These three theories all say that there is more to matter than science reveals and that is this extra element that explains matter’s ability to produce consciousness. McGinn has argued that this extra element is something we are constitutionally unable to discover. I argue that if there were such a feature it would have to explain consciousness and have no other effects (otherwise it would be detectable). Thus such a feature might reasonably be assumed to be at least proto-phenomenal, which puts it in the same category as neutral monism. The main problem facing neutral monism is that it has no plausible account of how something qualitative (as the qualia of neutral monism are said to be) become phenomenal or conscious. The only way to overcome this problem is to go the whole hog and be a panpsychist. There are a variety of problems with panpsychism, but the two main ones are: (i) Is it really possible to make sense of the kind of consciousness that might belong to a quark? It is doubtful enough whether it makes sense for earthworms. (ii) There is good reason to think that there is cognitive phenomenology as well as sensory phenomenology. It is hard enough to imagine a quark with the sort of very dim feeling that might contribute to our rich perceptual experience, but what would the quark’s contribution to a thought about, for example, the ontological argument consist in?