Lewis and Nemirow both claim that what Mary initially lacks and gains on seeing colour is an ability. Their account of what this ability is – namely the ability to reactivate the original experience – fails to touch the central problem, which is to give an account of what it is like to see a colour: the ability to reactivate a state cannot be an explanation of what that state is. In fact Lewis believes that this – the nature of the quale – is something Mary already knows better than we do on the basis of her scientific knowledge. This claim detaches qualia from what experience is subjectively like in a totally counterintuitive if not actually incoherent manner. I also discuss Lewis’s attack on phenomenal information and argue that none of his arguments have any force. Stalnaker bases his phenomenal externalism on Lewis’s attack on phenomenal information, and I show how the failure of the latter undermines Stalnaker’s position. I argue that any form of analytic functionalism is a self-destructive theory, because it undermines the very concepts on which it is based. Finally, I criticize Kirk’s attempt to prove that a non-analytic form of functionalism is necessarily true. Kirk’s ground is that the denial of functionalism entails the possibility of epiphenomenalism and epiphenomenalism is incoherent. I argue that it is not incoherent, so its bare possibility is not a reductio.