] After getting rid of the particular empirical determinations of external objects, there remains for us still the concept of matter in general. It is now to be asked how, by means of the analysis of this concept, there could be established a priori principles suitable for providing unity to the systematic treatment of natural science, such that all its parts converged in one idea, as it were.

Among the natural sciences it is pre-eminently chemistry that makes a claim to the principles that set out the metaphysics of nature for the doctrine of nature. [Chemistry] is the doctrine of the qualitative relations [Verhaltnisse] of matter and of the processes nature undergoes that alter [such relations]. [2] From this it is apparent that it will be the principles of dynamics above all to which chemistry devotes itself. Dynamics teaches us that the existence of matter can be thought only under the assumption of the concurrence of two original forces – these forces are the force of attraction and the force of repulsion. This is not the place to prove this premise; instead, what follows is merely a brief glance at its salient features:

All matter is an empirical filling of space within determinate limits. In this claim, there are two aspects at play: first, the cause of empirical filling; secondly, the cause of the determination of the limits of empirical filling. The first can only be grasped if we assume that matter fills its space by means of repulsive forces in all its parts, i.e. by means of its own force of extension. The second aspect, on the contrary, indicates [3] to us the assumption of an original force of attraction that attempts to limit the force of repulsion.

It needs to be remarked at this point that it is only from the metaphysician of nature's standpoint – which is to say, [from the standpoint] of proving the necessary assumption of these forces – that the duplicity of matter and forces, introduced so frequently into explanations of phenomena in natural science, can here be justified. Theoretical dualism in the natural sciences is actually postulated by dynamics, even though these origins are usually ignored.

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Chapter
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The Schelling-Eschenmayer Controversy, 1801
Nature and Identity
, pp. 199 - 204
Publisher: Edinburgh University Press
Print publication year: 2020

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